This contribution derives from a rather extensive study on the foundations of probability. We start by discussing critically the two main models of the random event in Probability Theroy and cast light over a number of incongruities. We conclude that the argument of probability is the critical knot of the probability foundations and put forward the structure of levels for the partially determinate event. The structural model enables us to define the prabability and to attune its subjective and objective interpretations.
This contribution derives from a rather extensive study on the foundations of probability. We start by discussing critically the two main models of the random event in Probability Theroy and cast light over a number of incongruities. We conclude that the argument of probability is the critical knot of the probability foundations and put forward the structure of levels for the partially determinate event. The structural model enables us to define the prabability and to attune its subjective and objective interpretations.
The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.
The probability [Formula: see text] of the occurrence of an event pertaining to a physical system which is observed in different states [Formula: see text] determines a function [Formula: see text] from the set [Formula: see text] of states of the system to [Formula: see text]. Function [Formula: see text] is called a numerical event or more precisely an [Formula: see text]-probability. When appropriately structured, sets [Formula: see text] of numerical events form so-called algebras of [Formula: see text]-probabilities, which are orthomodular posets that can serve as quantum logics. If one deals with a classical physical system, then [Formula: see text] will be a Boolean algebra. Starting with a supposed quantum logic or logics obtained by individual measurements, newly added numerical events may turn out to be crucial for the assumption of classicality or nonclassicality of the physical system. We will call those numerical events critical and will study their impacts among various classes of algebras of numerical events. Moreover, we will consider the situation of enlarging [Formula: see text] by new states and will describe how elements of an algebra of [Formula: see text]-probabilities contribute to the character of a logic when there exists a certain relation between them and the element that is newly added.
Kolmogorov's foundation of probability takes measure spaces, σ-algebras, and probability measures as basic objects. It is, however, widely recognized that this classical framework is inadequate for random phenomena involving quantum effects, and more generally for \emph{quantum-like} situations. A broader formulation is provided by an algebraic viewpoint: one starts from an algebra of random variables equipped with a distinguished linear functional -- the \emph{state} -- interpreted as expectation. In this sense, the approach can also be viewed as a modern reading of ideas already implicit in early probability (e.g., the Bernoullis), while its contemporary form has been developed and used extensively in quantum physics.
The algebraic framework accommodates both classical and quantum-like behaviours, yet it remains underused in classical probability and uncertainty quantification, where it can nevertheless open new perspectives and clarify structural features. Although the language carries a physics flavor, the subject is purely probabilistic. The key distinction between classical and quantum-like behaviour is \emph{commutativity}: its failure produces the characteristic effects of quantum-like situations. The rise of quantum computing is a prominent setting in which such behaviour may become relevant even for practitioners in computational science. Here we focus on the purely algebraic core of the approach. By restricting attention to finite-dimensional algebras, we avoid many analytical subtleties while retaining the main ideas, their classical limit, and their applicability to quantum-like models and quantum computation.
Interpretational paradoxes of quantum mechanics may be associated with the application of the structure of classical probability theory to systems whose probabilistic organization is fundamentally contextual. In this work, we propose an outline of an alternative probability theory in which the primary object is not an elementary outcome but a contextual whole—a class of alternatives defined by a common structural property. In this approach, probability is organized on two levels. The first level describes the probabilities of contextual wholes, while the second level describes the conditional probabilities of alternatives within those wholes. Individual alternatives do not possess autonomous probabilities outside their context. Their probabilities arise only as contextual projections of a more fundamental probabilistic structure. Within this model, quantum mechanics appears as a special case of a more general theory in which contextual wholes are described by superpositions of probability amplitudes. Classical probability theory emerges as a limiting case in which all contexts are mutually compatible and can be combined into a single global description. The proposed framework provides a possible conceptual foundation for understanding quantum probability, contextuality, interference, and hybrid probability distributions within a unified structure.
Various physical examples are displayed in which the probability distribution can be traced back to its causal origin. It is argued that probability is never irreducible, but is, in principle, always derivable from a deterministic process which determines its numerical value. It is suggested that deterministic and probabilistic theories are interlocked, each presenting a different aspect of reality, yet that no description of the laws of nature in terms of either of these concepts will ever be ultimate.