Attempts to derive the Born rule, either in the Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretation, are unsatisfactory for systems with only a finite number of degrees of freedom. In the case of Many Worlds this is a serious problem, since its goal is to account for apparent collapse phenomena, including the Born rule for probabilities, assuming only unitary evolution of the wavefunction. For finite number of degrees of freedom, observers on the vast majority of branches would not deduce the Born rule. However, discreteness of the quantum state space, even if extremely tiny, may restore the validity of the usual arguments.
Attempts to derive the Born rule, either in the Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretation, are unsatisfactory for systems with only a finite number of degrees of freedom. In the case of Many Worlds this is a serious problem, since its goal is to account for apparent collapse phenomena, including the Born rule for probabilities, assuming only unitary evolution of the wavefunction. For finite number of degrees of freedom, observers on the vast majority of branches would not deduce the Born rule. However, discreteness of the quantum state space, even if extremely tiny, may restore the validity of the usual arguments.
We explain the measure problem (cf. origin of the Born probability rule) in no-collapse quantum mechanics. Everett defined maverick branches of the state vector as those on which the usual Born probability rule fails to hold — these branches exhibit highly improbable behaviors, including possibly the breakdown of decoherence or even the absence of an emergent semi-classical reality. Derivations of the Born rule which originate in decision theory or subjective probability (i.e. the reasoning of individual observers) do not resolve this problem, because they are circular: they assume, a priori, that the observer occupies a non-maverick branch. An ab initio probability measure is sometimes assumed to explain why we do not occupy a maverick branch. This measure is constrained by, e.g. Gleason’s theorem or envariance to be the usual Hilbert measure. However, this ab initio measure ultimately governs the allocation of a self or a consciousness to a particular branch of the wave function, and hence invokes primitives which lie beyond the Everett wave function and beyond what we usually think of as physics. The significance of this leap has been largely overlooked, but requires serious scrutiny.
Quantum Mechanics notoriously faces a measurement problem, the problem that the unitary time evolution, encoded in its dynamical equations, together with the kinematical structure of the theory generally implies the non-existence \nof definite measurement outcomes. There have been multiple suggestions to solve this problem, among them the so called many worlds interpretation that originated with the work of Hugh Everett III. According to it, the quantum state and time evolution fully and accurately describe nature as it is, implying that under certain conditions multiple measurement outcomes that are seemingly mutually exclusive can be realized at the same time – but as different 'worlds' contained in a global, quantum mechanical structure, sometimes referred to as 'the multiverse'. The many worlds interpretation has, however, been confronted with serious difficulties over the course of its development, some of which were solved by the advent of decoherence theory. The present thesis critically investi- \ngates the state of play on a key remaining problem of the many worlds interpretation, the problem of the meaning and quantification of probabilities in a quantum multiverse. Recent attempts of deriving the pivotal statistical ingredient of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule, from either principles of decision theory or from quantum mechanics alone, supplemented with a few general premises about \nprobability are analyzed and their premises are scrutinized. It will be argued that, though both approaches yield promising results, they both ultimately fail \nto clearly establish the validity of Born’s rule in the context of the many worlds interpretation. It is hence suggested that further research on this problem is indicated.
In order to make the quantum mechanics a closed theory one has to derive the Born rule from the first principles, like the Schroedinger equation (SEq), rather than postulate it. The Born rule was in certain sense derived in several articles, e.g. in [1] and [2]. In this work some arguments of previous authors are simplified and made more “physical”. It is shown how to derive the Born rule using the conservation of quantum state norm (Ψ|Ψ) that is the unitary evolution property determined by the SEq. It is this property that makes the probability equal to the square of the amplitude modulus. Possible modification of the Born rule is briefly discussed in the case when the evolution of the system is described by a nonlinear Schroedinger equation. We also present arguments in the spirit of the Many-World Interpretation to explain the origin of probabilistic behavior. Simply speaking, the randomness appears as a result of representing the wave function by using a detector of discrete nature that is found only in one state at a time, out of two or more possible states.
A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
The measurement problem is the issue of explaining how the objective classical world emerges from a quantum one. Here we take a different approach. We assume that there is an objective classical system, and then ask that the standard rules of probability theory apply to it when it interacts with a quantum system. Under mild assumptions, we recover the unitary dynamics, collapse and Born rule postulates from quantum theory. Nonetheless, there is no decoherence, because the quantum state remains pure conditioned on the classical trajectory. This results in one world, rather than many-worlds. Our main technical tool is to exploit a change of measure on the space of classical paths, the functional form of which is shown to characterise the quantum dynamics and Born rules of a class of quantum-like theories.
Abstract This introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in thermal environments, yields a multiplicity of branching structures (worlds) obeying approximately classical equations, a result that follows from decoherence theory with no special assumptions or additions to the quantum formalism; and that further, the branching of worlds has a natural interpretation in terms of probability, as quantified by the Born rule in terms of ratios of squared norms of branch amplitudes. In particular, an agent who knows the branching structures of the quantum state that will result from his actions is rationally compelled to order his preferences among actions by the expected utilities of those branching structures as defined by the Born rule. He is, moreover, entitled to view a branching process as involving uncertainty as to which branch he will find himself. But independent of the truth of these claims, the theory is still testable: an agent who does not know the branching structure of the state, and who is indeed undecided between a many-worlds and a one-world theory, is rationally bound to update her credences in such theories by conditionalisation on observed statistical evidence, just as she is bound to do in the case of conventional quantum mechanics. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments and counter-arguments for these claims as developed in subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides some more mathematical and historical background to the Everett interpretation, including a brief introduction to the decoherent histories formalism.