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arXiv:gr-qc/0012061 · Physics Letters A

Indeterminism and time symmetry are incompatible: A Reply to Rȩbilas

Avshalom C. Elitzur, Shahar Dolev

Published Feb 1, 2000• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/s0375-9601(00)00057-8

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Quantum theory is widely regarded as fundamentally indeterministic, yet classical frameworks can also exhibit indeterminism once infinite information is abandoned. At the same time, relativity is usually taken to forbid superluminal signalling, although Lorentz symmetry formally admits superluminal transformations (SpTs). Dragan and Ekert have argued that SpTs entail a form of indeterminism analogous to that encountered in quantum theory. Here, we derive a theory-independent no-go theorem from a set of natural assumptions: any framework admitting non-order-preserving SpTs must either abandon finite information, relinquish time-symmetric informational content, deny that the past stores memory, or abandon the notion that time determines a preferred causal ordering. In particular, one possible implication is that any theory accommodating SpTs suggests an ontology with unbounded informational content, akin to deterministic classical theories formulated over the real numbers. Consequently, any ontic indeterminacy associated with superluminal transformations cannot originate from finite information.