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arXiv:cs/0603046

Trusted Certificates in Quantum Cryptography

William A. Perkins

Published Mar 10, 2006• 10 citations
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the performance of Kak's three stage quantum cryptographic protocol based on public key cryptography against a man-in-the-middle attack. A method for protecting against such an attack is presented using certificates distributed by a trusted third party.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.cs/0603046

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