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arXiv:cs/0508059

Honesty can be the best policy within quantum mechanics

Arindam Mitra

Published Aug 11, 2005• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Honesty has never been scientifically proved to be the best policy in any case. It is pointed out that only honest person can prevent his dishonest partner to bias the outcome of quantum coin tossing.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.cs/0508059

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