Issues related to a materialist philosophy are explored as concerns the implied equivalence of computers running software and human observers. One issue explored concerns the measurement process in quantum mechanics. Another issue explored concerns the nature of experience as revealed by the existence of dreams. Some difficulties stemming from a materialist philosophy as regards these issues are pointed out. For example, a gedankenexperiment involving what has been called "negative" observation is discussed that illustrates the difficulty with a materialist assumption in quantum mechanics. Based on an exploration of these difficulties, specifications are outlined briefly that would provide a means to demonstrate the equivalence of of computers running software and human experience given a materialist assumption.
Issues related to a materialist philosophy are explored as concerns the implied equivalence of computers running software and human observers. One issue explored concerns the measurement process in quantum mechanics. Another issue explored concerns the nature of experience as revealed by the existence of dreams. Some difficulties stemming from a materialist philosophy as regards these issues are pointed out. For example, a gedankenexperiment involving what has been called "negative" observation is discussed that illustrates the difficulty with a materialist assumption in quantum mechanics. Based on an exploration of these difficulties, specifications are outlined briefly that would provide a means to demonstrate the equivalence of of computers running software and human experience given a materialist assumption.
The philosophy of physics is continuous with physics itself. Just as certain issues in the Foundations of Mathematics have been discussed by both mathematicians and by philosophers of mathematics, so certain issues in the philosophy of physics have been discussed by both physicists and by philosophers of physics. And just as there are issues of a more epistemological kind that tend to concern philosophers of mathematics more than they do working mathematicians, so there are issues that concern philosophers of physics more than they do working physicists. In this brief report I shall try to give an account of the present state of the discussion in America of both kinds of issues, starting with the problems of quantum mechanics, which concern both physicists and philosophers, and ending with general questions about necessary truth and the analytic-synthetic distinction which concern only philosophers. The problem of ‘measurement’ in quantum mechanics Quantum mechanics asserts that if A and B are any two possible ‘states’ of a physical system, then there exists at least one state (and in fact a continuous infinity of states) which can be described as ‘superpositions of A and B ’. If A and B are the sorts of states talked about in classical physics – definite states of position, or momentum, or kinetic energy, etc. – then their superpositions may not correspond to classically thinkable states.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
In quantum mechanics, the measurement problem is commonly regarded as reason for deep concern. It seems that, either, the problem can be solved and there is hope for quantum mechanics, or the theory better be left behind in search of another one. We investigate the prospect of finding a solution to the measurement problem—within quantum mechanics, as well as in theoretical frameworks beyond it. As we do so, there emerges a perspective on doing physics drawing from considerations in the philosophy of language and in epistemology. Developing this perspective for further aspects in physics reveals: The notion of a system is similarly problematic. Eventually, the question arises whether these are problems of specific physical theories, or rather of specific stances towards physics. In this regard, we examine in particular the role and understanding of assumptions.
The emergence of quantum computing has prompted researchers to examine potential parallels between quantum mechanical principles and human cognitive processes. This article explores the theoretical framework of quantum cognition, examining how concepts from quantum mechanics, including superposition, entanglement, and measurement, might inform our understanding of human decision-making, memory, and consciousness. While quantum computing operates on fundamentally different physical principles than biological neural networks, the mathematical formalisms of quantum mechanics offer novel perspectives on cognitive phenomena that classical probability theory struggles to explain. This review critically examines the current state of quantum cognition research, its applications in computational modeling, and the ongoing debates regarding the validity of quantum mechanical analogies in psychological theory. The analysis reveals both promising theoretical insights and significant limitations in applying quantum principles to human cognition, highlighting the need for empirical validation and careful distinction between mathematical analogy and physical reality.
Three quantum paradoxical experiments — (1) double-slit, (2) delayed choice, and (3) EPR paradox ones are considered. These experiments definitely indicate the inadequacy of the mate- rialist paradigm. The materialist doctrine can not describe, explain and predict phenomena and strangeness of quantum world, and the concept of matter is inconsistent at the quantum level. Doubtless, from the materialistic point of view, two propositions saying about that the physical properties of the system are in themselves, they are objective and independent of measurement (1) and measurement (observation) of one system does not affect the result of the measurement (observation) of another system (2) are not verified by the recent experiments confirming so- called quantum non-locality or non-local realism. In relation to this, we have to doubt the truth of materialist ontology which denies the existence of transcendental objects or any extrasensory phenomena with certainty. There should be set boundaries for the materialist paradigm, beyond which it can not be accepted. The poliontichny paradigm that considers reality in potential and actual modes is proposed as an alternative world view embracing both material and quantum world. The unity of the world is not denied but it can be distinguished by two structural levels — two modes of reality evidencing the dual nature of the Universe.