Introduction The philosopher in the street, who has not suffered a course in quantum mechanics, is quite unimpressed by Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlations. He can point to many examples of similar correlations in everyday life. The case of Bertlmann's socks is often cited. Dr. Bertlmann likes to wear two socks of different colours. Which colour he will have on a given foot on a given day is quite unpredictable. But when you see (Fig. 1) that the first sock is pink you can be already sure that the second sock will not be pink. Observation of the first, and experience of Bertlmann, gives immediate information about the second. There is no accounting for tastes, but apart from that there is no mystery here. And is not the EPR business just the same? Consider for example the particular EPR gedanken experiment of Bohm (Fig. 2). Two suitable particles, suitably prepared (in the ‘singlet spin state’), are directed from a common source towards two widely separated magnets followed by detecting screens. Each time the experiment is performed each of the two particles is deflected either up or down at the corresponding magnet. Whether either particle separately goes up or down on a given occasion is quite unpredictable. But when one particle goes up the other always goes down and vice-versa. After a little experience it is enough to look at one side to know also about the other.
Introduction The philosopher in the street, who has not suffered a course in quantum mechanics, is quite unimpressed by Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlations. He can point to many examples of similar correlations in everyday life. The case of Bertlmann's socks is often cited. Dr. Bertlmann likes to wear two socks of different colours. Which colour he will have on a given foot on a given day is quite unpredictable. But when you see (Fig. 1) that the first sock is pink you can be already sure that the second sock will not be pink. Observation of the first, and experience of Bertlmann, gives immediate information about the second. There is no accounting for tastes, but apart from that there is no mystery here. And is not the EPR business just the same? Consider for example the particular EPR gedanken experiment of Bohm (Fig. 2). Two suitable particles, suitably prepared (in the ‘singlet spin state’), are directed from a common source towards two widely separated magnets followed by detecting screens. Each time the experiment is performed each of the two particles is deflected either up or down at the corresponding magnet. Whether either particle separately goes up or down on a given occasion is quite unpredictable. But when one particle goes up the other always goes down and vice-versa. After a little experience it is enough to look at one side to know also about the other.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are very like many ordinary occurrences of everyday life. So it is a little difficult for the man in the street to understand immediately why there has been so much fuss about them. It must be recalled that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had convinced themselves that it was necessary to abandon the idea of an objective reality at the microphysical level. But the correlations in question, together with the idea of local causality, were a formidable argument for such a reality. The founding fathers offered counter-arguments (neither very clear nor very convincing in my opinion) and each side held to its position. Since then it has been possible to push the analysis a little further, considering especially situations just a little different from those considered before. Then correlations appear, according to quantum mechanics, which are not at all like those of everyday life. As a result it is not now easy to believe, with Einstein, that quantum mechanical predictions are reconcilable with the notion of a Lorentz invariant objectively real microphysical world.
Unlike our basic theories of space and time, quantum mechanics is not a locally causal theory. Moreover, it is widely believed that any hopes of restoring local causality within any realistic theory have been undermined by Bell's theorem and the experimental investigations it has inspired. In this pedagogical paper, John S. Bell's amusing example of Dr. Bertlmann's socks to illustrate the results of these experiments is reconsidered, first within a toy model of a two-dimensional one-sided world of a non-orientable Möbius strip, and then within a real world of three-dimensional quaternionic sphere, S3, which results from an addition of a single point to IR3at infinity. In the latter quaternionic world, which happens to be the spatial part of a solution of Einstein's field equations of general relativity, the singlet correlations between a pair of entangled fermions can be understood as classically as those between Dr. Bertlmann's colorful socks.
The subject of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlations—those strong quantum correlations that seem to imply “spooky actions at a distance”—has just been given a new and beautiful twist. Daniel Greenberger, Michael Horne, and Anton Zeilinger have found a clever and powerful extension of the two-particle EPR experiment to gedanken decays that produce more than two particles [1]. In the GHZ experiment the spookiness assumes an even more vivid form than it acquired in John Bell's celebrated analysis of the EPR experiment, given over 25 years ago [2]. The argument that follows is my attempt to simplify a refinement of the GHZ argument given by the philosophers Robert Clifton, Michael Redhead, and Jeremy Butterfield [3]. Consider three spin-½ particles, named 1, 2, and 3. They have originated in a spin-conserving gedanken decay and are now gedanken flying apart along three different straight lines in the horizontal plane. (It's not essential for the gedanken trajectories to be coplanar, but it makes it easier to describe the rest of the geometry.) I specify the spin state |Ψ〉 of the three particles in a time-honored manner, giving you a complete set of commuting Hermitian spin-space operators of which |Ψ〉 is an eigenstate. Those operators are assembled out of the following pieces (measuring all spins in units of ½ ħ ): σ z i the operator for the spin of particle i along its direction of motion; σ x i the spin along the vertical direction; and σ y i , the spin along the horizontal direction orthogonal to the trajectory. (Any three orthogonal directions independently chosen for each particle would do. But we're going to be gedanken -measuring x and y components of each particle's spin, so it's nice to think of the x and y directions as orthogonal to the direction of motion, since the components can then be straightforwardly measured by passage through a conventional Stern–Gerlach magnet.) The complete set of commuting Hermitian operators consists of σ x 1 σ y 2 σ y 3 , σ y 1 σ x 2 σ y 3 , σ y 1 σ y 2 σ x 3 . Even though the x and y components of a given particle's spin anticommute—a fact of paramount importance in what follows—all three of the operators in (1) do indeed commute with one another, because the product of any two of them differs from the product in the reverse order by an even number of such anticommutations. Because they all commute, the three operators can be provided with simultaneous eigenstates.
We always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me … It has not yet become obvious to me that there is no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there is no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. Richard Feynman Max Born and quantum probabilities In this chapter, we will take a short break from our survey of successful applications of quantum mechanics to take a closer look at the foundations of this great edifice of modern physics. In a sense, we are now disobeying Feynman's warning about the results of the double slit experiment of chapter 1. We shall now ask Feynman's ‘forbidden’ question ‘But how can it be like that?’ Nobody disputes that quantum mechanics has been magnificently successful, enabling us to make correct quantitative calculations of atomic and nuclear effects. But there is a great divergence of opinion about the implications of quantum mechanics for the nature of matter, and indeed, of reality itself. To avoid becoming embroiled in a purely philosophical mire, we will focus on two famous paradoxes. The first of these is the ‘Einstein–Podolsky-Rosen’ paradox, named after its originators Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, and usually abbreviated by the initials ‘EPR’. The second paradox is named after ‘Schrödinger's cat’.
We now have under our belts several interpretations of quantum mechanics, each requiring, or anyhow advocating, some understanding of quantum probabilities. In the next two chapters, I will consider some connections among various interpretations of quantum probabilities and non-locality. I do so in the context of the well-known EPR–Bohm experiment, though it is worth emphasizing at the start that non-locality is very likely the rule rather than the exception for quantum-mechanical systems. Entanglement of systems occurs not only in the confines of a laboratory, but also in the course of quite typical interactions among quantum-mechanical systems. Nonetheless, the EPR-Bohm experiment shines a bright light on the phenomenon of non-locality, and is therefore the most useful context in which to explore the relation between probability and non-locality. In this chapter, I consider models of the EPR–Bohm experiment that deliver probabilities for the various outcomes given the initial state of the pair of particles. In the next chapter, I consider fully dynamical models, i.e., ones that provide a dynamics for the complete state of the pair of particles as well as probabilities for various outcomes based on these complete states. The EPR–Bohm experiment The EPR–Bohm experiment is well known, but some observations about it are important for later.