Fictions are well established in the theory and practice of civil law; similar importance is here claimed for fictions in the theory and application of scientific law. A puzzle from quantum mechanics, previously referred to in this Journal [Am. J. Physiol. 238 (Regulatory Integrative Comp. Physiol. 7(: R277-R290, 1980], is reinterpreted by suggesting quantum logic as a source of relevant fictions, which indicate a solution to that puzzle. Another physiological application of quantum theory suggests that the concept of "the state of the brain" may, in its usual classical sense, not be useful for an individual brain--but may well be suggestively modeled by a quantum state. The notion of "myths," usually only pejoratively applied in positivistic writings, is suggested for rehabilitation, in view of their helpful function (often unnoticed) even in positivistic thinking. Finally, an example of a biological simulation (of a tumor by a cell culture) is presented, to show that its multilayered fictionalizations illustrate the surprising fact that a simulation that is insulated from the system being simulated can be logically more powerful than any uninsulated simulation.
Some skeptical arguments on the physical reality of quantum states are given. First, I argue that the algebraic formalism of quantum field theory in curved spacetime (algebraic QFTCS, AQFTCS) leads to such a skepticism. Of course we have the purely mathematical notion of states on a
C∗-algebra
A, but usually in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory in Minkowski spacetime (QFTM), not all of them are considered to be physically real; Some of them are physically real (or realizable) states, but others are non-physical ``fictional'' states. Only the states which can be expressed as a density matrix on a fixed ``physical Hilbert space'' (the GNS representation space of
A w.r.t. the vacuum) are viewed to be physically real. On the other hand, in QFTCS, there is no distinguished physical Hilbert space; no distinguished vacuum state. Thus we cannot distinguish physically real states from fictional states. The second part of my argument is a counterargument to what I call ``pragmatic realism on quantum states'', which insists as follows: ``We are permitted to regard a quantum state as a physical reality, because the concept of quantum state is indispensable in quantum physics.'' I argue that the concept of quantum state is indeed dispensable in non-relativistic QM, and hence this pragmatic realist thesis is vacuous there. I give a conjecture that it is also dispensable in QFTM and QFTCS, and some preliminary considerations on it.