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Springer eBooks

The Role of Probability in Quantum Mechanics

Patrick Suppes

Published Jan 1, 1969• 21 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-017-3173-7_14

Related papers

Probability in Quantum Mechanics

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Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1989•1 citation

Objective and Subjective Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics

Leslie Ballentine, Guillaume Adenier, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov +3 more

The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probabilities that cannot be realized as quantum probabilities.

arXiv:0710.5945•AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2007•1 citation

The instrumentalist aspects of quantum mechanics stem from probability theory

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The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency interpretation of R. von Mises) reveals that this notion always refers to an observing system. Therefore the instrumentalist aspects of quantum mechanics, and in particular the enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation, derive from a precise understanding of probability.

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Two-slit experiment: quantum and classical probabilities

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Inter-relation between quantum and classical probability models is one of the most fundamental problems of quantum foundations. Nowadays this problem also plays an important role in quantum technologies, in quantum cryptography and the theory of quantum random generators. In this letter, we compare the viewpoint of Richard Feynman that the behavior of quantum particles cannot be described by classical probability theory with the viewpoint that quantum–classical inter-relation is more complicated (cf, in particular, with the tomographic model of quantum mechanics developed in detail by Vladimir Man'ko). As a basic example, we consider the two-slit experiment, which played a crucial role in quantum foundational debates at the beginning of quantum mechanics (QM). In particular, its analysis led Niels Bohr to the formulation of the principle of complementarity. First, we demonstrate that in complete accordance with Feynman's viewpoint, the probabilities for the two-slit experiment have the non-Kolmogorovian structure, since they violate one of basic laws of classical probability theory, the law of total probability (the heart of the Bayesian analysis). However, then we show that these probabilities can be embedded in a natural way into the classical (Kolmogorov, 1933) probability model. To do this, one has to take into account the randomness of selection of different experimental contexts, the joint consideration of which led Feynman to a conclusion about the non-classicality of quantum probability. We compare this embedding of non-Kolmogorovian quantum probabilities into the Kolmogorov model with well-known embeddings of non-Euclidean geometries into Euclidean space (e.g., the Poincaré disk model for the Lobachvesky plane).

Physica Scripta•Jun 1, 2015•8 citations
The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probabilities that cannot be realized as quantum probabilities.
The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency interpretation of R. von Mises) reveals that this notion always refers to an observing system. Therefore the instrumentalist aspects of quantum mechanics, and in particular the enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation, derive from a precise understanding of probability.
Inter-relation between quantum and classical probability models is one of the most fundamental problems of quantum foundations. Nowadays this problem also plays an important role in quantum technologies, in quantum cryptography and the theory of quantum random generators. In this letter, we compare the viewpoint of Richard Feynman that the behavior of quantum particles cannot be described by classical probability theory with the viewpoint that quantum–classical inter-relation is more complicated (cf, in particular, with the tomographic model of quantum mechanics developed in detail by Vladimir Man'ko). As a basic example, we consider the two-slit experiment, which played a crucial role in quantum foundational debates at the beginning of quantum mechanics (QM). In particular, its analysis led Niels Bohr to the formulation of the principle of complementarity. First, we demonstrate that in complete accordance with Feynman's viewpoint, the probabilities for the two-slit experiment have the non-Kolmogorovian structure, since they violate one of basic laws of classical probability theory, the law of total probability (the heart of the Bayesian analysis). However, then we show that these probabilities can be embedded in a natural way into the classical (Kolmogorov, 1933) probability model. To do this, one has to take into account the randomness of selection of different experimental contexts, the joint consideration of which led Feynman to a conclusion about the non-classicality of quantum probability. We compare this embedding of non-Kolmogorovian quantum probabilities into the Kolmogorov model with well-known embeddings of non-Euclidean geometries into Euclidean space (e.g., the Poincaré disk model for the Lobachvesky plane).