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中国通信:英文版

Provably Secure Identity-based Group Key Exchange Protocol

SangJae, Moon Moon

Published Jan 1, 2007• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Group key management is one of the basic building blocks in securing group communication.A number of solutions to group key exchange have been proposed,but most of them are not scalable and,in particular,require at least 0(log n) communication rounds.We formally present a constant -round Identity-based protocol with forward secrecy for group key exchange,which is provably secure in the security model introduced by Bresson et al.Our protocol focuses on round efficiency and the number of communication round is only one greater than the lower bound presented by Becker and Wille.And,the protocol provides a batch verification technique,which simultaneously verifies the validity of messages from other group participants and greatly improves computational efficiency.Moreover,in our protocol,it is no necessary of always-online key generation center during the execution of the protocol compared to other Identity-based protocols.

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Group key management is one of the basic building blocks in securing group communication.A number of solutions to group key exchange have been proposed,but most of them are not scalable and,in particular,require at least 0(log n) communication rounds.We formally present a constant -round Identity-based protocol with forward secrecy for group key exchange,which is provably secure in the security model introduced by Bresson et al.Our protocol focuses on round efficiency and the number of communication round is only one greater than the lower bound presented by Becker and Wille.And,the protocol provides a batch verification technique,which simultaneously verifies the validity of messages from other group participants and greatly improves computational efficiency.Moreover,in our protocol,it is no necessary of always-online key generation center during the execution of the protocol compared to other Identity-based protocols.
Abstract: Group key management is one of the basic building blocks in securing group communication. A number of solutions to group key exchange have been proposed, but most of them are not scalable and require a number of rounds linear in the number of group members. We formally present a constant-round Identity-based protocol with forward secrecy for group key exchange, which is provably secure in the security model introduced by Bresson et al. Our protocol focuses on round efficiency and the number of communication round is only two. And, the protocol provides a batch verification technique, which simultaneously verifies the validity of messages from other group participants and greatly improves computational efficiency. Moreover, in our protocol, it is no necessary of always-online key generation center during the execution of the protocol compared to other Identity-based protocols. Key-Words:- provable security, identity-based, group key exchange, constant round, secret-share. 1
Group key exchange (GKE) is one of the basic building blocks in securing group communication. A number of solutions to GKE problem have been proposed, but most of them are not scalable and require a number of rounds linear with the number of group members. We present a method of constructing constant-round and identity-based protocol via secret sharing for GKE within universally composability (UC) framework. The resultant protocol focuses on round efficiency and three rounds of communication are required. The protocol allows the batch verification of messages signed by all other group participants. Moreover, compared with other identity-based protocols, the key generation center (KGC) in our protocol is not always online.
We consider the problem of authenticated group key exchange among n parties communicating over an insecure public network. A number of solutions to this problem have been proposed; however, all prior provably-secure solutions do not scale well and, in particular, require O (n) rounds. Our main contribution is the first scalable protocol for this problem along with a rigorous proof of security in the standard model under the DDH assumption; our protocol uses a constant number of rounds and requires only O (1) \full modular exponentiations per user. Toward this goal (and adapting work of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk), we first present an efficient compiler that transforms any ngroup key-exchange protocol secure against a passive eavesdropper to an authenticated protocol which is secure against an active adversary who controls all communication in the network. This compiler adds only one round and O (1) communication (per user) to the original scheme. We then prove secure | against a passive adversary | a variant of the two-round group key-exchange protocol of Burmester and Desmedt. Applying our compiler to this protocol results in a provably-secure three-round protocol for authenticated group key exchange which also achieves forward secrecy.
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) avoids the inherent escrow of identity-based cryptography and does not require certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. Based on CL-PKC, we present an efficient constant-round group key exchange protocol, which is provably secure under the intractability of computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Our protocol is a contributory key exchange with perfect forward secrecy and has only two communication rounds. So it is more efficient than other protocols. Moreover, our protocol provides a method to design efficient constant-round group key exchange protocols and most secret sharing schemes could be adopted to construct our protocol.
Key agreement protocols allow two or more participants exchange information over an open network with each other. In modern collaborative and distributed applications, authenticated group key agreement is one of the important issues. Recently identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol has been increasingly investigated because of the simplicity of a public key management. In this paper, we propose an authenticated three-round identity-based group key agreement protocol. The first round is for identity authentication, the second round is for key agreement, and the third round is for key confirmation. The proposed protocol is based on the protocol of Burmester and Desmedt, and the protocol is provably- secure in the random oracle model. In particular, the proposed authenticated identity-based group key agreement protocol provides a batch verification technique, which verifies the validity of transcripts from other group players simultaneously.
Group key agreement protocols are designed to solve the fundamental problem of securely establishing a session key among a group of parties communicating over a public channel. Although a number of protocols have been proposed to solve this problem over the years, they are not well suited for a high-delay wide area network; their communication overhead is significant in terms of the number of communication rounds or the number of exchanged messages, both of which are recognized as the dominant factors that slow down group key agreement over a networking environment with high communication latency. In this paper we present a communication-efficient group key agreement protocol and prove its security in the random oracle model under the factoring assumption. The proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy and requires only a constant number of communication rounds for any of group rekeying operations, while achieving optimal message complexity.