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Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Bohr’s Response to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen

David Z. Albert

Published Jan 1, 1992• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-011-2688-5_17

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This paper discusses the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox from a new point of view. In section II, the arguments by which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen reach their paradoxical conclusions are presented. They are found to rest on two critical assumptions: (a) that before a measurement is made on a system consisting of two non-interacting but correlated sub-systems, the state of the entire system is exactly represented by: (b) that the exact measurement of an observable A in one of the sub-systems is possible. In section III it is shown that assumption (b) is incorrect. Thus we conclude, as did Bohr, that the results of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are not valid. The arguments of section III are quite distinct from Bohr's, and therefore in Section IV this work is related to that of Bohr.

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Abstract The 1935 Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paper, “Can Quantum–Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, stands as a landmark in the foundational debates over quantum mechanics. While the paper has since become one of Einstein’s most cited works, it initially received little attention, and the feature of non-locality, which was central to the argument in the paper, was largely neglected for decades. In this paper, I offer two reasons for this early neglect of non-locality in the immediate aftermath of EPR. First, early responses to the EPR paper defended the completeness of quantum mechanics by reformulating the thought experiment the authors had presented, thereby obscuring the feature of quantum mechanics the authors had wished to highlight. Bohr’s influential reply, for instance, substituted the specific thought experiment presented by EPR with the two-slit experiment, thus suppressing the entanglement between spatially separated systems. A second reason for the marginalization of non-locality was the tendency to see Einstein’s critique of quantum mechanics as proceeding from a commitment to determinism, though this in fact played no role in the EPR paper or in his later writings and correspondence. This paper argues that the failure to recognize non-locality was partly a result of the rhetorical manoeuvring by EPR’s critics, but also to a broader philosophical climate dominated by concerns over determinism, which effectively eclipsed all other conceptual issues, Only with Bell’s theorem in the 1960s did non-locality return as a serious focus of foundational inquiry.

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REMARKS ON BOHR'S ARTICLE ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH EINSTEIN

V. Fock

Soviet Physics Uspekhi•Feb 28, 1958•6 citations
The chapter discusses Bohr’s response to the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criticism of quantum mechanics, illuminating the clash between Bohr’s approach, firmly grounded in the existing experimental context, and Einstein’s prescient philosophical concerns. Given its accord with Ernst Mach’s influential double-aspect philosophical view, Bohr’s broader philosophical argument reads as a conventional piece of philosophical thought aimed at further clarifying the account already produced by the inductive process.
This paper discusses the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox from a new point of view. In section II, the arguments by which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen reach their paradoxical conclusions are presented. They are found to rest on two critical assumptions: (a) that before a measurement is made on a system consisting of two non-interacting but correlated sub-systems, the state of the entire system is exactly represented by: (b) that the exact measurement of an observable A in one of the sub-systems is possible. In section III it is shown that assumption (b) is incorrect. Thus we conclude, as did Bohr, that the results of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are not valid. The arguments of section III are quite distinct from Bohr's, and therefore in Section IV this work is related to that of Bohr.
Abstract The 1935 Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paper, “Can Quantum–Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, stands as a landmark in the foundational debates over quantum mechanics. While the paper has since become one of Einstein’s most cited works, it initially received little attention, and the feature of non-locality, which was central to the argument in the paper, was largely neglected for decades. In this paper, I offer two reasons for this early neglect of non-locality in the immediate aftermath of EPR. First, early responses to the EPR paper defended the completeness of quantum mechanics by reformulating the thought experiment the authors had presented, thereby obscuring the feature of quantum mechanics the authors had wished to highlight. Bohr’s influential reply, for instance, substituted the specific thought experiment presented by EPR with the two-slit experiment, thus suppressing the entanglement between spatially separated systems. A second reason for the marginalization of non-locality was the tendency to see Einstein’s critique of quantum mechanics as proceeding from a commitment to determinism, though this in fact played no role in the EPR paper or in his later writings and correspondence. This paper argues that the failure to recognize non-locality was partly a result of the rhetorical manoeuvring by EPR’s critics, but also to a broader philosophical climate dominated by concerns over determinism, which effectively eclipsed all other conceptual issues, Only with Bell’s theorem in the 1960s did non-locality return as a serious focus of foundational inquiry.