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The Physics of the One Who Is Looking: Recognition Boundary Theory

Jonathan Washburn

Published Nov 14, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Physics describes everything that can be seen and has never described the one who sees. Quantum theory, as it is used, needs an observer and does not say what one is. Relativity gives an observer a frame and not a self. Holography puts what can be known on a boundary and does not say whose. Recognition Boundary Theory is the missing law. Reality keeps one record, and a point of view is a boundary on it: a wall sealed when its history begins, a finite opening onto the rest, a motion inside that the record's own bookkeeping keeps going, and the record it writes. No body is on that list and no place is. For one explicit recognition step we prove that the walls are exact for every operation built from the record's own events (the record that makes them so is the history itself; no second system is used); that of the sixty-four independent states of one cell the bookkeeping keeps exactly four motions and their blends, the states that never fall silent, and that three entries expose every other state; that a state's own record decides whether it is kept and, along almost every endless record, brings its present onto one definite line; that joining in the regular order of entries creates no new participant; and that a finite opening tells apart no more states than it has settings, so that it always reads less than an unbounded record. Given two rhythms in an irrational ratio, every moment of the past has an address, and no reading depends on an entry that has not been written. We say what is proved, what is supplied, what is identified and what is open, and we give the case that such a boundary is a point of view that experiences.

DOI
10.67347/pith.preprint.2026.000070

Related papers

The Physics of the One Who Is Looking: Recognition Boundary Theory

Jonathan Washburn

Physics describes everything that can be seen and has never described the one who sees. Quantum theory, as it is used, needs an observer and does not say what one is. Relativity gives an observer a frame and not a self. Holography puts what can be known on a boundary and does not say whose. Recognition Boundary Theory is the missing law. Reality keeps one record, and a point of view is a boundary on it: a wall sealed when its history begins, a finite opening onto the rest, a motion inside that the record's own bookkeeping keeps going, and the record it writes. No body is on that list and no place is. For one explicit recognition step we prove that the walls are exact for every operation built from the record's own events (the record that makes them so is the history itself; no second system is used); that of the sixty-four independent states of one cell the bookkeeping keeps exactly four motions and their blends, the states that never fall silent, and that three entries expose every other state; that a state's own record decides whether it is kept and, along almost every endless record, brings its present onto one definite line; that joining in the regular order of entries creates no new participant; and that a finite opening tells apart no more states than it has settings, so that it always reads less than an unbounded record. Given two rhythms in an irrational ratio, every moment of the past has an address, and no reading depends on an entry that has not been written. We say what is proved, what is supplied, what is identified and what is open, and we give the case that such a boundary is a point of view that experiences. Version 1.1, 37 pages. The theorems cited from reference [1] are proved in the full manuscript, Recognition Boundary Theory: How One Ledger Holds Many Perspectives (doi:10.5281/zenodo.23721170). The paper has a page with a film and figures computed from the step itself: https://recognitionphysics.org/papers/one-who-is-looking/

•Nov 14, 2026•0 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

The Five Postulates of Quantum Mechanics on the Record: Theorems, Premises, and What Is Owed

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Quantum mechanics is taught from five postulates: a state is a vector in a complex space; left alone it turns by a unitary step that an energy operator generates; a measurement returns an outcome with a probability equal to a squared length; the state afterwards is the part that matches the outcome; and two systems together live in the product of their spaces. The textbook does not say where the five come from. We read each of them as a statement about one object, the recognition ledger, a record of events that is written in postings and never erased, and we say for each how much of it is then a theorem. The guiding sentence is short: histories that leave no record add, and what is on the record is counted. The record's clock makes a complex unit. The tick of the eight-position register has no complete set of real stationary states, and on the states that four ticks reverse, two ticks square to minus one. For a law on a finite-dimensional space whose factors all lie above zero, the unitary step is fixed up to its unit: a linear rule for the step that uses only the law between two records, keeps every length, regroups and is continuous is exp(−icH) with H = −log T, where T is the law itself. The square follows, for reads of a register's positions, from two principal properties and three mild ones: a read that weighs each position by its own value and adds over positions, is silent on an empty position and is never less for a larger value, and whose total is blind to a common turn of the register, is the sum of squares. For reads along other splittings of a space the square is a hypothesis. Two acts can be read together exactly when they commute, and reading one first moves the other's weights by an amount we give in closed form, never more than one half. Where a crossing takes held states off the held part, a contact divides a held state into a part left exactly as it was and a part with one crossing applied, with squared lengths cos²θ and sin²θ; where it keeps them held, the contact reads one sign of the register and nothing else. Two blocks of one cube compose by the product, their acts commute, and their correlations have three ceilings, 2, 2√2 and 4, for acts that only read, acts that write, and tables that merely do not signal; the cube reaches 2√2 exactly. Each theorem is proved on the page from premises we name, and we say postulate by postulate what that gives. The second follows from four statements about a linear step. The third follows for reads of positions, given that a read is taken position by position, which is owed. For the first, the clock makes a complex unit with no premise, the one such unit that is a whole number of ticks; that states are complex rests on a premise about the clock that is close to the conclusion, that a held register is among the states the unit acts on is a working statement, and from the second postulate on the spaces are taken complex, as in the textbook. Of the fourth the algebra is proved; the weights and the state afterwards are the textbook's, and that one outcome occurs is owed. The fifth is proved for two blocks of one cube and owed for two laboratories, where published network experiments exclude a real product whose sources share nothing. Several of the theorems are known results of the textbook's own mathematics, and the ledger enters through what their objects are identified with. What is owed is named in four statements, and we say how exact each is. The paper closes with twelve paradoxes of quantum mechanics, from the double slit to Wigner's friend, each in three lines: the puzzle, what the record says, and what is owed. Eleven of the twelve wait on the same owed statement, and every number they return is the textbook's own.

•Nov 14, 2026•0 citations

What is physics? The individual and the universal, and seeing past the noise

A. R. P. Rau

Along with weaving together observations, experiments, and theoretical constructs into a coherent mesh of understanding of the world around us, physics over its past five centuries has continuously refined the base concepts on which the whole framework is built. In quantum physics, first in non-relativistic mechanics and later in quantum field theories, even familiar concepts of position, momentum, wave or particle, are derived constructs from the classical limit in which we live but not intrinsic to the underlying physics. Most crucially, the very idea of the individual, whether an object or an event, distinguished only in a mere label of identity from others identical to it in all the physics, exists only as an approximation, not an element of underlying reality. Failure to recognize this and seeking alternative explanations in many worlds or multiverses leads only to incoherent logic and incorrect physics. As an example, in a physical system such as an atom in a particular state, physics deals with the universal system of all such atoms but makes no meaningful prediction of the position of an electron or the time of decay of any specific atom. Those are incidental, entirely random among all possible positions and times, even while physics makes very precise predictions for the distribution of the outcomes in measurements on atoms in that state. Physics deals with the universal, not the individual.

arXiv:1605.03106•Physics Essays•Mar 16, 2017•3 citations

The Five Postulates of Quantum Mechanics on the Record: Theorems, Premises, and What Is Owed

Jonathan Washburn

Quantum mechanics is taught from five postulates: a state is a vector in a complex space; left alone it turns by a unitary step that an energy operator generates; a measurement returns an outcome with a probability equal to a squared length; the state afterwards is the part that matches the outcome; and two systems together live in the product of their spaces. The textbook does not say where the five come from. We read each of them as a statement about one object, the recognition ledger, a record of events that is written in postings and never erased, and we say for each how much of it is then a theorem. The guiding sentence is short: histories that leave no record add, and what is on the record is counted. The record's clock makes a complex unit. The tick of the eight-position register has no complete set of real stationary states, and on the states that four ticks reverse, two ticks square to minus one. For a law on a finite-dimensional space whose factors all lie above zero, the unitary step is fixed up to its unit: a linear rule for the step that uses only the law between two records, keeps every length, regroups and is continuous is exp(−icH) with H = −log T, where T is the law itself. The square follows, for reads of a register's positions, from two principal properties and three mild ones: a read that weighs each position by its own value and adds over positions, is silent on an empty position and is never less for a larger value, and whose total is blind to a common turn of the register, is the sum of squares. For reads along other splittings of a space the square is a hypothesis. Two acts can be read together exactly when they commute, and reading one first moves the other's weights by an amount we give in closed form, never more than one half. Where a crossing takes held states off the held part, a contact divides a held state into a part left exactly as it was and a part with one crossing applied, with squared lengths cos²θ and sin²θ; where it keeps them held, the contact reads one sign of the register and nothing else. Two blocks of one cube compose by the product, their acts commute, and their correlations have three ceilings, 2, 2√2 and 4, for acts that only read, acts that write, and tables that merely do not signal; the cube reaches 2√2 exactly. Each theorem is proved on the page from premises we name, and we say postulate by postulate what that gives. The second follows from four statements about a linear step. The third follows for reads of positions, given that a read is taken position by position, which is owed. For the first, the clock makes a complex unit with no premise, the one such unit that is a whole number of ticks; that states are complex rests on a premise about the clock that is close to the conclusion, that a held register is among the states the unit acts on is a working statement, and from the second postulate on the spaces are taken complex, as in the textbook. Of the fourth the algebra is proved; the weights and the state afterwards are the textbook's, and that one outcome occurs is owed. The fifth is proved for two blocks of one cube and owed for two laboratories, where published network experiments exclude a real product whose sources share nothing. Several of the theorems are known results of the textbook's own mathematics, and the ledger enters through what their objects are identified with. What is owed is named in four statements, and we say how exact each is. The paper closes with twelve paradoxes of quantum mechanics, from the double slit to Wigner's friend, each in three lines: the puzzle, what the record says, and what is owed. Eleven of the twelve wait on the same owed statement, and every number they return is the textbook's own.

•Nov 15, 2026•0 citations

Reality, Measurement, and the State of the System in Quantum Mechanics

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It has always been the ideal of science to discover laws of nature on which we can all agree. Agreement requires evidence independent of individual judgment, i.e., objective evidence. We apply the term objective to such unbiased scientific evidence because we associate it with an external world of objects that we conceive to be the origin of our information. This external world is instinctively invented by each of us as a means of dealing with invariant patterns in his private world of experience. The invention is validated and elaborated as a consequence of the fact that it turns out to be sharable. In fact the common content of all our invented external worlds is so unambiguous and independent of individual bias that it can form the universally accepted basis for communication and action in an organized society. The consistency of the patterns of experience associated with the external world is such that we are under severe psychological compulsion to assign to this world an existence independent of our experience and a reality superior to that of any small part of our experience. Physical science is devoted to the study of the “laws” of the external physical universe, i.e., to the behaviour of the objects in it. Hence there is a strong tendency to project into the external world the information gathered by scientifically objective methods and even the theoretical concepts in terms of which the information is interpreted. Whatever is so projected is objective in a second sense of the term, i.e., assigned by us to the external world of objects.

Philosophy of Science•Oct 1, 1951•10 citations
Physics describes everything that can be seen and has never described the one who sees. Quantum theory, as it is used, needs an observer and does not say what one is. Relativity gives an observer a frame and not a self. Holography puts what can be known on a boundary and does not say whose. Recognition Boundary Theory is the missing law. Reality keeps one record, and a point of view is a boundary on it: a wall sealed when its history begins, a finite opening onto the rest, a motion inside that the record's own bookkeeping keeps going, and the record it writes. No body is on that list and no place is. For one explicit recognition step we prove that the walls are exact for every operation built from the record's own events (the record that makes them so is the history itself; no second system is used); that of the sixty-four independent states of one cell the bookkeeping keeps exactly four motions and their blends, the states that never fall silent, and that three entries expose every other state; that a state's own record decides whether it is kept and, along almost every endless record, brings its present onto one definite line; that joining in the regular order of entries creates no new participant; and that a finite opening tells apart no more states than it has settings, so that it always reads less than an unbounded record. Given two rhythms in an irrational ratio, every moment of the past has an address, and no reading depends on an entry that has not been written. We say what is proved, what is supplied, what is identified and what is open, and we give the case that such a boundary is a point of view that experiences.
Physics describes everything that can be seen and has never described the one who sees. Quantum theory, as it is used, needs an observer and does not say what one is. Relativity gives an observer a frame and not a self. Holography puts what can be known on a boundary and does not say whose. Recognition Boundary Theory is the missing law. Reality keeps one record, and a point of view is a boundary on it: a wall sealed when its history begins, a finite opening onto the rest, a motion inside that the record's own bookkeeping keeps going, and the record it writes. No body is on that list and no place is. For one explicit recognition step we prove that the walls are exact for every operation built from the record's own events (the record that makes them so is the history itself; no second system is used); that of the sixty-four independent states of one cell the bookkeeping keeps exactly four motions and their blends, the states that never fall silent, and that three entries expose every other state; that a state's own record decides whether it is kept and, along almost every endless record, brings its present onto one definite line; that joining in the regular order of entries creates no new participant; and that a finite opening tells apart no more states than it has settings, so that it always reads less than an unbounded record. Given two rhythms in an irrational ratio, every moment of the past has an address, and no reading depends on an entry that has not been written. We say what is proved, what is supplied, what is identified and what is open, and we give the case that such a boundary is a point of view that experiences. Version 1.1, 37 pages. The theorems cited from reference [1] are proved in the full manuscript, Recognition Boundary Theory: How One Ledger Holds Many Perspectives (doi:10.5281/zenodo.23721170). The paper has a page with a film and figures computed from the step itself: https://recognitionphysics.org/papers/one-who-is-looking/
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Quantum mechanics is taught from five postulates: a state is a vector in a complex space; left alone it turns by a unitary step that an energy operator generates; a measurement returns an outcome with a probability equal to a squared length; the state afterwards is the part that matches the outcome; and two systems together live in the product of their spaces. The textbook does not say where the five come from. We read each of them as a statement about one object, the recognition ledger, a record of events that is written in postings and never erased, and we say for each how much of it is then a theorem. The guiding sentence is short: histories that leave no record add, and what is on the record is counted. The record's clock makes a complex unit. The tick of the eight-position register has no complete set of real stationary states, and on the states that four ticks reverse, two ticks square to minus one. For a law on a finite-dimensional space whose factors all lie above zero, the unitary step is fixed up to its unit: a linear rule for the step that uses only the law between two records, keeps every length, regroups and is continuous is exp(−icH) with H = −log T, where T is the law itself. The square follows, for reads of a register's positions, from two principal properties and three mild ones: a read that weighs each position by its own value and adds over positions, is silent on an empty position and is never less for a larger value, and whose total is blind to a common turn of the register, is the sum of squares. For reads along other splittings of a space the square is a hypothesis. Two acts can be read together exactly when they commute, and reading one first moves the other's weights by an amount we give in closed form, never more than one half. Where a crossing takes held states off the held part, a contact divides a held state into a part left exactly as it was and a part with one crossing applied, with squared lengths cos²θ and sin²θ; where it keeps them held, the contact reads one sign of the register and nothing else. Two blocks of one cube compose by the product, their acts commute, and their correlations have three ceilings, 2, 2√2 and 4, for acts that only read, acts that write, and tables that merely do not signal; the cube reaches 2√2 exactly. Each theorem is proved on the page from premises we name, and we say postulate by postulate what that gives. The second follows from four statements about a linear step. The third follows for reads of positions, given that a read is taken position by position, which is owed. For the first, the clock makes a complex unit with no premise, the one such unit that is a whole number of ticks; that states are complex rests on a premise about the clock that is close to the conclusion, that a held register is among the states the unit acts on is a working statement, and from the second postulate on the spaces are taken complex, as in the textbook. Of the fourth the algebra is proved; the weights and the state afterwards are the textbook's, and that one outcome occurs is owed. The fifth is proved for two blocks of one cube and owed for two laboratories, where published network experiments exclude a real product whose sources share nothing. Several of the theorems are known results of the textbook's own mathematics, and the ledger enters through what their objects are identified with. What is owed is named in four statements, and we say how exact each is. The paper closes with twelve paradoxes of quantum mechanics, from the double slit to Wigner's friend, each in three lines: the puzzle, what the record says, and what is owed. Eleven of the twelve wait on the same owed statement, and every number they return is the textbook's own.
Along with weaving together observations, experiments, and theoretical constructs into a coherent mesh of understanding of the world around us, physics over its past five centuries has continuously refined the base concepts on which the whole framework is built. In quantum physics, first in non-relativistic mechanics and later in quantum field theories, even familiar concepts of position, momentum, wave or particle, are derived constructs from the classical limit in which we live but not intrinsic to the underlying physics. Most crucially, the very idea of the individual, whether an object or an event, distinguished only in a mere label of identity from others identical to it in all the physics, exists only as an approximation, not an element of underlying reality. Failure to recognize this and seeking alternative explanations in many worlds or multiverses leads only to incoherent logic and incorrect physics. As an example, in a physical system such as an atom in a particular state, physics deals with the universal system of all such atoms but makes no meaningful prediction of the position of an electron or the time of decay of any specific atom. Those are incidental, entirely random among all possible positions and times, even while physics makes very precise predictions for the distribution of the outcomes in measurements on atoms in that state. Physics deals with the universal, not the individual.
Quantum mechanics is taught from five postulates: a state is a vector in a complex space; left alone it turns by a unitary step that an energy operator generates; a measurement returns an outcome with a probability equal to a squared length; the state afterwards is the part that matches the outcome; and two systems together live in the product of their spaces. The textbook does not say where the five come from. We read each of them as a statement about one object, the recognition ledger, a record of events that is written in postings and never erased, and we say for each how much of it is then a theorem. The guiding sentence is short: histories that leave no record add, and what is on the record is counted. The record's clock makes a complex unit. The tick of the eight-position register has no complete set of real stationary states, and on the states that four ticks reverse, two ticks square to minus one. For a law on a finite-dimensional space whose factors all lie above zero, the unitary step is fixed up to its unit: a linear rule for the step that uses only the law between two records, keeps every length, regroups and is continuous is exp(−icH) with H = −log T, where T is the law itself. The square follows, for reads of a register's positions, from two principal properties and three mild ones: a read that weighs each position by its own value and adds over positions, is silent on an empty position and is never less for a larger value, and whose total is blind to a common turn of the register, is the sum of squares. For reads along other splittings of a space the square is a hypothesis. Two acts can be read together exactly when they commute, and reading one first moves the other's weights by an amount we give in closed form, never more than one half. Where a crossing takes held states off the held part, a contact divides a held state into a part left exactly as it was and a part with one crossing applied, with squared lengths cos²θ and sin²θ; where it keeps them held, the contact reads one sign of the register and nothing else. Two blocks of one cube compose by the product, their acts commute, and their correlations have three ceilings, 2, 2√2 and 4, for acts that only read, acts that write, and tables that merely do not signal; the cube reaches 2√2 exactly. Each theorem is proved on the page from premises we name, and we say postulate by postulate what that gives. The second follows from four statements about a linear step. The third follows for reads of positions, given that a read is taken position by position, which is owed. For the first, the clock makes a complex unit with no premise, the one such unit that is a whole number of ticks; that states are complex rests on a premise about the clock that is close to the conclusion, that a held register is among the states the unit acts on is a working statement, and from the second postulate on the spaces are taken complex, as in the textbook. Of the fourth the algebra is proved; the weights and the state afterwards are the textbook's, and that one outcome occurs is owed. The fifth is proved for two blocks of one cube and owed for two laboratories, where published network experiments exclude a real product whose sources share nothing. Several of the theorems are known results of the textbook's own mathematics, and the ledger enters through what their objects are identified with. What is owed is named in four statements, and we say how exact each is. The paper closes with twelve paradoxes of quantum mechanics, from the double slit to Wigner's friend, each in three lines: the puzzle, what the record says, and what is owed. Eleven of the twelve wait on the same owed statement, and every number they return is the textbook's own.
It has always been the ideal of science to discover laws of nature on which we can all agree. Agreement requires evidence independent of individual judgment, i.e., objective evidence. We apply the term objective to such unbiased scientific evidence because we associate it with an external world of objects that we conceive to be the origin of our information. This external world is instinctively invented by each of us as a means of dealing with invariant patterns in his private world of experience. The invention is validated and elaborated as a consequence of the fact that it turns out to be sharable. In fact the common content of all our invented external worlds is so unambiguous and independent of individual bias that it can form the universally accepted basis for communication and action in an organized society. The consistency of the patterns of experience associated with the external world is such that we are under severe psychological compulsion to assign to this world an existence independent of our experience and a reality superior to that of any small part of our experience. Physical science is devoted to the study of the “laws” of the external physical universe, i.e., to the behaviour of the objects in it. Hence there is a strong tendency to project into the external world the information gathered by scientifically objective methods and even the theoretical concepts in terms of which the information is interpreted. Whatever is so projected is objective in a second sense of the term, i.e., assigned by us to the external world of objects.