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ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)

Shorter VOLE-in-the-Head-based Signatures from Vector Semi-Commitment

Seongkwang Kim, Byeonghak Lee, M. H. Son

Published Nov 12, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The VOLE-in-the-Head (VOLEitH) paradigm compiles VOLE-based zero-knowledge proofs into publicly verifiable post-quantum signature schemes. A central component of VOLEitH is a GGM-style tree used to realize a vector commitment, whose size dominates the signature. In this work, we adapt vector semi-commitment (VSC)---previously developed for MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) by Kim et al. ( Eurocrypt 2025 )---to the VOLEitH paradigm and prove its security. While prior MPCitH analyses relied on assumption-specific, fragmented security proofs, we give a unified treatment that characterizes which abstract property the underlying tree must satisfy, and instantiate it under the random oracle, Davies--Meyer, counter (CTR), and pseudorandom generator (PRG) models. Building on this, we construct reduced VOLE-in-the-Head (rVOLEitH) and apply it to FAEST, one of the NIST additional post-quantum signature candidates, obtaining signature sizes comparable to those of FAEST v2.0, ranging from 94.9% to 102.8% of the corresponding FAEST v2.0 sizes, while attaining 27.7--124.2% faster signing and 28.3--115.3% faster verification for 128-bit parameters. Finally, we describe a forgery attack on a recently proposed VOLEitH variant of the subfield bilinear collision (SBC) signature scheme by Huth and Joux ( Asiacrypt 2025 ) which replaces leaf commitments with a single global commitment, demonstrating the necessity of the commitment structure retained by VSC.

DOI
10.1145/3830454.3846805

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The VOLE-in-the-Head (VOLEitH) paradigm compiles VOLE-based zero-knowledge proofs into publicly verifiable post-quantum signature schemes. A central component of VOLEitH is a GGM-style tree used to realize a vector commitment, whose size dominates the signature. In this work, we adapt vector semi-commitment (VSC)---previously developed for MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) by Kim et al. ( Eurocrypt 2025 )---to the VOLEitH paradigm and prove its security. While prior MPCitH analyses relied on assumption-specific, fragmented security proofs, we give a unified treatment that characterizes which abstract property the underlying tree must satisfy, and instantiate it under the random oracle, Davies--Meyer, counter (CTR), and pseudorandom generator (PRG) models. Building on this, we construct reduced VOLE-in-the-Head (rVOLEitH) and apply it to FAEST, one of the NIST additional post-quantum signature candidates, obtaining signature sizes comparable to those of FAEST v2.0, ranging from 94.9% to 102.8% of the corresponding FAEST v2.0 sizes, while attaining 27.7--124.2% faster signing and 28.3--115.3% faster verification for 128-bit parameters. Finally, we describe a forgery attack on a recently proposed VOLEitH variant of the subfield bilinear collision (SBC) signature scheme by Huth and Joux ( Asiacrypt 2025 ) which replaces leaf commitments with a single global commitment, demonstrating the necessity of the commitment structure retained by VSC.
We present a new method for transforming zero-knowledge protocols in the designated verifier setting into public-coin protocols, which can be made non-interactive and publicly verifiable. Our transformation applies to a large class of ZK protocols based on oblivious transfer. In particular, we show that it can be applied to recent, fast protocols based on vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE), with a technique we call VOLE-in-the-head, upgrading these protocols to support public verifiability. Our resulting ZK protocols have linear proof size, and are simpler, smaller and faster than related approaches based on MPC-in-the-head. To build VOLE-in-the-head while supporting both binary circuits and large finite fields, we develop several new technical tools. One of these is a new proof of security for the SoftSpokenOT protocol (Crypto 2022), which generalizes it to produce certain types of VOLE correlations over large fields. Secondly, we present a new ZK protocol that is tailored to take advantage of this form of VOLE, which leads to a publicly verifiable VOLE-in-the-head protocol with only 2x more communication than the best, designated-verifier VOLE-based protocols. We analyze the soundness of our approach when made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transform, using round-by-round soundness. As an application of the resulting NIZK, we present FAEST\textsf{FAEST}FAEST , a post-quantum signature scheme based on AES. FAEST is the first AES-based signature scheme to be smaller than SPHINCS+, with signature sizes between 5.6 and 6.6kB at the 128-bit security level. Compared with the smallest version of SPHINCS+ (7.9kB), FAEST verification is slower, but the signing times are between 8x and 40x faster.
The MPC-in-the-Head paradigm is a promising approach for constructing post-quantum signatures, and its variants VOLE-in-the-Head (VOLEitH) and TC-in-the-Head (TCitH) are adopted in some NIST PQC candidates. Recent works by Aguilar-Melchor et al. (ASIACRYPT 2023), Hülsing et al. (CRYPTO 2024), and Baum et al. (CRYPTO 2025) establish EUF-CMA security for MPCitH/VOLEitH in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), but these proofs either ignore crucial optimizations such as rejection sampling and grinding or rely on round-by-round soundness and key-generation lossiness. Due to these restrictions, they do not directly apply to TCitH signatures such as Mirath, RYDE, or MQOM. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing the QROM security of TCitH signatures that incorporate the crucial optimizations. Our treatment of rejection sampling and grinding applies more generally to MPCitH signatures, while our complete security proofs are instantiated for the TCitH signatures Mirath and RYDE. Our contributions are twofold: 1) We provide a new (strong) EUF-CMA security proof that accommodates rejection sampling and grinding. 2) We identify a gap in the EUF-CMA proof of MQOM and show that this issue extends to some schemes, including SBC (Huth and Joux, CRYPTO 2024) and rBN++ (Kim, Lee, and Son, EUROCRYPT 2025).
The rise of quantum computing threatens to break many of the cryptographic systems that secure today’s digital world. In response, researchers are developing new tools designed to remain secure in a post-quantum future. Most of the promising candidates for post-quantum digital signatures rely on security assumptions based on lattices or properties of hash functions. Another promising approach transforms secure multi-party computation protocols into zero-knowledge proofs, which are then turned into digital signatures. This technique, known as multi-party computation in-the-head (MPCitH), offers strong security properties and flexibility for distributed applications. This thesis investigates whether MPCitH digital signatures can be efficiently adapted for use by two cooperating parties to jointly produce a signature. Here we show how to construct two-party signatures based on syndrome decoding in-the-head (SDitH) signatures. We propose a provably secure scheme that achieves the smallest known communication overhead among two-party MPCitH signatures, while resulting in a signature size approximately double that of a single-prover variant. This result provides a new data point in the design space of multi-party MPCitH signatures and post-quantum digital signatures in general.
Since 2016’s NIST call for standardization of post-quantum cryptographic primitives, developing efficient post-quantum secure digital signature schemes has become a highly active area of research. The difficulty in constructing such schemes is evidenced by NIST reopening the call in 2022 for digital signature schemes, because of missing diversity in existing proposals. In this work, we introduce the new postquantum digital signature scheme MiRitH. As direct successor of a scheme recently developed by Adj, Rivera-Zamarripa and Verbel (Africacrypt ’23), it is based on the hardness of the MinRank problem and follows the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm. We revisit the initial proposal, incorporate design-level improvements and provide more efficient parameter sets. We also provide the missing justification for the quantum security of all parameter sets following NIST metrics. In this context we design a novel Grover-amplified quantum search algorithm for solving the MinRank problem that outperforms a naive quantum brute-force search for the solution.MiRitH obtains signatures of size 5.7 kB for NIST category I security and therefore competes for the smallest signatures among any post-quantum signature following the MPCitH paradigm.At the same time MiRitH offers competitive signing and verification timings compared to the state of the art. To substantiate those claims we provide extensive implementations. This includes a reference implementation as well as optimized constant-time implementations for Intel processors (AVX2), and for the ARM (NEON) architecture. The speedup of our optimized AVX2 implementation relies mostly on a redesign of the finite field arithmetic, improving over existing implementations as well as an improved memory management.
The MPC-in-the-head technique (Ishai et al., STOC 2007) is a celebrated method to build zero-knowledge protocols with desirable theoretical properties and high practical efficiency. This technique has generated a large body of research and has influenced the design of real-world post-quantum cryptographic signatures. In this work, we present a generalization of the MPC-in-the-head paradigm to the quantum setting, where the MPC is running a quantum computation. As an application of our framework, we propose a new approach to build zero-knowledge protocols where security holds even against a verifier that can obtain a superposition of transcripts. This notion was pioneered by Damgard et al., who built a zero-knowledge protocol for NP (in the common reference string model) secure against superposition attacks, by relying on perfectly hiding and unconditionally binding dual-mode commitments. Unfortunately, no such commitments are known from standard cryptographic assumptions. In this work we revisit this problem, and present two new three-round protocols in the common reference string model: (i) A zero-knowledge argument for NP, whose security reduces to the standard learning with errors (LWE) problem. (ii) A zero-knowledge argument for QMA from the same assumption.
Nowadays, quantum computing is developing at an unprecedented speed. This will pose a serious threat to the security of widely used public-key cryptosystems in the near future. Scientists are actively looking for ways to protect against quantum attacks; however, existing solutions still face different limitations in terms of efficiency and practicality. This paper explores hash-based digital signature schemes, post-quantum vector commitments and Verkle tree-based approaches for protecting against quantum attacks. The paper proposes an improved approach to generating digital signatures based on Verkle trees using lattice based vector commitments. In order to further reduce the memory space, the paper offers the methodology of integrating a post-quantum secure pseudo-random number generator into the scheme. Finally, the paper proposes an efficient post-quantum digital signature scheme based on Verkle trees, which minimizes memory requirements and reduces the signature size. Our proposed framework has strong resistance to quantum attacks, as well as high speed and efficiency. This study is an important contribution to the elaboration of post-quantum cryptosystems, which lays the foundation for developing secure and practical digital signature systems in the face of emerging quantum threats.