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A Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Identification Scheme

Maryam Rezaei Kashi, Mojtaba Bahramian

Published Dec 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

‎In this paper‎, ‎we introduce a zero-knowledge identification protocol designed for authentication within the supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange framework‎. ‎The protocol allows both parties to participate as either the prover or the verifier‎, ‎with the goal of proving that they know their private information‎. ‎We show the completeness and soundness of the protocol by showing that the privacy of both the prover and the verifier depends on the difficulty of solving the extended isogeny logarithm problem‎. ‎A new authentication protocol for SIDH is presented in this paper‎, ‎that is secure against attacks from eavesdroppers‎.

DOI
10.22052/mir.2025.255716.1483

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AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations
‎In this paper‎, ‎we introduce a zero-knowledge identification protocol designed for authentication within the supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange framework‎. ‎The protocol allows both parties to participate as either the prover or the verifier‎, ‎with the goal of proving that they know their private information‎. ‎We show the completeness and soundness of the protocol by showing that the privacy of both the prover and the verifier depends on the difficulty of solving the extended isogeny logarithm problem‎. ‎A new authentication protocol for SIDH is presented in this paper‎, ‎that is secure against attacks from eavesdroppers‎.
The goal of this project is to understand and analyze the supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH), a post-quantum key exchange protocol which security lies on the isogeny-finding problem between supersingular elliptic curves. In order to do so, we first introduce the reader to cryptography focusing on key agreement protocols and motivate the rise of post-quantum cryptography as a necessity with the existence of the model of quantum computation. We review some of the known attacks on the SIDH and finally study some algorithmic aspects to understand how the protocol can be implemented.
Quantum computing threatens classical key exchange protocols such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH). Post-quantum schemes like Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) offer quantum resistance but at notable computational and communication costs. We propose DualSecure Key Exchange (DSKE), a hybrid protocol that integrates the classical security of ECDH with the quantum resistance of SIDH. Methodology: DSKE jointly derives two shared secrets -KECDH via elliptic-curve scalar multiplication over a 256-bit prime field and KSIDHvia supersingular isogeny mappings—then fuses them using a secure KDF (e.g., SHA-3): K=KDF(KECDH || KSIDH). We formalize core operations and asymptotics (ECDH O(n3); SIDH O(mlog m)), specify key materials, and fix parameter choices aligned with established baselines (e.g., Curve25519 for ECDH and standard SIKE/SIDH parameter sets) to ensure reproducibility. Experimental settings: Evaluations were conducted on an Intel Core i7 with 16 GB RAM using Python-based cryptographic libraries, with repeated trials for timing stability. Results: DSKE achieves runtime = 6.6 ms versus ECDH = 1.2 ms and SIDH = 5.4 ms; communication = 512 bytes versus ECDH = 128 bytes and SIDH = 384 bytes; and key size 1024 bits (hybrid) versus 256 bits (ECDH) and 768 bits (SIDH). Comparative analysis against SIKE further contextualizes DSKE’s efficiency–security trade-off. Security strength follows the minimum of the constituent levels; with a 256-bit prime for ECDH (=128-bit classical) and standard SIDH/SIKE parameters (targeting =128-bit quantum), the fused key maintains an effective 128-bit level under the stated assumptions and KDF construction. These results indicate that DSKE offers a balanced pathway toward post-quantum readiness, particularly for long-lived, security-critical deployments that can tolerate modest overheads for dual-layer protection.
Abstract The Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol is a leading contender for post-quantum cryptography. However, recent advances, specifically the Castryck-Decru attack, have exposed significant security flaws, primarily related to the predictability of torsion points and vulnerabilities in curve parameters. This study proposes and evaluates enhancements to the SIDH protocol, including increasing the size of torsion subgroups, introducing randomized isogeny generation , and employing advanced obfuscation techniques. Experimental results demonstrate that these modifications substantially improve SIDH’s security, with a manageable increase in computational overhead, positioning SIDH as a more resilient candidate for post-quantum cryptographic applications.
The goal of this thesis is to implement a software library that provides a wrapping of real-time socket- like communication into an cryptographic protocol with purpose similar to SSL or TLS, that is secure against an adversary in possession of a quantum computer. Resulting software utilizes the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) key-exchange algorithm for achieving this level of security, and is simple, portable and independent on system-specific primitives. The thesis gives a concise introduction to the theory on which SIDH is built, targeting the audience of undergraduate students of Computer Science. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
In this paper, we have discussed isogeny-based cryptography as a rather appealing option for post-quantum security. We provide analysis of current protocols like SIDH (Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman) and SIKE (Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation) setting up fundamental issues with their security and performance. In this work we introduce a novel isogeny pathfinding algorithm that employs graph theory as well as probabilistic models in order to lower its computational complexity. The results show significant improvement in both efficiency and security, strengthening the case for the use of isogeny based systems in a quantum-resilient cryptographic space.
Collision-resistant hashing and key exchange are two significant Post Quantum cryptography challenges based on isogeny. The challenge in isogeny-based encryption is to identify an isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2, between two given supersingular elliptic curves defined over a finite field Fq. Finding End(E1) and End(E2) is the analogous problem to this one. Supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) key exchange is designed to be quantum secure. In this instance, we take advantage of the endomorphism ring’s non-commutative property. In SIDH, both the initiator and the response contribute equally to the shared secret. Here, we create both public and private keys and send them through an unsecured channel. Finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves is the fundamentally challenging problem. The needed isogeny is calculated using the torsion point information and the degree of the secret isogeny.In July 2022, Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru devised a successful key recovery attack on SIDH/ SIKE. The attack heavily depends on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob communicate during the protocol and is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves. We shall present a successful technique to prevent the aforementioned attack in this paper.