Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a theoretically secure means of communication through the application of fundamental physical principles, i.e., the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the no-cloning theorem. However, a significant gap exists between mathematical theory and physical implementation because real-world devices are unable to achieve the “perfect” properties required for mathematical security proofs. Consequently, these physical flaws create exploitable vulnerability surfaces known as side-channels. This thesis presents a structured literature review of 47 sources published between 2016 and 2026 to categorize these threats and their respective countermeasures. The study employs a practical QKD reference model to map threats to specific hardware components on both the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob). Critical vulnerabilities are examined, such as Trojan-horse, reference-beam, laser-seeding, and optical-pumping attacks on the transmitter, alongside detector blinding, efficiency mismatch, APD backflash, and temporal effects on the receiver. The research develops a Comparative Evaluation Matrix to standardize these diverse findings by scoring each threat based on its loophole likelihood, technology requirements, and potential information gain. It identifies several high-risk vulnerabilities across the transmitter and receiver sides, with the receiver side being the highest-risk area in the system. Although localized hardware defenses represent an essential first layer of protection, they are insufficient on their own due to fundamental physical constraints such as spectral holes. Finally, the thesis evaluates architectural shifts and concludes that certified hardware standards and unified security proofs are paramount for future systems to realistically deliver information-theoretic security.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a theoretically secure means of communication through the application of fundamental physical principles, i.e., the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the no-cloning theorem. However, a significant gap exists between mathematical theory and physical implementation because real-world devices are unable to achieve the “perfect” properties required for mathematical security proofs. Consequently, these physical flaws create exploitable vulnerability surfaces known as side-channels. This thesis presents a structured literature review of 47 sources published between 2016 and 2026 to categorize these threats and their respective countermeasures. The study employs a practical QKD reference model to map threats to specific hardware components on both the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob). Critical vulnerabilities are examined, such as Trojan-horse, reference-beam, laser-seeding, and optical-pumping attacks on the transmitter, alongside detector blinding, efficiency mismatch, APD backflash, and temporal effects on the receiver. The research develops a Comparative Evaluation Matrix to standardize these diverse findings by scoring each threat based on its loophole likelihood, technology requirements, and potential information gain. It identifies several high-risk vulnerabilities across the transmitter and receiver sides, with the receiver side being the highest-risk area in the system. Although localized hardware defenses represent an essential first layer of protection, they are insufficient on their own due to fundamental physical constraints such as spectral holes. Finally, the thesis evaluates architectural shifts and concludes that certified hardware standards and unified security proofs are paramount for future systems to realistically deliver information-theoretic security.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. However, practical implementations deviate from idealized models and are therefore susceptible to side-channel attacks that exploit physical imperfections rather than theoretical vulnerabilities. Over the past two decades, a wide range of attacks have been demonstrated against QKD systems, including those targeting detectors, sources, timing information, power consumption, and electromagnetic emissions. This paper addresses a selection of a few side-channel attacks reported in the literature, classifying them according to their underlying physical mechanisms and attack strategies. We analyze their impact on the security of different QKD protocols and platforms, and highlight how experimental demonstrations have shaped the community's understanding of implementation security. In addition, we present and evaluate mitigation techniques proposed to date, such as device-independent and measurement-device-independent QKD, hardware countermeasures, monitoring strategies, and so on. We also identify open challenges and promising directions for enhancing the robustness of future quantum communication systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that enables secure private key exchange between geographically distant parties over an insecure channel, protecting confidentiality against potential eavesdroppers. QKD has evolved significantly since its inception with the BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. Its theoretical foundation relies on quantum physics, particularly the uncertainty principle, the no-cloning theorem, and particle entanglement, which ensures its information-theoretic security when combined with the one-time-pad cryptographic algorithm. However, certain security loopholes persist in terms of practical implementation in commercial devices. Some vulnerabilities are associated with side-channel vectors linked to commonly used optical subcomponents, while others are more related to how existing protocols handle encoding and communication pipelines. In this work, we aim to comprehensively study the current state of security loopholes affecting QKD technology in commercial devices. We also provide a concise overview of the existing types of QKD implementations. Additionally, we offer insights into current trends and vulnerability countermeasures, paving the way for future research and novel mechanisms to enhance the implementation security of commercial QKD devices.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is widely regarded as a highly secure quantum encryption approach since it applies theoretical principles of quantum mechanics as a medium of security, unlike classical encryption processes that rely on complex mathematics. However, practical QKD systems are vulnerable due to imperfect photon source hardware, communication channel, and detector implementation. These hardware imperfections open side channels that an adversary can exploit without violating principles of quantum mechanics. This review provides a comprehensive overview of the current QKD protocols, quantum hacking strategies and their operating principles, vulnerable hardware components and their mitigation techniques. This paper further investigates how state-of-the-art paradigms based on artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), along with key subfields—such as deep learning (DL), deep reinforcement learning (DRL), and quantum machine learning (QML)—are reshaping the domain. In particular, this paper analyzes their dual roles as enablers of sophisticated attacks and as instruments for attack detection and mitigation. By jointly addressing the challenges in quantum communication and adaptive learning, as well as attack and detection architectures, this survey elucidates both the capabilities and the limitations of contemporary attack-detection mechanisms in the field. This survey seeks to establish a unified framework that conceptually integrates physical-layer quantum hacking with AI-/ML-based security, emphasizing their dual function as both an intelligent defensive layer and a potential tool for advanced threats.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is regarded as providing information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a substantial body of practical attacks shows that deployed QKD systems can be compromised without violating these principles, by exploiting weaknesses in devices, control processes, and system integration. This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on the system and infrastructure security of QKD deployments. We analyze 81 research works and develop a unified taxonomy together with an assumption-based model that explains attacks as violations of a small set of shared system assumptions spanning transmitters, channels, receivers, and classical infrastructure.Our central finding is that practical QKD security is limited not by the absence of defenses, but by the absence of system-level assurance. Existing work strengthens individual components but does not ensure that these protections guarantee end-to-end security. This creates an assurance gap: local defenses exist, yet there is no reliable way to confirm that system-wide assumptions remain valid in real deployments. We show that attacks follow recurring mechanisms and that infrastructure dependencies remain fragmented. Taken together, this work reframes QKD security as a system-level assurance problem driven by engineering realities, essential for hybrid QKD and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) architectures/quantum-safe infrastructures.
Information security becomes an inseparable part of our everyday life. An encryption \nmethod widely used today is public-key encryption. The security of this method is based on \na hard to solve mathematical problems against an adversary with limited computational \npower. Such an assumption could be broken as our understanding of the mathematics \nbeing improved or new computation tools being developed. One such tool that poses a \nthreat to the public key encryption is a quantum computer. As a result, a new encryption \nmethod with a new security assumption is required. \nQuantum key distribution is a point-to-point symmetric key distribution method with \nsecurity based on the law of physics. In theory, the key generated by QKD is informationtheoretic secured. However, in practice, physical devices could have flaws or possess some \nbehaviors deviated from the theoretical model. These imperfections could open security \nloopholes for an adversary to exploit, compromising the security. Thus the security verification and system characterization of practical implementation of QKD are necessary. \nThe necessity of this verification is further emphasized as several QKD systems are being \ncommercialized and used in several discrete communication links today. \nTo extend this new encryption system’s practical implementation on a wider network \nscale requires a set of standards or common practices for developers and service providers \nto follow. This set of rules is set to ensure the compatibility of different device models in \nthe network and ensure the security of each component in the system, which would affect \nthe security of the system as a whole. \nTo fulfill standardization and certification criteria, a record of best practice on security \nanalysis, system design, device characterization, and security verification of QKD implementation is required. The research projects throughout my Ph.D. study contribute toward \nthis practice. These studies also address some issues and provide possible solutions to the \ndevelopment of a standard for QKD. This thesis is a collection of six experimental studies \non performance evaluation and security verification of different components of practical \nquantum key distribution systems. \nThe first study is a comparison between the performance of the QKD system with \nquantum dot (QD) as a single-photon source and the performance of QKD with weakcoherent pulsed (WCP) source. The result shows that the QKD with QD could generate \nthe key at higher channel loss than WCP QKD using the same laser source. This result \nshows the potential of QKD with a single-photon source as a candidate for secret key \ndistribution over high channel loss, such as up-link satellite-based QKD. \nThe second study is a theoretical study on the method to characterize the QKD system \nagainst the Trojan-horse attack being considered as a standard for the QKD system. The \nresult shows a possible loophole of this method against a more powerful adversary than \nassumed in the previously proposed model. An improved version of characterization against \na more general form of Trojan-horse attack has been proposed. \nThe third experiment is on the information leakage from a free-space QKD receiver due \nto detector backflash, a photon produced by the detector upon detection. The result shows \nthat the backflash photons carry the information of the ’clicked’ detector that could be \ntransmitted back to the channel and discriminated by Eve. An experimental demonstration \nof this attack has been performed. Countermeasure both in theory and practical setup has \nbeen proposed. \nThe next experiment is on the effect of atmospheric turbulence on Eve’s spatial-mode \ndetection efficiency mismatch attack on the free-space QKD system. We show that, by \nusing a phase-only spatial light modulator (SLM) and hologram created by Zernike polynomials, atmospheric turbulence with various strength covered from sea level to upper \natmosphere can be experimentally emulated in the lab environment. We then use that \nsetup to show the limit of the distance that Eve’s attack is successful. The theoretical \nlimit of the attack distance also shown. \nIn the fifth study, we use the SLM and Zernike polynomial holograms to characterize a \nfree-space QKD system against spatial mode attack. The result shows that, with higherorder spatial modes and finer control of wavefront intensity distribution, Eve could bypass \nthe countermeasure proposed in our previous study. We proposed a more robust version \nof countermeasure against spatial mode attack. The new countermeasure is verified by the \nSLM setup. \nThe last study is on the fake-state attack on the transition edge sensor (TES). The \nresult shows that TES’s voltage response can be deterministically controlled by Eve using \nbright laser through the input channel. It also shows that the photon number result from \nTES can be controlled by Eve. An attack model exploiting this imperfection has been \nshown. \nIn addition to the contribution to the standardization of the QKD system, I hope that \nthe result of this thesis would emphasize the necessity of security verification of the QKD \nsystem and the verification of countermeasure and characterization method against more \ngeneral attack model. Although the unconditional security, promised in theory, could not \nyet be achieved, this loop of hacking and patching should provide us information and insight \non which security level could be claimed from the practical QKD devices implementing \ntoday.