Quantum key distribution turns the disturbance of quantum states into an alarm: any eavesdropping on the quantum channel raises the error rate, and the secret key rate falls as errors rise. This paper designs a decoy-state BB84 terminal for a 20 km fibre link and computes the value of stabilising the encoding interferometer against a torsion phase reference. Stabilisation that reduces the quantum bit error rate from 3.0 percent to 1.5 percent raises the asymptotic secret key rate by a factor of 1.27, to 47046 kbit per second at a 1 GHz clock. The calculation uses the standard decoy-state rate formula with the stated channel and detector parameters. The terminal is a design study; no key has been generated.
Quantum key distribution turns the disturbance of quantum states into an alarm: any eavesdropping on the quantum channel raises the error rate, and the secret key rate falls as errors rise. This paper designs a decoy-state BB84 terminal for a 20 km fibre link and computes the value of stabilising the encoding interferometer against a torsion phase reference. Stabilisation that reduces the quantum bit error rate from 3.0 percent to 1.5 percent raises the asymptotic secret key rate by a factor of 1.27, to 47046 kbit per second at a 1 GHz clock. The calculation uses the standard decoy-state rate formula with the stated channel and detector parameters. The terminal is a design study; no key has been generated.
Design blueprint derived from the source paper (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24138548): Quantum key distribution turns the disturbance of quantum states into an alarm: any eavesdropping on the quantum channel raises the error rate, and the secret key rate falls as errors rise. Status: DESIGN BLUEPRINT — SIMULATED, NOT MEASURED — NOT BUILT. All numbers are simulated values from the source paper's computation, deposited with this blueprint as compute.py and results.json. AI-use disclosure: Dave, an AI research system, assisted with the computation and drafting under the author's direction; author of record William Alexander Aldred.
Quantum key distribution is sold on security, never on energy. This paper prices a stated decoy-state BB84 link end to end: the secret-key rate is computed from the standard asymptotic decoy-state yield model (Lo, Ma and Chen 2005; Ma et al. 2005) at a 1 GHz clock, mean photon number 0.5, 0.2 dB/km fibre loss, and published detector classes, and divided into the stated total wall-plug power including detector cooling and classical post-processing. With InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (190 W total) the link delivers 7.68 Mbit/s at zero distance at 2.48e-05 J per secret bit and 57.37 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.31e-03 J per bit, with no key beyond about 134 km. With superconducting nanowire detectors (1690 W total, including a 1500 W closed-cycle cryocooler) it delivers 44.72 Mbit/s at zero distance at 3.78e-05 J per bit, 431.62 kbit/s at 100 km at 3.92e-03 J per bit, and 41.32 kbit/s at 150 km at 4.09e-02 J per bit, with no key beyond about 222 km. Energy per bit rises by a factor of 133.8 (avalanche) and 103.6 (nanowire) between 0 km and 100 km. A stated classical X25519 handshake costs 1.00e-03 J, or 3.91e-06 J per key bit, so the quantum link is 848 times (avalanche) and 1002 times (nanowire) as expensive per key bit at 100 km. Information-theoretic key security costs microjoules per bit at short range and millijoules per bit at 100 km, rising exponentially thereafter. Model calculations are labelled SIMULATED, NOT MEASURED. The deposit includes the paper PDF and text, the computation script (compute.py) that produces every number in the paper, and its outputs (results.json, results.txt).
Decoy state quantum key distribution (QKD), being capable of beating PNS attack and being unconditionally secure, has become attractive recently. However, in many QKD systems, disturbances of transmission channel make the quantum bit error rate (QBER) increase, which limits both security distance and key bit rate of real-world decoy state QKD systems. We demonstrate the two-intensity decoy QKD with a one-way Faraday-Michelson phase modulation system, which is free of channel disturbance and keeps an interference fringe visibility (99%) long period, over a 120km single mode optical fibre in telecom (1550 nm) wavelength. This is the longest distance fibre decoy state QKD system based on the two-intensity protocol.
The decoy-state method is a prominent approach to enhance the performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that operate with weak coherent laser sources. Due to the limited transmissivity of single photons in optical fiber, current experimental decoy-state QKD setups increase their secret key rate by raising the repetition rate of the transmitter. However, this usually leads to correlations between subsequent optical pulses. This phenomenon leaks information about the encoding settings, including the intensities of the generated signals, which invalidates a basic premise of decoy-state QKD. Here we characterize intensity correlations between the emitted optical pulses in two industrial prototypes of decoy-state BB84 QKD systems and show that they significantly reduce the asymptotic key rate. In contrast to what has been conjectured, we experimentally confirm that the impact of higher-order correlations on the intensity of the generated signals can be much higher than that of nearest-neighbor correlations.
A quantum key distribution system based on the subcarrier wave modulation method has been demonstrated which employs the BB84 protocol with a strong reference to generate secure bits at a rate of 16.5 kbit/s with an error of 0.5% over an optical channel of 10 dB loss, and 18 bits/s with an error of 0.75% over 25 dB of channel loss. To the best of our knowledge, these results represent the highest channel loss reported for secure quantum key distribution using the subcarrier wave approach. A passive unidirectional scheme has been used to compensate for the polarization dependence of the phase modulators in the receiver module, which resulted in a high visibility of 98.8%. The system is thus fully insensitive to polarization fluctuations and robust to environmental changes, making the approach promising for use in optical telecommunication networks. Further improvements in secure key rate and transmission distance can be achieved by implementing the decoy states protocol or by optimizing the mean photon number used in line with experimental parameters.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises provably secure communications. In order to improve the secret key rate, combining a biased basis choice with the decoy-state method is proposed. Concomitantly, there is a basis-independent detection efficiency condition, which usually cannot be satisfied in a practical system, such as the time-phase encoding. Fortunately, this flaw has been recently removed theoretically and experimentally in the four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol using the fact that the expected yields of single-photon states prepared in two bases stay the same for a given measurement basis. However, the security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. In this work, we provide the rigorous finite-key security bounds in the universally composable framework for the four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol. We build a time-phase encoding system with 200 MHz clock to implement this protocol, in which the real-time secret key rate is more than 60 kbps over 50 km single-mode fiber.