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Which Space Is Real? A Review of Mamun's "Algebraic Quantum Mechanics and Hilbert Space Realism: The Ontological and Epistemological Nexus (Vol-I)

Prince Mahmud

Published Nov 9, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This review examines Dr. Syed Muntasir Mamun’s paper “Algebraic Quantum Mechanics and Hilbert Space Realism: The Ontological and Epistemological Nexus (Vol-I)” (2026). The paper asks what the mathematics of quantum theory represents. It explains the Gelfand–Naimark–Segal (GNS) construction, by which a Hilbert space representation is generated from an abstract C*-algebra of observables and a state; discusses the interpretive problem posed by unitarily inequivalent representations in systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom, drawing on Ruetsche’s Coalescence Approach; and compares positions that treat different mathematical structures as real, from Algebraic Imperialism to Wavefunction Realism, Spacetime State Realism and Hilbert Space Realism (“Mad-Dog Everettianism”). It closes with phenomenological critiques and directions for future research. This review identifies three strengths: a clear exposition of the GNS construction and its philosophical significance; a well-organised map of competing ontologies; and a useful agenda for future research. It then raises four points for further discussion: a few technical statements that could be made more precise; the balance between the positions discussed; the choice of sources; and presentation. It closes with broader implications for interdisciplinary work in the foundations of physics.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.24073654

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Algebraic Quantum Mechanics and Hilbert Space Realism The Ontological and Epistemological Nexus (Vol-I)

Syed Muntasir Mamun

This comprehensive review dissects the profound philosophical tension at the core of quantum foundations: the ontological status of the Hilbert space formalism versus the abstract algebra of observables. Focusing on the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construction, the paper first establishes this theorem as the foundational mathematical bridge that uniquely derives a geometric Hilbert space representation from any given C*-algebra of observables and a specified physical state. The analysis then evaluates the interpretational crisis presented by the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations (UIRs) in infinite quantum systems, which challenges the ideal of a single, universal quantum state space. By comparing Algebraic Imperialism (Algebraic Quantum Field Theory) with highly sophisticated realist programs, the paper details the radical objectification of the Hilbert space. Specifically, it contrasts Wavefunction Realism (WFR), which posits a physically real field in a high-dimensional configuration space, with the minimalist ontology of Hilbert Space Realism (HSR), or "Mad-Dog Everettianism". Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/132963048/download_file?s=portfolio

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This report examines the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics, challenging the notion that geometric space and classical subsystems are primordial axioms of nature. By integrating algebraic quantum mechanics, quantum mereology, discrete homology, and topos theory, the study demonstrates that these features emerge dynamically from purely quantum mechanical precursors. The synthesis utilizes the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construction to derive geometric Hilbert spaces from abstract algebraic relations, effectively relegating the Hilbert space to a derived and contingent structure rather than a fundamental one. The research further employs a "basic shapes" paradigm in discrete homology to efficiently compute the higher-order structures of complex networks, bypassing the exponential computational bottlenecks traditionally associated with high-dimensional topological analysis. By identifying a minimal universal set of atomic configurations, such as the triangular prism or the discrete hypercube, the dimensionality of the boundary matrix is collapsed, achieving median speedups of 47.5x over previous algorithms. KSCCN Mamun, SM (2026) ………………………………….1 Algebraic, Topological, and Mereological Foundations of Quantum Information: A Synthetic Framework for Emergent Geometry, Computational Physics, and Cosmology K S C Furthermore, the report establishes a link between subatomic gauge symmetries and cosmological dark energy through the Axion-Modulated Quintessence framework. Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/133038377/download_file?s=portfolio

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The received view in the philosophy of physics is that a quantum theory is given its mathematical formulation in a so-called Hilbert space, with the states of a quantum system given by the elements of this space and observables—measurable quantities of the system—given by so-called operators on this space. But the status of this fundamental postulate becomes threatened when one moves to complex systems, like the quantum fields underlying fundamental particle physics or statistical systems composed of infinite collections of quantum particles. In these more complex cases, one finds many inequivalent Hilbert space representations that appear to be competing quantum theories. In looking for a mathematical structure of the theory to interpret as representing the physical world, one is faced with a choice: either arbitrarily pick one Hilbert space representation (out of the many competing representations) as a Hilbert Space Conservative, or else look for the abstract algebraic structure that all of these competing representations have in common as an Algebraic Imperialist. This dissertation provides an extended argument for the second route.

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The World in the Wave Function

David J. Wallace

David Lewis famously quipped that he was willing to take metaphysical lessons from quantum mechanics only when it cleaned up its own act by providing interpretations or modifications of the formalism shorn of appeal to consciousness, irreducibly macroscopic notions, or outright instrumentalism. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, multiple approaches to quantum mechanics had been developed to a degree which met Lewis’s challenge: dynamical-collapse theories, Bohm-style hidden-variable theories, and Everett-style many-worlds theories, for all their respective problems and challenges, all offer ways of understanding quantum mechanics that metaphysicians can reasonably engage with. And so the last twenty years have seen a resurgence in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, the question of what ontology and ideology is appropriate to a quantum universe. The metaphysics of quantum mechanics is not independent of the quantum measurement problem but does not coincide with it, either: there is a widespread view that adopting, say, the Everett interpretation still leaves significant ontological questions undecided, and conversely, a given answer to those questions might answer them for a dynamical-collapse theory too.Wave function realism has become a leading contender for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, particularly in the case of dynamical-collapse and Everettian approaches. The starting point is nonrelativistic quantum mechanics expressed in configuration space: mathematically, the subject matter of the theory is a complex function of 3N variables, evolving under the Schrödinger equation (perhaps interrupted by occasional stochastic collapses). Traditionally those 3N variables are interpreted as the three coordinates of position of N particles—but in wave function realism, they are interpreted as points in a new, high-dimensional space. Quantum mechanics, according to the wave function realist, fundamentally concerns the undulations of the wave function in this space; three-dimensional goings-on are emergent, high-level, derivative.Alyssa Ney has been a leading figure in the development of wave function realism for most of its existence. Her articles advocating and developing the position have been highly influential, and the present book can be seen as the culmination of this line of her research and is the definitive statement of wave function realism as of 2021. Despite its comparative brevity, the book is too rich to be adequately described—far less critiqued—in this brief review; my goal is to give an overview of the main themes and arguments, and to make a few critical remarks along the way.The World in the Wavefunction is not formally divided into parts, but it can profitably be thought of that way. Chapters 1 through 3 develop the core case for wave function realism. Chapter 4 defends the position from the frequent criticism that it is restricted to nonrelativistic physics, by providing a version of wave function realism appropriate to quantum field theory. And chapters 5 through 7 are an extended exploration of how the observed three-dimensional world can be understood as emerging from a high-dimensional fundamental reality.The case Ney makes in chapters 1 through 3 for wavefunction realism is modest and cautious. In chapter 1 she provides a fairly standard—though elegantly expressed—case for the prima facie plausibility of wave function realism simply based on the fact that standard formulations of quantum mechanics are written in 3N dimensions, and on the (related) fact that entanglement means we cannot interpret quantum mechanics simply in terms of spatially localized particles and nothing else. But in chapter 2 she explicitly argues against any attempt to strengthen these plausibility arguments into reasons why wave function realism must be adopted; indeed, she provides a detailed and sympathetic taxonomy of the alternatives to wave function realism that have been developed, all of which she regards as entirely viable. (Chapter 2 of the book could profitably be used as introductory reading for a general graduate course on quantum metaphysics.) For Ney, the question of which metaphysics to adopt is a standard metaphysician’s question, to be answered by weighing strengths and weaknesses of the various alternatives against one another.In chapter 3, Ney identifies two such strengths for wave function realism. First, it is separable: we can specify the complete state of the universe point-by-point on the fundamental space, without any need to appeal to irreducible holism. Second, it is dynamically local: expressed in 3N-dimensional space, the Schrödinger dynamics involve no action at a distance.Ney makes the case for separability at length. Her case for dynamical locality is brief: she regards it as a straightforward consequence of the fact that the Schrödinger equation is a differential equation, so that the rate of change of the wave function at a point x depends only on the wave function arbitrarily close to x. But I think there is more worth investigating here: after all, the nonrelativistic Schrödinger equation may be a differential equation, but it is a parabolic differential equation, with no maximum speed of propagation: the rate of change of the wave function at x may depend only on a neighborhood of x, but the value of the wavefunction at x an arbitrarily short time later depends on the wave function everywhere in space. (And this is not—or not straightforwardly—just an artifact of ignoring relativity.)But in any case, why think that a separable, local theory is preferable to the alternative? Ney claims that separability and locality are more intuitive and lead to a more comprehensible ontology—and she makes an unabashed defense of intuitiveness and explicability as theoretical virtues. She is quite explicit that her reasons are pragmatic: intuitive theories benefit students and teachers; they are better suited to help us develop new theories; they speak better to the reasons why many students (Ney included) want to study physics in the first place. The implied metaphilosophy here is fascinating and it would be good to see it developed further in subsequent work: Ney seems to reject the mainstream modern approach to ontology (in which these pragmatic virtues are not obviously relevant to the truth of wave function realism) in favor of something neo-Carnapian where (so far as I can see) the goal of a quantum ontology is to help us get a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics, and that’s all there is to it. This also fits naturally with the pluralism she urges, in which approaches other than hers can also be valuable.Chapter 4—on relativistic generalizations of wavefunction realism—attempts both a conceptual and a technical task. The conceptual task is to argue that wavefunction realism per se is not wedded to any particular theory or choice of Hilbert-space basis within the theory: rather, wave function realism is any strategy that reifies a high-dimensional space in order to produce a separable local quantum ontology. If so, there is no block in principle to a relativistic generalization of the approach: we just need to find some appropriate high-dimensional space to describe the quantum state in relativistic quantum theory.The general philosophical point is well taken and convincingly defended (though it’s important to note that while arbitrary choices of Hilbert-space basis will give a separable theory, there is no reason to assume they will give a dynamically local theory: even something as simple as shifting from the position to the momentum basis in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics transforms the Schrödinger equation into something explicitly nonlocal). Unfortunately, I don’t think Ney succeeds in giving a clear statement of the high-dimensional space she has in mind for quantum field theory. This is one place where her laudable goal of making the book intelligible to nonspecialists becomes problematic: she makes many suggestive and interesting comments on quantum field theory, but there is no explicit, precise, mathematical statement of her view that can be contrasted with the explicit, precise, mathematical representation of the state in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a complex function on 3N-dimensional space.In the last part of the book—concerned with the emergence of ordinary three-dimensional ontology—Ney begins (chapter 5) by rebutting influential arguments by Tim Maudlin, Valia Allori, Sheldon Goldstein, and others that it is empirically incoherent for a physical theory not to make precise, nonemergent, nonderivative statements about matter in three-dimensional space (for a theory not to have a primitive ontology, to use the standard term for it). Ney argues—persuasively, to me—that it is perfectly compatible with the way science usually works for a theory to make statements about the observable only in an indirect, derivative way, so that while it might be a desideratum for a theory to have a primitive ontology, it is not compulsory for it to do so in order to be empirically adequate. She goes on, though, to note that a satisfactory quantum metaphysics had better recover the existence of ordinary three-dimensional objects, on Moorean grounds: we are really confident that those objects exist!Chapter 6 is largely critical: an extended exegesis of the functionalist strategy for recovering higher-order ontology developed by David Albert, myself, and others. She raises two main criticisms of the functionalist strategy: it fails to distinguish between the wave function simulating three-dimensional objects and constituting those objects; it is restricted to recovering classical three-dimensional ontology, whereas we want to recover quantum-mechanical phenomena in three dimensions too. (The former objection is a development of criticisms by Bradley Monton, Tim Maudlin, and others; the latter is novel so far as I know.) For reasons of space, I won’t attempt to reply on behalf of the functionalist, but Ney certainly puts the challenge with admirable clarity.The final chapter of the book presents Ney’s positive account of emergent ontology, based not on functionalism but on considerations of symmetry (though she concedes that the separation is not completely sharp). Simplifying Ney’s subtle position: the permutation symmetries of quantum mechanics give a clear dynamical reason to regard certain decompositions of 3N-dimensional space (intuitively: those that decompose it into the N-fold product of Euclidean space) as preferred; that then licenses the metaphysical hypothesis that a localized wave function in 3N-dimensional space has, as its parts, particles in three-dimensional space. If the wave function is not localized (as will be the case generically, at least for the Everett interpretation), then we can think of those particles as being partially localized in various different regions of space.I have to say that I am not convinced this works, at least without a dynamical-collapse mechanism: in the Everett interpretation, it will yield an ontology where all the particles are completely delocalized. We only see a somewhat localized description of matter in three dimensions when we restrict to an Everett branch, and that restriction is normally motivated on functionalist grounds. But this may simply reflect subtleties of Ney’s intriguing proposal that I am not fully grasping at present.In summary, I congratulate Ney for a rich, subtle, and provocative account of wave function realism. Her edited collection of papers (coedited with Albert), The Wave Function, set the agenda for much of the metaphysics of quantum mechanics in the 2010s; The World in the Wave Function has a good chance of doing the same for the 2020s.

The Philosophical Review•Oct 1, 2022•2 citations
This review examines Dr. Syed Muntasir Mamun’s paper “Algebraic Quantum Mechanics and Hilbert Space Realism: The Ontological and Epistemological Nexus (Vol-I)” (2026). The paper asks what the mathematics of quantum theory represents. It explains the Gelfand–Naimark–Segal (GNS) construction, by which a Hilbert space representation is generated from an abstract C*-algebra of observables and a state; discusses the interpretive problem posed by unitarily inequivalent representations in systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom, drawing on Ruetsche’s Coalescence Approach; and compares positions that treat different mathematical structures as real, from Algebraic Imperialism to Wavefunction Realism, Spacetime State Realism and Hilbert Space Realism (“Mad-Dog Everettianism”). It closes with phenomenological critiques and directions for future research. This review identifies three strengths: a clear exposition of the GNS construction and its philosophical significance; a well-organised map of competing ontologies; and a useful agenda for future research. It then raises four points for further discussion: a few technical statements that could be made more precise; the balance between the positions discussed; the choice of sources; and presentation. It closes with broader implications for interdisciplinary work in the foundations of physics.
This comprehensive review dissects the profound philosophical tension at the core of quantum foundations: the ontological status of the Hilbert space formalism versus the abstract algebra of observables. Focusing on the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construction, the paper first establishes this theorem as the foundational mathematical bridge that uniquely derives a geometric Hilbert space representation from any given C*-algebra of observables and a specified physical state. The analysis then evaluates the interpretational crisis presented by the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations (UIRs) in infinite quantum systems, which challenges the ideal of a single, universal quantum state space. By comparing Algebraic Imperialism (Algebraic Quantum Field Theory) with highly sophisticated realist programs, the paper details the radical objectification of the Hilbert space. Specifically, it contrasts Wavefunction Realism (WFR), which posits a physically real field in a high-dimensional configuration space, with the minimalist ontology of Hilbert Space Realism (HSR), or "Mad-Dog Everettianism". Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/132963048/download_file?s=portfolio
This report examines the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics, challenging the notion that geometric space and classical subsystems are primordial axioms of nature. By integrating algebraic quantum mechanics, quantum mereology, discrete homology, and topos theory, the study demonstrates that these features emerge dynamically from purely quantum mechanical precursors. The synthesis utilizes the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construction to derive geometric Hilbert spaces from abstract algebraic relations, effectively relegating the Hilbert space to a derived and contingent structure rather than a fundamental one. The research further employs a "basic shapes" paradigm in discrete homology to efficiently compute the higher-order structures of complex networks, bypassing the exponential computational bottlenecks traditionally associated with high-dimensional topological analysis. By identifying a minimal universal set of atomic configurations, such as the triangular prism or the discrete hypercube, the dimensionality of the boundary matrix is collapsed, achieving median speedups of 47.5x over previous algorithms. KSCCN Mamun, SM (2026) ………………………………….1 Algebraic, Topological, and Mereological Foundations of Quantum Information: A Synthetic Framework for Emergent Geometry, Computational Physics, and Cosmology K S C Furthermore, the report establishes a link between subatomic gauge symmetries and cosmological dark energy through the Axion-Modulated Quintessence framework. Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/133038377/download_file?s=portfolio
The received view in the philosophy of physics is that a quantum theory is given its mathematical formulation in a so-called Hilbert space, with the states of a quantum system given by the elements of this space and observables—measurable quantities of the system—given by so-called operators on this space. But the status of this fundamental postulate becomes threatened when one moves to complex systems, like the quantum fields underlying fundamental particle physics or statistical systems composed of infinite collections of quantum particles. In these more complex cases, one finds many inequivalent Hilbert space representations that appear to be competing quantum theories. In looking for a mathematical structure of the theory to interpret as representing the physical world, one is faced with a choice: either arbitrarily pick one Hilbert space representation (out of the many competing representations) as a Hilbert Space Conservative, or else look for the abstract algebraic structure that all of these competing representations have in common as an Algebraic Imperialist. This dissertation provides an extended argument for the second route.
The ontology of quantum theory remains contested. Particle ontology struggles with the non-classical behavior of quantum entities, while wavefunction realism appears to locate the fundamental ontology in a high-dimensional mathematical state space rather than in ordinary physical space. Quantum field theory further complicates particle ontology by treating particle number as representation-dependent and, in interacting theories, often only emergent or approximate. This paper develops a philosophy-facing account of Geometric Monism (GM), a continuous-geometric ontology in which quantum entities are modeled as finite torsional standing-wave structures in a 5-dimensionalm geometric manifold governed by a universal Planck Stiffness κT = c4/G.The aim is not to replace the predictive formalism of quantum mechanics or quantum field theory. Rather, the paper asks whether the entities represented by those formalisms may be interpreted as continuous geometric structures rather than point particles, abstract wavefunctions, or merely emergent field excitations. GM distinguishes between continuous entity ontology and localized interaction events. To resolve the scale mismatch between the fundamental geometric stiffness and empirical observables, GM proposes a tripartite ontology: a Planck-scale topological core, a dimensional matching transition layer, and a macroscopic exterior dressing field. Observed measurement outcomes arise through boundary-conditioned interactions with this macroscopic dressing in accessible 4-dimensional spacetime.The paper presents the core ontological commitments of GM, including the active but observationally constrained embedding coordinate, the tripartite scale ontology, and the exact 40-degree operational microscopic sector obtained by imposing the Anti-Axial Constraint on the 5-dimensional torsion tensor. These commitments are compared with point-particle ontology, wavefunction realism, Bohmian mechanics, Everettian interpretations, and structural realism. The result is a proposed continuous-geometric primitive ontology: quantum objects are real, multi-scale geometric entities, while probabilities and measurement outcomes arise from localized boundary access to their macroscopic field extensions. Furthermore, the paper outlines the rigorous mathematical stability proofs required to validate such continuous ontologies.
David Lewis famously quipped that he was willing to take metaphysical lessons from quantum mechanics only when it cleaned up its own act by providing interpretations or modifications of the formalism shorn of appeal to consciousness, irreducibly macroscopic notions, or outright instrumentalism. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, multiple approaches to quantum mechanics had been developed to a degree which met Lewis’s challenge: dynamical-collapse theories, Bohm-style hidden-variable theories, and Everett-style many-worlds theories, for all their respective problems and challenges, all offer ways of understanding quantum mechanics that metaphysicians can reasonably engage with. And so the last twenty years have seen a resurgence in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, the question of what ontology and ideology is appropriate to a quantum universe. The metaphysics of quantum mechanics is not independent of the quantum measurement problem but does not coincide with it, either: there is a widespread view that adopting, say, the Everett interpretation still leaves significant ontological questions undecided, and conversely, a given answer to those questions might answer them for a dynamical-collapse theory too.Wave function realism has become a leading contender for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, particularly in the case of dynamical-collapse and Everettian approaches. The starting point is nonrelativistic quantum mechanics expressed in configuration space: mathematically, the subject matter of the theory is a complex function of 3N variables, evolving under the Schrödinger equation (perhaps interrupted by occasional stochastic collapses). Traditionally those 3N variables are interpreted as the three coordinates of position of N particles—but in wave function realism, they are interpreted as points in a new, high-dimensional space. Quantum mechanics, according to the wave function realist, fundamentally concerns the undulations of the wave function in this space; three-dimensional goings-on are emergent, high-level, derivative.Alyssa Ney has been a leading figure in the development of wave function realism for most of its existence. Her articles advocating and developing the position have been highly influential, and the present book can be seen as the culmination of this line of her research and is the definitive statement of wave function realism as of 2021. Despite its comparative brevity, the book is too rich to be adequately described—far less critiqued—in this brief review; my goal is to give an overview of the main themes and arguments, and to make a few critical remarks along the way.The World in the Wavefunction is not formally divided into parts, but it can profitably be thought of that way. Chapters 1 through 3 develop the core case for wave function realism. Chapter 4 defends the position from the frequent criticism that it is restricted to nonrelativistic physics, by providing a version of wave function realism appropriate to quantum field theory. And chapters 5 through 7 are an extended exploration of how the observed three-dimensional world can be understood as emerging from a high-dimensional fundamental reality.The case Ney makes in chapters 1 through 3 for wavefunction realism is modest and cautious. In chapter 1 she provides a fairly standard—though elegantly expressed—case for the prima facie plausibility of wave function realism simply based on the fact that standard formulations of quantum mechanics are written in 3N dimensions, and on the (related) fact that entanglement means we cannot interpret quantum mechanics simply in terms of spatially localized particles and nothing else. But in chapter 2 she explicitly argues against any attempt to strengthen these plausibility arguments into reasons why wave function realism must be adopted; indeed, she provides a detailed and sympathetic taxonomy of the alternatives to wave function realism that have been developed, all of which she regards as entirely viable. (Chapter 2 of the book could profitably be used as introductory reading for a general graduate course on quantum metaphysics.) For Ney, the question of which metaphysics to adopt is a standard metaphysician’s question, to be answered by weighing strengths and weaknesses of the various alternatives against one another.In chapter 3, Ney identifies two such strengths for wave function realism. First, it is separable: we can specify the complete state of the universe point-by-point on the fundamental space, without any need to appeal to irreducible holism. Second, it is dynamically local: expressed in 3N-dimensional space, the Schrödinger dynamics involve no action at a distance.Ney makes the case for separability at length. Her case for dynamical locality is brief: she regards it as a straightforward consequence of the fact that the Schrödinger equation is a differential equation, so that the rate of change of the wave function at a point x depends only on the wave function arbitrarily close to x. But I think there is more worth investigating here: after all, the nonrelativistic Schrödinger equation may be a differential equation, but it is a parabolic differential equation, with no maximum speed of propagation: the rate of change of the wave function at x may depend only on a neighborhood of x, but the value of the wavefunction at x an arbitrarily short time later depends on the wave function everywhere in space. (And this is not—or not straightforwardly—just an artifact of ignoring relativity.)But in any case, why think that a separable, local theory is preferable to the alternative? Ney claims that separability and locality are more intuitive and lead to a more comprehensible ontology—and she makes an unabashed defense of intuitiveness and explicability as theoretical virtues. She is quite explicit that her reasons are pragmatic: intuitive theories benefit students and teachers; they are better suited to help us develop new theories; they speak better to the reasons why many students (Ney included) want to study physics in the first place. The implied metaphilosophy here is fascinating and it would be good to see it developed further in subsequent work: Ney seems to reject the mainstream modern approach to ontology (in which these pragmatic virtues are not obviously relevant to the truth of wave function realism) in favor of something neo-Carnapian where (so far as I can see) the goal of a quantum ontology is to help us get a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics, and that’s all there is to it. This also fits naturally with the pluralism she urges, in which approaches other than hers can also be valuable.Chapter 4—on relativistic generalizations of wavefunction realism—attempts both a conceptual and a technical task. The conceptual task is to argue that wavefunction realism per se is not wedded to any particular theory or choice of Hilbert-space basis within the theory: rather, wave function realism is any strategy that reifies a high-dimensional space in order to produce a separable local quantum ontology. If so, there is no block in principle to a relativistic generalization of the approach: we just need to find some appropriate high-dimensional space to describe the quantum state in relativistic quantum theory.The general philosophical point is well taken and convincingly defended (though it’s important to note that while arbitrary choices of Hilbert-space basis will give a separable theory, there is no reason to assume they will give a dynamically local theory: even something as simple as shifting from the position to the momentum basis in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics transforms the Schrödinger equation into something explicitly nonlocal). Unfortunately, I don’t think Ney succeeds in giving a clear statement of the high-dimensional space she has in mind for quantum field theory. This is one place where her laudable goal of making the book intelligible to nonspecialists becomes problematic: she makes many suggestive and interesting comments on quantum field theory, but there is no explicit, precise, mathematical statement of her view that can be contrasted with the explicit, precise, mathematical representation of the state in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a complex function on 3N-dimensional space.In the last part of the book—concerned with the emergence of ordinary three-dimensional ontology—Ney begins (chapter 5) by rebutting influential arguments by Tim Maudlin, Valia Allori, Sheldon Goldstein, and others that it is empirically incoherent for a physical theory not to make precise, nonemergent, nonderivative statements about matter in three-dimensional space (for a theory not to have a primitive ontology, to use the standard term for it). Ney argues—persuasively, to me—that it is perfectly compatible with the way science usually works for a theory to make statements about the observable only in an indirect, derivative way, so that while it might be a desideratum for a theory to have a primitive ontology, it is not compulsory for it to do so in order to be empirically adequate. She goes on, though, to note that a satisfactory quantum metaphysics had better recover the existence of ordinary three-dimensional objects, on Moorean grounds: we are really confident that those objects exist!Chapter 6 is largely critical: an extended exegesis of the functionalist strategy for recovering higher-order ontology developed by David Albert, myself, and others. She raises two main criticisms of the functionalist strategy: it fails to distinguish between the wave function simulating three-dimensional objects and constituting those objects; it is restricted to recovering classical three-dimensional ontology, whereas we want to recover quantum-mechanical phenomena in three dimensions too. (The former objection is a development of criticisms by Bradley Monton, Tim Maudlin, and others; the latter is novel so far as I know.) For reasons of space, I won’t attempt to reply on behalf of the functionalist, but Ney certainly puts the challenge with admirable clarity.The final chapter of the book presents Ney’s positive account of emergent ontology, based not on functionalism but on considerations of symmetry (though she concedes that the separation is not completely sharp). Simplifying Ney’s subtle position: the permutation symmetries of quantum mechanics give a clear dynamical reason to regard certain decompositions of 3N-dimensional space (intuitively: those that decompose it into the N-fold product of Euclidean space) as preferred; that then licenses the metaphysical hypothesis that a localized wave function in 3N-dimensional space has, as its parts, particles in three-dimensional space. If the wave function is not localized (as will be the case generically, at least for the Everett interpretation), then we can think of those particles as being partially localized in various different regions of space.I have to say that I am not convinced this works, at least without a dynamical-collapse mechanism: in the Everett interpretation, it will yield an ontology where all the particles are completely delocalized. We only see a somewhat localized description of matter in three dimensions when we restrict to an Everett branch, and that restriction is normally motivated on functionalist grounds. But this may simply reflect subtleties of Ney’s intriguing proposal that I am not fully grasping at present.In summary, I congratulate Ney for a rich, subtle, and provocative account of wave function realism. Her edited collection of papers (coedited with Albert), The Wave Function, set the agenda for much of the metaphysics of quantum mechanics in the 2010s; The World in the Wave Function has a good chance of doing the same for the 2020s.