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New IND-CPA-D Attacks on BFV and BGV — Artifact

Damien Stehlé, Minsik Kang, Hyeongmin Choe

Published Nov 2, 2026• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This artifact backs the three attacks of the paper, Hyeongmin Choe, Minsik Kang, and Damien Stehlé, "New IND-CPA-D Attacks on BFV and BGV," ACM CCS 2026. This project holds the package used for artifact evaluation, including our samples for Section 3. The code is maintained at https://github.com/hmchoe0528/NEW_INDCPAD_HE.

Related papers

New IND-CPA-D Attacks on BFV and BGV

Hyeongmin Choe, Min-Sik Kang, Damien Stehlé

IND-CPA-D security is an extension of IND-CPA security introduced in the context of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). It captures the situation where the computation result is known to the adversary; it is in particular necessary for FHE with threshold decryption. This work presents three new attacks in this situation on the BFV and BGV FHE schemes, when their parameters are instantiated with heuristic assumptions commonly used to enable correctness. We first extend the bootstrapping failure attacks from Cheon et al. [CCS'24] on the DM/CGGI and CKKS schemes, to both BFV and BGV. We focus on BGV when instantiated with the so-called powerful-basis representation of ring elements. The second attack relies on skewing the ciphertext noise in BFV, making it outpace the heuristic noise bounds for plaintext-ciphertext multiplications. This is achieved by crafting plaintexts, for which the noise bounds do not hold. The third and last attack focuses on outpacing the noise growth in BFV ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications. For this purpose, we skew the mask part of the ciphertext by selecting a random encryption of zero, whose addition yields a ciphertext with a sufficiently large mask norm. While the first two attacks successfully recover the secret key, the last attack instead breaks the IND-CPA-D indistinguishability game. We report experiments on all these attacks, based on the HElib and OpenFHE libraries, respectively, for BGV and BFV. Notably, the second attack implemented in OpenFHE fully recovers the secret key in a few minutes to a few hours, depending on the parameters.

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Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions.

Felix Heuer, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak

About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other. In this paper we give a reduction whose loss is quantified via the dependence graph (where message dependencies correspond to edges) of the underlying message distribution. In particular, for some concrete distributions including Markov distributions, our reduction is polynomial.

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations
This artifact backs the three attacks of the paper, Hyeongmin Choe, Minsik Kang, and Damien Stehlé, "New IND-CPA-D Attacks on BFV and BGV," ACM CCS 2026. This project holds the package used for artifact evaluation, including our samples for Section 3. The code is maintained at https://github.com/hmchoe0528/NEW_INDCPAD_HE.
IND-CPA-D security is an extension of IND-CPA security introduced in the context of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). It captures the situation where the computation result is known to the adversary; it is in particular necessary for FHE with threshold decryption. This work presents three new attacks in this situation on the BFV and BGV FHE schemes, when their parameters are instantiated with heuristic assumptions commonly used to enable correctness. We first extend the bootstrapping failure attacks from Cheon et al. [CCS'24] on the DM/CGGI and CKKS schemes, to both BFV and BGV. We focus on BGV when instantiated with the so-called powerful-basis representation of ring elements. The second attack relies on skewing the ciphertext noise in BFV, making it outpace the heuristic noise bounds for plaintext-ciphertext multiplications. This is achieved by crafting plaintexts, for which the noise bounds do not hold. The third and last attack focuses on outpacing the noise growth in BFV ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications. For this purpose, we skew the mask part of the ciphertext by selecting a random encryption of zero, whose addition yields a ciphertext with a sufficiently large mask norm. While the first two attacks successfully recover the secret key, the last attack instead breaks the IND-CPA-D indistinguishability game. We report experiments on all these attacks, based on the HElib and OpenFHE libraries, respectively, for BGV and BFV. Notably, the second attack implemented in OpenFHE fully recovers the secret key in a few minutes to a few hours, depending on the parameters.
This is the Replicated Computational Results (RCR) Report for the paper C2|Q⟩: A Robust Framework for Bridging Classical and Quantum Software Development . The paper introduces a modular, hardware-agnostic framework that translates classical problem specifications—Python code or structured JSON—into executable quantum programs across ten problem families and multiple hardware backends. We release the framework source code on GitHub at https://github.com/C2-Q/C2Q , a pretrained parser model on Zenodo at https://zenodo.org/records/19061125 , evaluation data in a separate Zenodo record at https://zenodo.org/records/17071667 , and a PyPI package at https://pypi.org/project/c2q-framework/ for lightweight CLI and API use. Experiment 1 is supported through a released pretrained model and training notebook, while Experiments 2 and 3 are directly executable via documented make targets. This report describes the artifact structure, setup instructions, and the mapping from each execution route to the corresponding experiment.
About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other. In this paper we give a reduction whose loss is quantified via the dependence graph (where message dependencies correspond to edges) of the underlying message distribution. In particular, for some concrete distributions including Markov distributions, our reduction is polynomial.