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The Postulated Collapse: von Neumann's Projection Postulate, Priced

William Alexander Aldred

Published Nov 6, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 1932 John von Neumann gave quantum mechanics its first rigorous axiomatics, and inside that axiomatics he laid down two incompatible kinds of change: Process 2, the continuous, causal, unitary Schrödinger evolution, and Process 1, the discontinuous, acausal projection of the state onto an eigenstate at measurement. I credit the book at full strength: the Hilbert-space formulation, the spectral theory of observables, the density-matrix statistics and the measurement chain are the founding mathematics of the theory, and given the two processes the theory's statistical practice follows completely and correctly. Nothing in this paper falsifies the axiomatics, the unitary dynamics, or the Born statistics. What I evaluate is the joint between the two processes. Process 1 is postulated beside the dynamics, not derived from it: no equation in the book derives the projection from the unitary evolution, fixes where in the measurement chain it acts, or selects the single outcome it returns. My bench evaluates that postulate on declared inputs only, for a qubit with real amplitudes on a declared angle grid. The postulate's entire content is an off-diagonal deletion: the coherence the unitary joint evolution retains whole, |rho_01| = 0.500000 at equal amplitudes, the projection sets to 0.000000 at every grid point — a total deleted coherence of 2|alpha beta|, reaching 1.000000 at equal amplitudes, the largest value the quantity can take, deleted exactly where the measurement is maximally undecided. The diagonal does not move: the Born weights are identical under both processes at every grid point. The deletion costs purity: the projected mixture's purity deficit is 2|alpha beta|^2, peaking at 0.500000 at equal amplitudes, where the unitary joint state stays pure. Counted plainly: 1 postulated collapse against 0 derivations in 1932. Grade for this census entry, printed at full size: **REASON FOUND / STILL TURNING** — PREMISE-ONLY, explicitly not a kill and not a falsification. The program headline stands unmoved: **vacuum catastrophe NOT SOLVED / PARTIAL, producing-count 0.**

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.23998828

Related papers

The collapse problem as a consistency problem. Is the quantum measurement hypothesis consistent with conservation laws?

Rathindra Nath Sen

In his book Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics von Neumann asserted that the state vector must collapse upon measurement of any self-adjoint operator. This assertion was based on his reading of the Compton-Simon experiment. However, comparing von Neumann’s account with the Compton-Simon paper itself, we find that von Neumann had completely misinterpreted the experiment. Compton and Simon measured two angles on the same photographic plate; in von Neumann’s reading it became two successive measurements which gave identical results, where the experimenter could choose which measurement to perform first. In short, von Neumann’s case for collapse simply did not exist! In quantum mechanics, superpositions of different eigenvalues of conserved observables are freely admissible, but conservation laws require successive measurements of a conserved quantity upon the same object to return the same value (if the object is isolated and moves under a Schrödinger equation). This can be guaranteed only if the first measurement has caused the state vector to collapse. Thus collapse is a consistency condition which the theory must satisfy. Consistency problems are solved by displaying examples, or models, which fulfil the conditions in question. We therefore have to construct a mathematical model of the measurement process. This requires taking a stand on whether the measuring instrument does (Bohr) or does not (von Neumann-Wigner) have a classical description. If it does not, the ‘quantum measurement problem’ is insoluble. If it does, the problem – for conserved quantities – does have a solution, given by Sewell in 2005. The model displays collapse while evolving under the Schrödinger equation with a time-dependent hamiltonian; it does not have to call upon the observer’s ‘conscious ego’. Its existence shows that additive conservation laws are consistent with the superposition principle and Schrodinger evolution. Measurement of a conserved observable returns an eigenvalue of the observable; measurement of a non-conserved observable returns a diagonal matrix element of the observable in the basis of energy eigenvectors. If ‘classical descriptions’ of the apparatus are essential for these consistency conditions to be satisfied, what does it imply about the relation between classical and quantum mechanics? If the two are on the same footing, is it not possible that ‘dark matter’ is purely classical?

Annals of Physics•Sep 15, 2023•1 citation

Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Robert M. Wald

Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations

Von Neumann's projection postulate as a probability conditionalization rule in quantum mechanics

Jeffrey Bub

Journal of Philosophical Logic•Jan 1, 1977•90 citations

The Distribution That Goes Negative: Wigner's Phase-Space Function, Priced

William Alexander Aldred

In 1932 Eugene Wigner rewrote the quantum state as a function W(x,p) on classical phase space that returns the exact position and momentum marginals, and founded the quantum-correction programme for thermodynamic equilibrium. I credit that paper at full strength: the phase-space formulation of quantum mechanics is exact, its marginals are theorems — re-verified on my own bench to grid grade — and Moyal later recognised the function as the generating object of the full phase-space formalism. Nothing in this paper falsifies the construction or its marginals. What I evaluate is the statistical interpretation used on the object. The function takes negative values — it fails the defining property of a probability density — and no step in 1932 derives why an object failing that property may carry the statistical interpretation the paper puts on it; Wigner himself conceded the function cannot be really interpreted as the simultaneous probability for coordinates and momenta, and asked that this must not hinder its use as an auxiliary function. The negativity is accepted as the cost of the marginals, and the acceptance is the postulate. My bench evaluates that acceptance on declared inputs only. The Gaussian ground state contributes nothing: negative mass 0.000000, total variation 1.000000. The first excited state carries W(0,0) = −0.318310 and a negative mass of 0.213061 exactly (2e^(−1/2) − 1; 0.213062 on the declared grid), with total variation 1.426123. Even cat states carry negative mass 0.021753 at separation 2, 0.223787 at separation 4 and 0.300094 at separation 6 — growing with the interference the state carries. Counted plainly: 1 accepted quasi-probability against 0 derivations in 1932. Grade for this census entry, printed at full size: **REASON FOUND / STILL TURNING** — PREMISE-ONLY, explicitly not a kill and not a falsification. The program headline stands unmoved: **vacuum catastrophe NOT SOLVED / PARTIAL, producing-count 0.**

•Nov 6, 2026•0 citations

The Two-Valued Spin and Its One Neighbour: Lenz and Ising's Postulated Magnet, Priced

William Alexander Aldred

In 1920 Wilhelm Lenz simplified the magnet to two-valued variables on a lattice, and in 1925 Ernst Ising solved the one-dimensional case of that simplification in his doctoral thesis, a problem suggested to him by Lenz. I credit those papers at full strength: they produced the first exactly soluble model of a magnet, an exact negative result in one dimension, and, through the later exact two-dimensional solution at this same address, the founding landmark of the modern theory of critical phenomena and universality. Nothing in this paper falsifies a result derived inside the model, and nothing in it disputes the model's organising power. What I evaluate is the standing of the model itself in 1920 and 1925. A magnet is replaced, by postulation, with variables sigma_i = ±1 on a lattice, interacting only as nearest neighbours through a single coupling J in H = -J sum over nearest-neighbour pairs of sigma_i sigma_j. The continuous moment, its transverse components, every longer-range interaction and every multi-spin interaction are deleted, and J is a free parameter that no step in 1920 or 1925 sets from the material. My bench evaluates what that postulation carries, on declared inputs only. In two dimensions, on a square lattice, the exact condition sinh(2/t_c) = 1 returns t_c = 2.269185, where t = k_B T / J, with sinh(2/t_c) = 1.000000 at that point; mean field, with coordination number z = 4, returns 4.000000, an overstatement of 76.274717 per cent. The spontaneous magnetisation in Yang's form is M = 0.999276 at t = 1, M = 0.911319 at t = 2 and M = 0.671854 at t = 2.25, and it is zero at and above t_c. In one dimension, Ising's own case, the exact critical temperature is 0.000000, while mean field, with z = 2, invents a transition at 2.000000; the correlation length xi/a = 27.296022 at t = 0.5, 3.671861 at t = 1, 1.295443 at t = 2 and 0.710818 at t = 4, finite at every temperature above zero. Counted plainly: 1 postulated Hamiltonian, carrying 1 fitted coupling and 2 deletion classes, against 0 derivations in 1920 and 1925. Grade for this census entry, printed at full size: **REASON FOUND / STILL TURNING** — PREMISE-ONLY, explicitly not a kill and not a falsification. The program headline stands unmoved: **vacuum catastrophe NOT SOLVED / PARTIAL, producing-count 0.**

•Nov 5, 2026•0 citations

Many worlds, one universe

Jim Baggott

Abstract The concept of the collapse of the wave function was introduced into quantum theory by John von Neumann in the early 1930s and has since become an integral part of the theory’s orthodox interpretation. But if we were to ask ourselves what evidence we have that this collapse is a real physical phenomenon, we would have to admit that we have none. The notion of a collapse is necessary to explain how a quantum system initially present in a linear superposition state before the process of measurement is converted into a quantum system present in one, and only one, of the measurement eigenstates after the process has occurred. It was introduced into the theory because it is our experience that pointers point in only one direction at a time.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Nov 6, 2003•0 citations
In 1932 John von Neumann gave quantum mechanics its first rigorous axiomatics, and inside that axiomatics he laid down two incompatible kinds of change: Process 2, the continuous, causal, unitary Schrödinger evolution, and Process 1, the discontinuous, acausal projection of the state onto an eigenstate at measurement. I credit the book at full strength: the Hilbert-space formulation, the spectral theory of observables, the density-matrix statistics and the measurement chain are the founding mathematics of the theory, and given the two processes the theory's statistical practice follows completely and correctly. Nothing in this paper falsifies the axiomatics, the unitary dynamics, or the Born statistics. What I evaluate is the joint between the two processes. Process 1 is postulated beside the dynamics, not derived from it: no equation in the book derives the projection from the unitary evolution, fixes where in the measurement chain it acts, or selects the single outcome it returns. My bench evaluates that postulate on declared inputs only, for a qubit with real amplitudes on a declared angle grid. The postulate's entire content is an off-diagonal deletion: the coherence the unitary joint evolution retains whole, |rho_01| = 0.500000 at equal amplitudes, the projection sets to 0.000000 at every grid point — a total deleted coherence of 2|alpha beta|, reaching 1.000000 at equal amplitudes, the largest value the quantity can take, deleted exactly where the measurement is maximally undecided. The diagonal does not move: the Born weights are identical under both processes at every grid point. The deletion costs purity: the projected mixture's purity deficit is 2|alpha beta|^2, peaking at 0.500000 at equal amplitudes, where the unitary joint state stays pure. Counted plainly: 1 postulated collapse against 0 derivations in 1932. Grade for this census entry, printed at full size: REASON FOUND / STILL TURNING — PREMISE-ONLY, explicitly not a kill and not a falsification. The program headline stands unmoved: vacuum catastrophe NOT SOLVED / PARTIAL, producing-count 0.
In his book Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics von Neumann asserted that the state vector must collapse upon measurement of any self-adjoint operator. This assertion was based on his reading of the Compton-Simon experiment. However, comparing von Neumann’s account with the Compton-Simon paper itself, we find that von Neumann had completely misinterpreted the experiment. Compton and Simon measured two angles on the same photographic plate; in von Neumann’s reading it became two successive measurements which gave identical results, where the experimenter could choose which measurement to perform first. In short, von Neumann’s case for collapse simply did not exist! In quantum mechanics, superpositions of different eigenvalues of conserved observables are freely admissible, but conservation laws require successive measurements of a conserved quantity upon the same object to return the same value (if the object is isolated and moves under a Schrödinger equation). This can be guaranteed only if the first measurement has caused the state vector to collapse. Thus collapse is a consistency condition which the theory must satisfy. Consistency problems are solved by displaying examples, or models, which fulfil the conditions in question. We therefore have to construct a mathematical model of the measurement process. This requires taking a stand on whether the measuring instrument does (Bohr) or does not (von Neumann-Wigner) have a classical description. If it does not, the ‘quantum measurement problem’ is insoluble. If it does, the problem – for conserved quantities – does have a solution, given by Sewell in 2005. The model displays collapse while evolving under the Schrödinger equation with a time-dependent hamiltonian; it does not have to call upon the observer’s ‘conscious ego’. Its existence shows that additive conservation laws are consistent with the superposition principle and Schrodinger evolution. Measurement of a conserved observable returns an eigenvalue of the observable; measurement of a non-conserved observable returns a diagonal matrix element of the observable in the basis of energy eigenvectors. If ‘classical descriptions’ of the apparatus are essential for these consistency conditions to be satisfied, what does it imply about the relation between classical and quantum mechanics? If the two are on the same footing, is it not possible that ‘dark matter’ is purely classical?
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.
In 1932 Eugene Wigner rewrote the quantum state as a function W(x,p) on classical phase space that returns the exact position and momentum marginals, and founded the quantum-correction programme for thermodynamic equilibrium. I credit that paper at full strength: the phase-space formulation of quantum mechanics is exact, its marginals are theorems — re-verified on my own bench to grid grade — and Moyal later recognised the function as the generating object of the full phase-space formalism. Nothing in this paper falsifies the construction or its marginals. What I evaluate is the statistical interpretation used on the object. The function takes negative values — it fails the defining property of a probability density — and no step in 1932 derives why an object failing that property may carry the statistical interpretation the paper puts on it; Wigner himself conceded the function cannot be really interpreted as the simultaneous probability for coordinates and momenta, and asked that this must not hinder its use as an auxiliary function. The negativity is accepted as the cost of the marginals, and the acceptance is the postulate. My bench evaluates that acceptance on declared inputs only. The Gaussian ground state contributes nothing: negative mass 0.000000, total variation 1.000000. The first excited state carries W(0,0) = −0.318310 and a negative mass of 0.213061 exactly (2e^(−1/2) − 1; 0.213062 on the declared grid), with total variation 1.426123. Even cat states carry negative mass 0.021753 at separation 2, 0.223787 at separation 4 and 0.300094 at separation 6 — growing with the interference the state carries. Counted plainly: 1 accepted quasi-probability against 0 derivations in 1932. Grade for this census entry, printed at full size: **REASON FOUND / STILL TURNING** — PREMISE-ONLY, explicitly not a kill and not a falsification. The program headline stands unmoved: **vacuum catastrophe NOT SOLVED / PARTIAL, producing-count 0.**
In 1920 Wilhelm Lenz simplified the magnet to two-valued variables on a lattice, and in 1925 Ernst Ising solved the one-dimensional case of that simplification in his doctoral thesis, a problem suggested to him by Lenz. I credit those papers at full strength: they produced the first exactly soluble model of a magnet, an exact negative result in one dimension, and, through the later exact two-dimensional solution at this same address, the founding landmark of the modern theory of critical phenomena and universality. Nothing in this paper falsifies a result derived inside the model, and nothing in it disputes the model's organising power. What I evaluate is the standing of the model itself in 1920 and 1925. A magnet is replaced, by postulation, with variables sigma_i = ±1 on a lattice, interacting only as nearest neighbours through a single coupling J in H = -J sum over nearest-neighbour pairs of sigma_i sigma_j. The continuous moment, its transverse components, every longer-range interaction and every multi-spin interaction are deleted, and J is a free parameter that no step in 1920 or 1925 sets from the material. My bench evaluates what that postulation carries, on declared inputs only. In two dimensions, on a square lattice, the exact condition sinh(2/t_c) = 1 returns t_c = 2.269185, where t = k_B T / J, with sinh(2/t_c) = 1.000000 at that point; mean field, with coordination number z = 4, returns 4.000000, an overstatement of 76.274717 per cent. The spontaneous magnetisation in Yang's form is M = 0.999276 at t = 1, M = 0.911319 at t = 2 and M = 0.671854 at t = 2.25, and it is zero at and above t_c. In one dimension, Ising's own case, the exact critical temperature is 0.000000, while mean field, with z = 2, invents a transition at 2.000000; the correlation length xi/a = 27.296022 at t = 0.5, 3.671861 at t = 1, 1.295443 at t = 2 and 0.710818 at t = 4, finite at every temperature above zero. Counted plainly: 1 postulated Hamiltonian, carrying 1 fitted coupling and 2 deletion classes, against 0 derivations in 1920 and 1925. Grade for this census entry, printed at full size: **REASON FOUND / STILL TURNING** — PREMISE-ONLY, explicitly not a kill and not a falsification. The program headline stands unmoved: **vacuum catastrophe NOT SOLVED / PARTIAL, producing-count 0.**
Abstract The concept of the collapse of the wave function was introduced into quantum theory by John von Neumann in the early 1930s and has since become an integral part of the theory’s orthodox interpretation. But if we were to ask ourselves what evidence we have that this collapse is a real physical phenomenon, we would have to admit that we have none. The notion of a collapse is necessary to explain how a quantum system initially present in a linear superposition state before the process of measurement is converted into a quantum system present in one, and only one, of the measurement eigenstates after the process has occurred. It was introduced into the theory because it is our experience that pointers point in only one direction at a time.