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International Conference on Advances in Computer Science, Electrical, Electronics, and Communication Technologies (CE2CT)

A Unified Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism for Secure Real-Time Communication

Shany Jophin, Jerin Varghese, Paul Eldhose, Rishikesh K S, Roshan O S, Sai Asok

Published Jul 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The existing public-key cryptographic mechanisms, in particular those relying only on the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem, are threatened by largescale quantum computing. Quantum-resilient schemes like latticebased key accounting mechanisms and digital signature schemes have been introduced by post-quantum cryptography. However, deploying in practice entails harsh compatibility, performance and migration requirements. The proposed system suggests a hybrid secure messaging protocol that combines the NIST standardised ML-KEM-768 post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism and the classical Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). Our cryptographic solution leverages a key derivation scheme based on SHAKE-256 that combines shared secrets from both domains. It delivers key establishment, which is resistant to quantum attacks and is interoperable. When evaluated on a browser-based environment, the experimental results indicate that our proposed system takes about 3.1 ms for key establishment. The public key size is found to be 1249 bytes and the ciphertext of size 1153 bytes. The performance seen is still acceptable for real-time communication application. Evidence shows that a standardised postquantum cryptographic mechanism can be efficiently integrated with classical cryptographic mechanisms. This offers a pragmatic solution for secure messaging in the move to the post-quantum world.

DOI
10.1109/ce2ct68422.2026.11756627

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The existing public-key cryptographic mechanisms, in particular those relying only on the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem, are threatened by largescale quantum computing. Quantum-resilient schemes like latticebased key accounting mechanisms and digital signature schemes have been introduced by post-quantum cryptography. However, deploying in practice entails harsh compatibility, performance and migration requirements. The proposed system suggests a hybrid secure messaging protocol that combines the NIST standardised ML-KEM-768 post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism and the classical Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). Our cryptographic solution leverages a key derivation scheme based on SHAKE-256 that combines shared secrets from both domains. It delivers key establishment, which is resistant to quantum attacks and is interoperable. When evaluated on a browser-based environment, the experimental results indicate that our proposed system takes about 3.1 ms for key establishment. The public key size is found to be 1249 bytes and the ciphertext of size 1153 bytes. The performance seen is still acceptable for real-time communication application. Evidence shows that a standardised postquantum cryptographic mechanism can be efficiently integrated with classical cryptographic mechanisms. This offers a pragmatic solution for secure messaging in the move to the post-quantum world.
This study reviews post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for secure communication, focusing on standardized lattice-based schemes and their practical deployment implications. Classical public-key systems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography remain central to secure communication, but their long-term security is threatened by quantum algorithms capable of solving factorization and discrete logarithm problems. The study adopts a hybrid approach combining literature-based review with dataset-driven performance analysis. The empirical evaluation compares ML-KEM and ML-DSA with RSA-4096 and ECDSA-P256 using CPU benchmarking and network simulation metrics. Results indicate that ML-KEM provides substantial computational advantages over RSA-4096, making it suitable for latency-sensitive key establishment. ML-DSA also demonstrates competitive performance, especially in verification, but introduces larger signature sizes than ECDSA-P256. The analysis shows that the main deployment challenge is not computational feasibility but increased communication overhead caused by larger keys, ciphertexts, and signatures. These findings suggest that post-quantum migration requires more than direct algorithm replacement. Effective deployment should involve protocol optimization, crypto-agility, hybrid transition strategies, and context-specific parameter selection. Although the dataset focuses mainly on lattice-based algorithms, the study confirms the practical relevance of standardized post-quantum schemes for future secure communication infrastructure and identifies directions for broader evaluation across additional PQC families, including code-based, hash-based, multivariate approaches, real-world networks, and implementation-level security testing in practice contexts.
Quantum computing poses a growing challenge to conventional public-key cryptographic systems, particularly those relying on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Widely deployed schemes such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography are expected to become vulnerable as large-scale quantum computing capabilities emerge. This concern has intensified the demand for communication frameworks capable of maintaining long-term confidentiality in the presence of both classical and quantum-enabled adversaries. This paper presents a Hybrid Quantum-Resilient Key Exchange Algorithm (HKEA) that combines classical cryptographic mechanisms with lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic techniques to establish secure session keys. The proposed framework employs a dual-layer key establishment process in which classical and post-quantum shared secrets are integrated to generate a strengthened hybrid session key. The design aims to preserve compatibility with existing communication infrastructures while improving resistance to future quantum attacks and mitigating risks associated with Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threats. A prototype implementation was developed using Python-based cryptographic and post-quantum security libraries. The framework was evaluated using key generation time, latency, throughput, computational overhead, and security strength as performance indicators. Comparative analysis against conventional cryptographic approaches indicates that the proposed HKEA provides enhanced quantum resilience with only a modest increase in computational cost. The proposed approach offers a practical pathway toward secure and scalable communication systems for next-generation quantum-era network environments.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional public-key cryptographic systems, particularly resource-constrained mobile and cyber-physical environments. To address this challenge, this study proposes an implementation-oriented unified hybrid key derivation framework that integrates the Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE-P256) and post-quantum ML-KEM-768 algorithm for quantum-resilient secure communication. The proposed approach combines independently generated classical and post-quantum shared secrets through a lightweight mixing step followed by HKDF-SHA256 extraction and expansion to derive a unified 256-bit session key. This design preserves forward secrecy while enhancing resilience against quantum adversaries without requiring substantial modifications to the existing communication infrastructures. The framework was implemented on a heterogeneous testbed consisting of an x86_64 client and ARM64-based Android device. Experimental evaluations were conducted across 27 test configurations under three network latency conditions (50, 150, and 500 ms) using payload sizes of 64, 1024, and 10240 KB. Each configuration was executed for 1000 iterations to ensure statistically reliable measurements. The results demonstrate that, compared with standalone ECDHE-P256 and standalone ML-KEM-768, the proposed hybrid framework introduces only minimal computational overhead while maintaining stable resource utilization. Furthermore, network latency contributes more significantly to end-to-end communication delay than cryptographic processing overhead, indicating that the integration of classical and post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms does not constitute a major performance bottleneck. Overall, the proposed implementation-oriented framework provides a practical and lightweight transition strategy to quantum-resilient secure communication in heterogeneous mobile, IoT, and cyber-physical environments.
. Quantum computing technology is developing at a pace that threatens classic public-key ciphers, including those based on integer factorization and elliptic-curve discrete logarithms. In response, it has been proposed to work towards a hybrid model that can be used in the short term and that is based on the combination of classical Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) primitives, increasing security where classically secure key exchanges are used and found to be secure against quantum attacks. The proposed protocol combines ephemeral ECDH key exchange with Falcon-512 digital signatures to provide authenticated session establishment with forward secrecy. This work extends upon these results and assesses as well as justifies the construction of hybrid ECC-Lattice protocols, specifically ECC + Falcon, for quantum-safe authentication and authenticated key establishment. The results highlight that hybrid architecture provides a balanced trade-off between performance, interoperability, and robustness against quantum transition period, positioning them as an essential pathway in the global migration toward quantum-safe cryptography. The protocol was implemented and evaluated under controlled network conditions using 2000 protocol executions. Experimental results demonstrated an average handshake latency of 41.61 ms, a throughput of 24.03 handshakes per second, and a total communication overhead of 1434 bytes per handshake. The results indicate that the proposed Hybrid ECC–Falcon protocol achieves efficient authenticated key establishment while maintaining moderate communication costs. By combining ECDH-based forward secrecy with Falcon-512 post-quantum authentication, the protocol provides a practical solution for secure communications during the post-quantum transition period, particularly in post-quantum transition environments.
With the development of quantum computing, traditional public-key cryptographic systems based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems face security challenges. To systematically review the research progress of post-quantum cryptography, its theoretical foundations, algorithmic systems, engineering implementation, and deployment issues were surveyed. First, the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic systems under quantum attack models and the constraints of protocol migration were analyzed. Then, post-quantum cryptographic schemes, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based schemes, were classified and compared, and hardware adaptation, implementation optimization, and implementation security were discussed in combination with CPU, FPGA, and embedded platforms. Under a unified testing environment, the performance and communication overhead of traditional, post-quantum, hybrid, and selected signature and KEM schemes proposed and publicly implemented by domestic research teams were evaluated. The results show that different technical routes involve obvious trade-offs among security, computational efficiency, and communication cost. Finally, challenges in long-term security validation, implementation security, system migration, and engineering deployment were summarized, providing a reference for post-quantum cryptography research and application.
Recent advances in quantum computing indicate that several cryptographic mechanisms widely used today may become unreliable in the foreseeable future. In particular, publickey systems based on RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography, and Diffie-Hellman key exchange rely on mathematical assumptions that are known to be vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Even though practical large-scale quantum computers are not yet available, encrypted data exchanged today can be stored and retrospectively decrypted once such machines become feasible, making early migration toward quantum-resilient solutions necessary. This paper presents PQNoise, a post-quantum secure extension of the Noise Protocol Framework implemented in Java. The proposed framework integrates NIST-standardized latticebased primitives, namely CRYSTALS-Kyber for key establishment and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for authentication, while still supporting widely deployed classical algorithms such as X25519 and Ed25519. The system is designed to operate in three modes: classical, post-quantum, and hybrid. In the hybrid configuration, shared session keys are derived by combining secrets from both classical and post-quantum mechanisms using HKDF, thereby providing protection even if one class of primitives is later weakened. In addition to describing the architectural design and protocol integration strategy, this work reports on a detailed experimental evaluation of the proposed system. The results indicate that, although post-quantum and hybrid handshakes introduce additional computational and bandwidth overhead, the overall performance remains within practical limits for realworld deployment. PQNoise therefore offers a realistic and incremental path toward quantum-resilient secure communication systems.