This chapter provides a detailed examination of how quantum computing developments will affect third-party risk management, with particular focus on the cryptographic governance implications for vendor relationships. It covers the current state of quantum computing development, the threat timeline to current cryptographic standards (including RSA, ECC, and AES), and the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards being developed by NIST. The chapter examines how organizations should incorporate quantum risk into their vendor assessments – evaluating cryptographic agility, PQC migration planning, and hardware security module (HSM) upgrade roadmaps. It also addresses quantum computing as an opportunity: how quantum-enhanced optimization, simulation, and machine learning capabilities offered by third-party quantum service providers will create new risk categories to assess. Practical guidance is provided on near-term actions organizations should take to prepare for the post-quantum transition.
This chapter provides a detailed examination of how quantum computing developments will affect third-party risk management, with particular focus on the cryptographic governance implications for vendor relationships. It covers the current state of quantum computing development, the threat timeline to current cryptographic standards (including RSA, ECC, and AES), and the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards being developed by NIST. The chapter examines how organizations should incorporate quantum risk into their vendor assessments – evaluating cryptographic agility, PQC migration planning, and hardware security module (HSM) upgrade roadmaps. It also addresses quantum computing as an opportunity: how quantum-enhanced optimization, simulation, and machine learning capabilities offered by third-party quantum service providers will create new risk categories to assess. Practical guidance is provided on near-term actions organizations should take to prepare for the post-quantum transition.
The maturation of quantum computing hardware and algorithms has transformed what was once a theoretical concern into an active planning priority for governments, enterprises, and standards bodies. This paper assesses the current and projected threat that quantum computation poses to classical public-key cryptographic standards, namely RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman key exchange, all of which derive their security from mathematical problems that Shor's algorithm renders tractable on a sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer. We synthesize recent hardware progress, algorithmic refinements that have substantially reduced estimated qubit requirements, and the finalization of NIST's post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards (FIPS 203, 204, and 205) to provide an evidence-based assessment of where the field stands as of mid-2026. Particular attention is given to the widening gap between optimistic resource estimates, including a contested March 2026 claim of a thousand-fold reduction in factoring resources, and the practical reality that no existing quantum computer approaches the logical qubit counts required to threaten deployed encryption. We further examine migration challenges, including performance overhead, cryptographic agility, constraints on embedded and IoT systems, and the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model that makes migration urgency independent of exact timeline predictions. Drawing on NIST transition guidance and recent G7 coordination targets, we argue that organizations should treat cryptographic migration as a present-tense operational requirement rather than a future contingency, regardless of unresolved disagreement among experts about when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will exist. The paper concludes with practical recommendations for risk-based migration prioritization and identifies open research questions in cryptographic agility and quantum-resistant system design.
Quantum computing presents a fundamental threat to current payment security infrastructure by potentially breaking the cryptographic systems that protect financial transactions worldwide. As quantum technology advances from theoretical concept to practical reality, financial institutions face an urgent need to transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. This article explores the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptography to quantum attacks, examines emerging post-quantum cryptographic approaches, and details the standardization efforts led by NIST to develop secure alternatives. It further analyzes implementation considerations including cryptographic agility, hybrid approaches, and hardware security module adaptations, while addressing key challenges related to performance, backward compatibility, and regulatory compliance. A strategic roadmap is presented for financial organizations to prepare for the post-quantum era through comprehensive cryptographic inventory, risk assessment, standards monitoring, vendor engagement, and skills development to ensure continued protection of payment systems.
Quantum computing poses significant risks to cybersecurity by threatening the integrity of widely used cryptographic systems like RSA, ECC, and DH. This chapter examines the urgency of rethinking traditional cyber insurance risk models in response to these quantum-enabled threats. It introduces a quantum-aware risk modeling approach that incorporates factors such as PQC migration readiness and dynamic premium adjustments. The chapter also explores how insurers can embed quantum resilience into policies through cryptographic agility requirements and third-party risk assessments. Regulatory initiatives, particularly NIST's PQC standardization, are discussed for their role in guiding industry preparedness. Simulated breach scenarios highlight potential challenges in underwriting and claim resolution in a post-quantum era. This chapter offers a forward-looking roadmap for building a resilient, adaptive cyber insurance ecosystem prepared for the quantum future.
Quantum computing is no longer a distant concern for cybersecurity planning. Its progress has raised serious questions about the long-term reliability of widely used public-key cryptographic systems, especially RSA, elliptic curve cryptography, and related key exchange mechanisms that currently protect digital communication, cloud services, financial transactions, government systems, and enterprise information assets. The main concern is that powerful quantum algorithms could weaken the mathematical assumptions on which these systems depend, creating future risks for encrypted data, digital signatures, identity systems, and secure network protocols (Shor, 1994; Mosca, 2018). Post-quantum cryptography has therefore become a major cybersecurity readiness priority, not only as a technical replacement for vulnerable algorithms, but as a broader organizational migration challenge. Effective preparation requires cryptographic asset inventory, risk classification, crypto-agility, vendor coordination, interoperability testing, and phased deployment across complex information systems (Kumar, 2022; Campbell, 2025). This article examines the cybersecurity implications of quantum computing and reviews the major post-quantum cryptographic algorithm families, current standardization efforts, enterprise migration barriers, and strategic readiness measures needed for the quantum computing era. It also discusses the importance of aligning post-quantum migration with existing cybersecurity governance, information systems management, and long-term digital resilience planning. By emphasizing early preparation, structured migration, and continuous cryptographic governance, the article argues that organizations can reduce future quantum-related exposure and strengthen the security of critical digital infrastructure before large-scale quantum attacks become practical (NIST, 2024; NCCoE, 2025).
As Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum Computing (CRQC) approaches, organizations managing critical infrastructure must prepare to transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This paper provides comprehensive guidance for this transition, addressing the challenges of quantum computing to current cryptographic systems. It presents a framework for the efficient and timely adoption of PQC within critical infrastructure. The study examines the current development of PQC, evaluates vulnerabilities in legacy cryptographic algorithms, and identifies key strategies for mitigating risks associated with quantum computing. The proposed framework includes a multi-faceted approach, encompassing the evaluation and selection of PQC algorithms, developing a phased transition plan, and establishing governance structures to ensure the long-term viability of quantum-resistant cryptographic infrastructure. Additionally, the paper underscores the importance of collaboration among business leaders, governmental bodies, and educational institutions to promote knowledge sharing and accelerate the adoption of PQC standards. By proactively addressing the challenges of transitioning to PQC, organizations can enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive data in the face of advancing quantum computing capabilities.
Quantum computing poses an existential threat to classical public-key cryptography, particularly RSA and elliptic-curve systems, which form the backbone of secure communication, authentication, and digital trust. Once scalable quantum computers emerge, algorithms such as Shor’s will be capable of breaking these schemes, jeopardizing confidentiality and integrity across the internet and enterprise systems. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) offers a viable defense, providing quantum-resistant algorithms that can be implemented on today’s hardware and protocols. Recent standardization milestones—including NIST’s approval of ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment, ML-DSA (Dilithium) and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) for signatures, and the selection of HQC as a complementary KEM—mark a turning point for practical adoption. This paper surveys the quantum threat model, algorithm families, performance trade-offs, and integration patterns such as hybrid modes and crypto-agile architectures. It further outlines a phased migration roadmap for enterprises, emphasizing harvest-now-decrypt-later risks and compliance imperatives. By bridging technical, operational, and policy perspectives, the study provides actionable guidance to prepare organizations for a secure and quantum-resilient future.