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Demanded of States That Do Not Exist Yet: The Additivity Premise in von Neumann's 1932 Proof, Priced

William Alexander Aldred

Published Nov 2, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 1932 John von Neumann published the most famous impossibility proof in physics: no hidden-variable completion of quantum mechanics, he argued, can exist. The proof is correct. This paper does not touch the proof. It evaluates the premise the proof stands on. The argument needs expectation values to add up — the value of a sum must be the sum of the values — for arbitrary observables, including pairs that do not commute. For real quantum states that is a theorem, proved from the trace, and nobody disputes it. But the proof needs it somewhere else: inside the hypothetical dispersion-free states a hidden-variable theory would have to supply — states where every observable already has its value, and that value is one of the observable's eigenvalues. For those states additivity is not a theorem. It is a demand. And the demand cannot be met. Take the smallest exhibit that carries it, two spin components at right angles. Each one's values are ±1, so any assignment's sum lands in {−2, 0, +2}. The sum observable's eigenvalues are ±√2. Zero of the four assignments satisfy additivity and the eigenvalue rule at the same time. Turn the angle between the two axes and it gets no better: the premise is satisfiable only when the axes are aligned or anti-aligned, a set of measure zero in the space of pairs. So the class of completions the 1932 proof excludes is, on a generic pair, the empty set — while the class it was read as excluding for 34 years, hidden variables as such, contains at least one working member, Bohm's 1952 model, which the premise never touches. One assumed step, zero derivations, and the step is not merely underived: on the generic case it is unsatisfiable. The verdict is printed at full size in §6: the premise is evaluated; the proof, given the premise, stands.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.23935133

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In 1932 John von Neumann published the most famous impossibility proof in physics: no hidden-variable completion of quantum mechanics, he argued, can exist. The proof is correct. This paper does not touch the proof. It evaluates the premise the proof stands on. The argument needs expectation values to add up — the value of a sum must be the sum of the values — for arbitrary observables, including pairs that do not commute. For real quantum states that is a theorem, proved from the trace, and nobody disputes it. But the proof needs it somewhere else: inside the hypothetical dispersion-free states a hidden-variable theory would have to supply — states where every observable already has its value, and that value is one of the observable's eigenvalues. For those states additivity is not a theorem. It is a demand. And the demand cannot be met. Take the smallest exhibit that carries it, two spin components at right angles. Each one's values are ±1, so any assignment's sum lands in {−2, 0, +2}. The sum observable's eigenvalues are ±√2. Zero of the four assignments satisfy additivity and the eigenvalue rule at the same time. Turn the angle between the two axes and it gets no better: the premise is satisfiable only when the axes are aligned or anti-aligned, a set of measure zero in the space of pairs. So the class of completions the 1932 proof excludes is, on a generic pair, the empty set — while the class it was read as excluding for 34 years, hidden variables as such, contains at least one working member, Bohm's 1952 model, which the premise never touches. One assumed step, zero derivations, and the step is not merely underived: on the generic case it is unsatisfiable. The verdict is printed at full size in §6: the premise is evaluated; the proof, given the premise, stands.
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I demonstrate that Bell's theorem is based on circular reasoning and thus a fundamentally flawed argument. It unjustifiably assumes the additivity of expectation values for dispersion-free states of contextual hidden variable theories for non-commuting observables involved in Bell-test experiments, which is tautologous to assuming the bounds of ±2 on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values. Its premises thus assume in a different guise the bounds of ±2 it sets out to prove. Once this oversight is ameliorated from Bell's argument by identifying the impediment that leads to it and local realism is implemented correctly, the bounds on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values work out to be ±2√2 instead of ±2, thereby mitigating the conclusion of Bell's theorem. Consequently, what is ruled out by any of the Bell-test experiments is not local realism but the linear additivity of expectation values, which does not hold for non-commuting observables in any hidden variable theories to begin with. I also identify similar oversight in the GHZ variant of Bell's theorem, invalidating its claim of having found an inconsistency in the premisses of the argument by EPR for completing quantum mechanics. Conceptually, the oversight in both Bell's theorem and its GHZ variant traces back to the oversight in von~Neumann's theorem against hidden variable theories identified by Grete Hermann in the 1930s.
I demonstrate that Bell's theorem is based on circular reasoning and thus a fundamentally flawed argument. It unjustifiably assumes the additivity of expectation values for dispersion-free states of contextual hidden variable theories for non-commuting observables involved in Bell-test experiments, which is tautologous to assuming the bounds of ±2 on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values. Its premises thus assume in a different guise the bounds of ±2 it sets out to prove. Once this oversight is ameliorated from Bell's argument by identifying the impediment that leads to it and local realism is implemented correctly, the bounds on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values work out to be ±2√2 instead of ±2, thereby mitigating the conclusion of Bell's theorem. Consequently, what is ruled out by any of the Bell-test experiments is not local realism but the linear additivity of expectation values, which does not hold for non-commuting observables in any hidden variable theories to begin with. I also identify similar oversight in the GHZ variant of Bell's theorem, invalidating its claim of having found an inconsistency in the premisses of the argument by EPR for completing quantum mechanics. Conceptually, the oversight in both Bell's theorem and its GHZ variant traces back to the oversight in von~Neumann's theorem against hidden variable theories identified by Grete Hermann in the 1930s.
I demonstrate that Bell's theorem is based on circular reasoning and thus a fundamentally flawed argument. It unjustifiably assumes the additivity of expectation values for dispersion-free states of contextual hidden variable theories for non-commuting observables involved in Bell-test experiments, which is tautologous to assuming the bounds of ±2 on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values. Its premises thus assume in a different guise the bounds of ±2 it sets out to prove. Once this oversight is ameliorated from Bell's argument by identifying the impediment that leads to it and local realism is implemented correctly, the bounds on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values work out to be ±2√2 instead of ±2, thereby mitigating the conclusion of Bell's theorem. Consequently, what is ruled out by any of the Bell-test experiments is not local realism but the linear additivity of expectation values, which does not hold for non-commuting observables in any hidden variable theories to begin with. I also identify similar oversight in the GHZ variant of Bell's theorem, invalidating its claim of having found an inconsistency in the premisses of the argument by EPR for completing quantum mechanics. Conceptually, the oversight in both Bell's theorem and its GHZ variant traces back to the oversight in von~Neumann's theorem against hidden variable theories identified by Grete Hermann in the 1930s.
I demonstrate that Bell's theorem is based on circular reasoning and thus a fundamentally flawed argument. It unjustifiably assumes the additivity of expectation values for dispersion-free states of contextual hidden variable theories for non-commuting observables involved in Bell-test experiments, which is tautologous to assuming the bounds of ±2\pm2±2 on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values. Its premises thus assume in a different guise the bounds of ±2 \pm2\,±2 it sets out to prove. Once this oversight is ameliorated from Bell's argument by identifying the impediment that leads to it and local realism is implemented correctly, the bounds on the Bell-CHSH sum of expectation values work out to be ±22{\pm2\sqrt{2}}±22​ instead of ±2{\pm2}±2, thereby mitigating the conclusion of Bell's theorem. Consequently, what is ruled out by any of the Bell-test experiments is not local realism but the linear additivity of expectation values, which does not hold for non-commuting observables in any hidden variable theories to begin with. I also identify similar oversight in the GHZ variant of Bell's theorem, invalidating its claim of having found an inconsistency in the premisses of the argument by EPR for completing quantum mechanics. Conceptually, the oversight in both Bell's theorem and its GHZ variant traces back to the oversight in von Neumann's theorem against hidden variable theories identified by Grete Hermann in the 1930s.
The impossibility of theories with hidden variables as an alternative and replacement for quantum mechanics was discussed by J. von Neumann in 1932. His proof was criticized as being logically circular, by Grete Hermann soon after, and as fundamentally flawed, by John Bell in 1964. Bell's severe criticism of Neumann's proof and the explicit (counter) example of a hidden variable model for the measurement of a quantum spin are considered by most researchers, though not all, as the definitive demonstration that Neumann's proof is inadequate. Despite being an argument of mathematical physics, an ambiguity of decision remains to this day. I show that Neumann's assumption of the linear additivity of the expectation values, even for incompatible (noncommuting) observables, is a necessary constraint related to the nature of observable physical variables and to the conservation laws. Therefore, any theory should necessarily obey it to qualify as a physically valid theory. Then, obviously, the hidden variable theories with dispersion-free ensembles that violate this assumption are ruled out. I show that it is Bell's counter-example that is fundamentally flawed, being inconsistent with the factual mechanics. Further, it is shown that the local hidden variable theories, for which the Bell's inequalities were derived, are grossly incompatible with the fundamental conservation laws. I identify the intrinsic uncertainty in the action as the reason for the irreducible dispersion, which implies that there are no dispersion-free ensembles at any scale of mechanics. With the unconditional validity of its central assumption shown, Neumann's proof is fully resurrected.