Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Mathematics study resources

Basic Cryptographic Protocols

Albrecht Beutelspacher, Jörg Schwenk, Klaus-Dieter Wolfenstetter

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-67443-7_3

Related papers

Cryptographic Protocols

Springer eBooks•Aug 3, 2007•2 citations

Analysis on Protocols of Quantum Cryptography

Yinhuan Li

This paper introduces three basic Quantum Cryptographic Protocols.There are BB84 Protocol,HBB Protocol and BF Protocol. And also discusses study of Quantum Authentication Protocols.

Computer Knowledge and Technology•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

Proposal of semiformal model of anonymity based cryptographic tasks and protocols and their analyses

Josef Šprojcar

The thesis investigates a broad area of cryptography dealing with anonymity. We proposed a semi-formal model of anonymous channels (protocols for anonymous communication). Our model is able to capture many aspects of wide range of types of anonymous communication, however, we concentrate mostly on sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and relationship anonymity. These are the most basic types of anonymity and many others can be either derived from them or only slight modifications are required to include them into our model. Our model is based on protocol graphs (graphs describing communication patterns). Security properties are based on comparing these protocol graphs. If certain properties hold we can speak about anonymity achieved by a protocol. Our model also includes a novel idea of friends - participants who are allowed to know identity of some anonymous participant. Several anonymous channels together with their dining cryptographers based protocols are also presented in the thesis. These include protocols for the most basic anonymous channels (these are private bipartite channels) as well as for several complex channels. We also present information-theoretically secure protocols that make use of quantum resources. We were able to build a quantum protocol for an anonymous channel for which no classical protocol is known to exist (in the same cryptographic settings). Based on these anonymous channels and their protocols we also scratched surface of resource based reduction between cryptographic protocols. Because of complexity of all the areas of our research the thesis is written in semi-formal language. The main reason is flexibility and feasibility of working with the model. We use the well known language that is often used in IT security.

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

Cryptographic Protocols

Adam J. Elbirt

Auerbach Publications eBooks•Apr 9, 2009•0 citations

Cryptographic Protocols

Hans Delfs, Helmut Knebl

Information security and cryptography•Jan 1, 2007•2 citations

Security and composition of cryptographic protocols: a tutorial (part I)

Ran Canetti

What does it mean for a cryptographic protocol to be "secure"? Capturing the security requirements of cryptographic tasks in a meaningful way is a slippery business: On the one hand, we want security criteria that prevent "all potential attacks" against a protocol; on the other hand, we want our criteria not to be overly restrictive and accept "reasonable protocols". One of the main reasons for flaws is the often unexpected interactions among different protocol instances that run alongside each other in a composite system.This tutorial studies a general methodology for defining security of cryptographic protocols. The methodology, often dubbed the "trusted party paradigm", allows for defining the security requirements of a large variety of cryptographic tasks in a unified and natural way. We first review more basic formulations that capture security in isolation from other protocol instances. Next we address the security problems associated with protocol composition, and review formulations that guarantee security even in composite systems.

ACM SIGACT News•Sep 1, 2006•53 citations
The thesis investigates a broad area of cryptography dealing with anonymity. We proposed a semi-formal model of anonymous channels (protocols for anonymous communication). Our model is able to capture many aspects of wide range of types of anonymous communication, however, we concentrate mostly on sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and relationship anonymity. These are the most basic types of anonymity and many others can be either derived from them or only slight modifications are required to include them into our model. Our model is based on protocol graphs (graphs describing communication patterns). Security properties are based on comparing these protocol graphs. If certain properties hold we can speak about anonymity achieved by a protocol. Our model also includes a novel idea of friends - participants who are allowed to know identity of some anonymous participant. Several anonymous channels together with their dining cryptographers based protocols are also presented in the thesis. These include protocols for the most basic anonymous channels (these are private bipartite channels) as well as for several complex channels. We also present information-theoretically secure protocols that make use of quantum resources. We were able to build a quantum protocol for an anonymous channel for which no classical protocol is known to exist (in the same cryptographic settings). Based on these anonymous channels and their protocols we also scratched surface of resource based reduction between cryptographic protocols. Because of complexity of all the areas of our research the thesis is written in semi-formal language. The main reason is flexibility and feasibility of working with the model. We use the well known language that is often used in IT security.
What does it mean for a cryptographic protocol to be "secure"? Capturing the security requirements of cryptographic tasks in a meaningful way is a slippery business: On the one hand, we want security criteria that prevent "all potential attacks" against a protocol; on the other hand, we want our criteria not to be overly restrictive and accept "reasonable protocols". One of the main reasons for flaws is the often unexpected interactions among different protocol instances that run alongside each other in a composite system.This tutorial studies a general methodology for defining security of cryptographic protocols. The methodology, often dubbed the "trusted party paradigm", allows for defining the security requirements of a large variety of cryptographic tasks in a unified and natural way. We first review more basic formulations that capture security in isolation from other protocol instances. Next we address the security problems associated with protocol composition, and review formulations that guarantee security even in composite systems.