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Lecture notes in computer science

Nested YOSO: Optimal Resilience from a PKI

Ittai Abraham, Eli Chouatt, Ivan Damgård, Yossi Gilad, Gilad Stern, Sophia Yakoubov

Published Oct 30, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-43617-7_6

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YOSO MPC (Gentry et al., Crypto 2021) is a new MPC framework where each participant can speak at most once. This models an adaptive adversary’s ability to watch the network and corrupt or destroy parties it deems significant based on their communication. By using private channels to anonymous receivers (e.g. by encrypting to a public key whose owner is unknown), the communication complexity of YOSO MPC can scale sublinearly with the total number N of available parties, even when the adversary’s corruption threshold is linear in N (e.g. just under N/2). It was previously an open problem whether YOSO MPC can achieve guaranteed output delivery in a constant number of rounds without relying on trusted setup. In this work, we show that this can indeed be accomplished. We demonstrate three different approaches: the first two (which we call YaOSO and YOSO-GLS) use two and three rounds of communication, respectively. Our third approach (which we call YOSO-LHSS) uses O(d) rounds, where d is the multiplicative depth of the circuit being evaluated; however, it can be used to bootstrap any constant-round YOSO protocol that requires setup, by generating that setup within YOSO-LHSS. Though YOSO-LHSS requires more rounds than our first two approaches, it may be more practical, since the zero knowledge proofs it employs are more efficient to instantiate. As a contribution of independent interest, we introduce a verifiable state propagation UC functionality, which allows parties to send private message which are verifiably derived in the “correct” way (according to the protocol in question) to anonymous receivers. This is a natural functionality to build YOSO protocols on top of.
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) provide digital public services and communication by securing information-sharing and strong credentials for digital identity management to individuals, businesses, and government agencies. While cryptographic algorithms that current PKI systems depend on are mostly resilient against hacks and other threats launched from computers we use today, the advancement of quantum computing technology introduces new security threats. This calls for current PKI systems to be modified with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms. However, transitioning to Quantum-safe (QS) PKI systems remains complex, and the challenges are socio-technical. The research aims to guide organizations transitioning towards QS PKI systems. In doing so, we will deconstruct the QS transition into a series of stages and paths using growth models and examine how organizations can transit over time towards QS PKI systems.
Critical infrastructure sectors are increasingly adopting enterprise Distributed Ledgers (DL) to host long-term assets, systems, and information that is considered vital to an organization’s ability to operate without clear or public plans and strategies to migrate safely and timely to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC). A quantum computer (QC) compromised DL would allow, eavesdropping, unauthorized client authentication, signed malware, cloak-in encrypted session, a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM), forged documents and emails. These attacks can lead to disruption of service, damage of reputation and trust, injury to human life, and the loss of intellectual property, assets, regulated data, and global economic security. In 2018, Gartner revealed that a QC is a digital disruption that organizations may not be ready and prepared, and CIOs may not see coming. On September 18, 2019, IBM announced the largest universal QC available for commercial use would be available in October 2019. On October 23, 2019, Google officially announced “Quantum Supremacy,” “by performing a calculation in 200 seconds that would take a classical supercomputer approximately 10,000 years.” DL Cyber Resilience requires “reasonable” measures, policies, procedures, strategies, and risk management before large-scale deployment. Cyber Resilience implementations must be a critical component during the design and building phase, or during the initialization phase. The most significant existing attack vectors for enterprise DLs is the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is fundamental in securing the Internet and enterprise DLs and is a core component of authentication, data confidentiality, and data and system integrity [1] [2]. Effectively implementing and managing a quantum-resistant PKI solution requires adherence to PKI standards, industry requirements, potential government mandates, certificate management policies, training personnel, and data recovery policies that currently do not exist. This research discusses security risks in enterprise DL PKI, areas that can be compromised, and provides an idea of what should be in a PKI DL Risk Management Framework plan.