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Lexington Books

Logical Causality in Quantum Mechanics: a Relational Realist Ontology

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.5040/9798216501732.ch04

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Introduction: Bell’s concept of local causality assumes more than local action. It also presumes an ontology of point particles. Bell correlations are feasible in nonlinear field ontologies with quantised interactions between suitably correlated participants. Materials and methods: Local causality is unsatisfactory for many reasons, not just Bell’s Theorem. The EPR paradox is due to metaphysical overcommitment to point models. An alternative, distributed concept of long-range interaction is appropriate for field ontologies. Inherently distributed field interaction quanta modify the causal structure of relations between observables. Results: Causal structure of Bell measurements in de Broglie–Bohm EPR experiments: Causal analysis of local realist field models violates Bell Inequalities without violating local action. Experimental Tests: Testable consequences include an observable range dependence of the coherence time of Bell states. Conclusions: Local realist field ontologies are not ruled out by the existence of Bell correlations in nature. The only “conflict” between quantum mechanics and relativity is because lightcone causal analysis effectively presumes a particle ontology.

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In this essay, I offer a critical evaluation of Hilary Putnam's writings on epistemology and philosophy of science, in particular his engagement with interpretative problems in quantum mechanics. I trace the development of his thinking from the late 1960s when he adopted a strong causal-realist position on issues of meaning, reference, and truth, via the "internal realist" approach of his middle-period writings, to the various forms of pragmatist, naturalized, or "commonsense" epistemology proposed in his latest books. My contention is that Putnam's retreat from a full-fledged realist outlook has been prompted in large part by his belief that it cannot possibly be reconciled with the implications of quantum mechanics for our understanding of processes and events in the subatomic domain. However, I suggest, this response should be seen as premature given the range of as-yet unresolved problems with quantum mechanics on the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation and also the existence of an alternative account - David Bohm's hidden-variables theory - which perfectly matches the established predictive-observational results while providing a credible realist ontology. I also examine Putnam's case for adopting a nonstandard (three-valued) "quantum logic" in relation to the thinking of other philosophers - Michael Dummett among them - who have espoused a more global or doctrinaire version of anti-realism. I conclude that Putnam's early (causal-realist) position is by no means untenable in light of the various arguments that he now takes as counting decisively against it.

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Results and Conclusions

Manuel Bernardo Muñoz Bastias

This chapter presents the results and conclusions of the research in three parts. The first part contains the hermeneutical results. It shows that the Neo-Kantian, logical-empiricist, and scientific-realist interpretations of Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics, considered with respect to the transversal principles of causality and stationary action, satisfy the criteria by which Mauricio Beuchot identifies hermeneutical interpretations. It then classifies them: Neo-Kantianism as predominantly univocal, logical empiricism as predominantly equivocal, and scientific realism as univocal in its ontology, although it belongs to the realist family. Classical realism, reached through the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7, appears as the only analogical interpretation, because only it grounds its ontology in the third degree of formal abstraction. The second part derives a secondary thesis concerning the existential states that tend to accompany each hermeneutical mode: anguish in the case of univocity, hopelessness in the case of equivocity, and hope in the case of analogy. It is presented as a philosophical interpretation in dialogue with psychological research, not as an empirical finding. The third part draws three corollaries: a cosmological corollary, which reinterprets the problem of time in the Wheeler–DeWitt equation through the act–potency structure; a physical corollary, which examines the “absolute” that physics can reach within its own formal object; and an ontological corollary, which shows that the first three ways of Thomas Aquinas are valid within the analogical hermeneutic.

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Realism and Causality in Quantum Mechanics

Kaj Börge Hansen

•Jan 1, 1997•0 citations
Introduction: Bell’s concept of local causality assumes more than local action. It also presumes an ontology of point particles. Bell correlations are feasible in nonlinear field ontologies with quantised interactions between suitably correlated participants. Materials and methods: Local causality is unsatisfactory for many reasons, not just Bell’s Theorem. The EPR paradox is due to metaphysical overcommitment to point models. An alternative, distributed concept of long-range interaction is appropriate for field ontologies. Inherently distributed field interaction quanta modify the causal structure of relations between observables. Results: Causal structure of Bell measurements in de Broglie–Bohm EPR experiments: Causal analysis of local realist field models violates Bell Inequalities without violating local action. Experimental Tests: Testable consequences include an observable range dependence of the coherence time of Bell states. Conclusions: Local realist field ontologies are not ruled out by the existence of Bell correlations in nature. The only “conflict” between quantum mechanics and relativity is because lightcone causal analysis effectively presumes a particle ontology.
In this essay, I offer a critical evaluation of Hilary Putnam's writings on epistemology and philosophy of science, in particular his engagement with interpretative problems in quantum mechanics. I trace the development of his thinking from the late 1960s when he adopted a strong causal-realist position on issues of meaning, reference, and truth, via the "internal realist" approach of his middle-period writings, to the various forms of pragmatist, naturalized, or "commonsense" epistemology proposed in his latest books. My contention is that Putnam's retreat from a full-fledged realist outlook has been prompted in large part by his belief that it cannot possibly be reconciled with the implications of quantum mechanics for our understanding of processes and events in the subatomic domain. However, I suggest, this response should be seen as premature given the range of as-yet unresolved problems with quantum mechanics on the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation and also the existence of an alternative account - David Bohm's hidden-variables theory - which perfectly matches the established predictive-observational results while providing a credible realist ontology. I also examine Putnam's case for adopting a nonstandard (three-valued) "quantum logic" in relation to the thinking of other philosophers - Michael Dummett among them - who have espoused a more global or doctrinaire version of anti-realism. I conclude that Putnam's early (causal-realist) position is by no means untenable in light of the various arguments that he now takes as counting decisively against it.
This chapter presents the results and conclusions of the research in three parts. The first part contains the hermeneutical results. It shows that the Neo-Kantian, logical-empiricist, and scientific-realist interpretations of Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics, considered with respect to the transversal principles of causality and stationary action, satisfy the criteria by which Mauricio Beuchot identifies hermeneutical interpretations. It then classifies them: Neo-Kantianism as predominantly univocal, logical empiricism as predominantly equivocal, and scientific realism as univocal in its ontology, although it belongs to the realist family. Classical realism, reached through the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7, appears as the only analogical interpretation, because only it grounds its ontology in the third degree of formal abstraction. The second part derives a secondary thesis concerning the existential states that tend to accompany each hermeneutical mode: anguish in the case of univocity, hopelessness in the case of equivocity, and hope in the case of analogy. It is presented as a philosophical interpretation in dialogue with psychological research, not as an empirical finding. The third part draws three corollaries: a cosmological corollary, which reinterprets the problem of time in the Wheeler–DeWitt equation through the act–potency structure; a physical corollary, which examines the “absolute” that physics can reach within its own formal object; and an ontological corollary, which shows that the first three ways of Thomas Aquinas are valid within the analogical hermeneutic.