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International Conference on Computer Engineering and Application (ICCEA)

A Low-Round Key Exchange Mechanism for Post-Quantum Migration in IPsec

Xuejie He, Lei Han, Jun Li, Yan Xing

Published May 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

With the development of quantum computing, public-key cryptosystems based on conventional hard mathematical problems are facing potential security threats, making the post-quantum migration of critical network infrastructure an urgent requirement. As the core control protocol of IPsec virtual private networks, Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) encounters a practical limitation in existing post-quantum migration solutions: the intermediate exchange mechanism introduces additional interaction rounds, leading to poor handshake efficiency in high-latency networks. To address this issue, this paper proposes PQ-STS-IKE, a 1.5-RTT post-quantum authenticated key exchange protocol. Its central contribution is twofold. First, the standard IKEv2 handshake is reconstructed into a 1.5-RTT architecture by overlapping the key-exchange and authentication phases. Second, an extended contextual signature binding mechanism repairs the unknown key share vulnerability inherent in low-round STS architectures. Under the Dolev–Yao model and the perfect cryptography assumption, the proposed protocol is symbolically modeled and formally analyzed with ProVerif, confirming that the targeted symbolic security properties, namely confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy, are satisfied. Furthermore, compared with the intermediate exchange mechanism, the proposed protocol reduces handshake latency by 29.44%–48.99% under typical network-delay conditions, and the reduction approaches the theoretical upper bound of 50% as network latency increases.

DOI
10.1109/iccea69962.2026.11743730

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With the development of quantum computing, public-key cryptosystems based on conventional hard mathematical problems are facing potential security threats, making the post-quantum migration of critical network infrastructure an urgent requirement. As the core control protocol of IPsec virtual private networks, Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) encounters a practical limitation in existing post-quantum migration solutions: the intermediate exchange mechanism introduces additional interaction rounds, leading to poor handshake efficiency in high-latency networks. To address this issue, this paper proposes PQ-STS-IKE, a 1.5-RTT post-quantum authenticated key exchange protocol. Its central contribution is twofold. First, the standard IKEv2 handshake is reconstructed into a 1.5-RTT architecture by overlapping the key-exchange and authentication phases. Second, an extended contextual signature binding mechanism repairs the unknown key share vulnerability inherent in low-round STS architectures. Under the Dolev–Yao model and the perfect cryptography assumption, the proposed protocol is symbolically modeled and formally analyzed with ProVerif, confirming that the targeted symbolic security properties, namely confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy, are satisfied. Furthermore, compared with the intermediate exchange mechanism, the proposed protocol reduces handshake latency by 29.44%–48.99% under typical network-delay conditions, and the reduction approaches the theoretical upper bound of 50% as network latency increases.
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred between two endpoints, even if the means of transport are insecure. One popular protocol is Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) which operates at OSI layer 3 and protects all protocols at higher layers. Cryptographic keys in IPSec are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE negotiates security parameters for IPSec sessions. In particular, the IKEv2 protocol uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm to establish a secret key shared between two nodes on a network. Although solving such a problem remains difficult with current computing power, it is believed that generic quantum computers will be able to solve this problem, which implies that the security of IKEv2 is compromised. There are, however, several cryptographic systems that are trusted to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. This family of cryptosystems is known as quantum-resistant cryptography (QRC). In this paper, after highlighting the requirements for a secure key exchange protocol, we briefly review the QRC solutions that have been proposed in the recent literature.
The threat of quantum computers breaking classical cryptographic is accelerating the adoption of quantum- resistant cryptographic algorithms. Several government agencies have set a tight time-line for upgradation of all system to support post quantum cryptographs. We study post-quantum migration of IPSec protocols and their impact on network performance. The large key lengths in Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) cannot fit in a single IP packet leading to IP fragmentation. This can cause failure of security associations and degrade performance of IKEv2 under poor network conditions. To tackle this problem, we study a new key- sharing mechanism for IKEv2 and evaluate its performance. Unlike current hybrid key-sharing approaches, which send the classical and quantum keys sequentially over UDP or TCP (as in RFC 9370), the new approach concatenates them into a single composite key and transport them over TCP to ensure a reliable handshake. We implement and benchmark the new composite key-sharing handshake mechanism against existing hybrid algorithms that use either UDP or TCP. Extensive experiments under various network conditions demonstrate that the new approach significantly improves handshake time and energy consumption by avoiding the severe retransmission penalties of the Hybrid handshake mechanism. At 1% packet loss, the handshake time of composite key sharing mechanism is better by atleast 20% than hybrid mechanisms, and the improve- ment get better with higher packet loss reaching 30% at 10% packet loss. Energy consumption follows the same pattern achieving reduction of 29% at 10% packet loss
With the introduction of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, there are ongoing efforts to not only standardize the proposed solutions but also consider integrating them into existing network applications and evaluating their performance. This evaluation is especially critical for security-sensitive applications such as satellite communications, where network limitations such as high packet loss and propagation delay pose unique challenges. In this paper, we consider the integration of PQC with one of the widely used security protocols, namely IPSec, by focusing on its key exchange protocol IKEv2. Specifically, we evaluate how PQ key exchange and digital signatures impact the latency compared to existing classical crypto solutions. We demonstrate through simulation how such integration triggers fragmentation that needs to be handled by IKEv2 and quantify the performance overhead due to packet loss or delaying of such fragments when used under satellite networking applications. The results indicate that while higher packet losses pose significant overheads that may hinder the adoption of PQ-based IPSec solutions, this may be subsidized when propagation delays are much higher in satellite networks.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant threats to classical public-key cryptographic primitives such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. As many critical network and security protocols depend on these primitives for key exchange and authentication, there is an urgent need to understand their quantum vulnerability and assess the progress made towards integrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This survey provides a detailed examination of nine widely deployed protocols - TLS, IPsec, BGP, DNSSEC, SSH, QUIC, OpenID Connect, OpenVPN, and Signal Protocol - analysing their cryptographic foundations, quantum risks, and the current state of PQC migration. We find that TLS and Signal lead the transition with hybrid post-quantum key exchange already deployed at scale, while IPsec and SSH have standardised mechanisms but lack widespread production adoption. DNSSEC and BGP face the most significant structural barriers, as post-quantum signature sizes conflict with fundamental protocol constraints. Across all protocols, key exchange proves consistently easier to migrate than authentication, and protocol-level limitations such as message size and fragmentation often dominate over raw algorithm performance. We also discuss experimental deployments and emerging standards that are shaping the path towards a quantum-resistant communication infrastructure.
The Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) underpins Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) by establishing secure associations and negotiating cryptographic keys. Its reliance on classical public-key primitives such as Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) renders it vulnerable to quantum attacks, as Shor’s algorithm can break these schemes once large-scale quantum computers become available. To address this challenge, we integrate post-quantum cryptography into IKEv2 using a hybrid key exchange combining ECDH over P-384 with the ML-KEM-768 parameter set of the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), following Request for Comments (RFC) 9370 and RFC 9242. We present a Fragmentation Boundary Model that identifies when post-quantum payloads approach or exceed the non-fragmenting IKE_SA_INIT payload budget across ML-KEM parameter sets, Internet Protocol (IP) versions, and effective path maximum transmission units (PMTUs). We implemented the hybrid design on a Texas Instruments TM4C1294 microcontroller running FreeRTOS and CycloneTCP, and measured its execution time, memory footprint, and network overhead. Across 150 successful handshakes per configuration, mean Security Association establishment time increased from 3390.4 to 3488.6 ms, an overhead of 98.2 ms (2.9%). Flash use increased by 8%, random-access memory (RAM) use by 5%, and total IKEv2 traffic size by 42%, while no IP fragmentation was observed under the evaluated Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) conditions. These findings establish the feasibility of the evaluated hybrid configuration on the TM4C1294 platform and provide a platform-specific baseline for further evaluation of quantum-resilient IPsec on embedded automotive architectures.
. Quantum computing technology is developing at a pace that threatens classic public-key ciphers, including those based on integer factorization and elliptic-curve discrete logarithms. In response, it has been proposed to work towards a hybrid model that can be used in the short term and that is based on the combination of classical Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) primitives, increasing security where classically secure key exchanges are used and found to be secure against quantum attacks. The proposed protocol combines ephemeral ECDH key exchange with Falcon-512 digital signatures to provide authenticated session establishment with forward secrecy. This work extends upon these results and assesses as well as justifies the construction of hybrid ECC-Lattice protocols, specifically ECC + Falcon, for quantum-safe authentication and authenticated key establishment. The results highlight that hybrid architecture provides a balanced trade-off between performance, interoperability, and robustness against quantum transition period, positioning them as an essential pathway in the global migration toward quantum-safe cryptography. The protocol was implemented and evaluated under controlled network conditions using 2000 protocol executions. Experimental results demonstrated an average handshake latency of 41.61 ms, a throughput of 24.03 handshakes per second, and a total communication overhead of 1434 bytes per handshake. The results indicate that the proposed Hybrid ECC–Falcon protocol achieves efficient authenticated key establishment while maintaining moderate communication costs. By combining ECDH-based forward secrecy with Falcon-512 post-quantum authentication, the protocol provides a practical solution for secure communications during the post-quantum transition period, particularly in post-quantum transition environments.