Large-scale quantum computers, once realized, threaten the mathematical foundations on which today’s public-key infrastructure is built. Widely deployed schemes such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography depend on number-theoretic problems that quantum algorithms are expected to solve effi-ciently, motivating a decade-long effort to design cryptographic primitives that resist both classical and quantum adversaries. This survey brings together that effort under a single lens, tracing the reasoning behind post-quantum cryptography (PQC) from its theoretical origins to its practical deployment. We begin by clarifying why quantum computation undermines classical hardness assumptions, then walk through the four major PQC families – lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and multivariate constructions – weighing each against the others on security assurance, computational cost, and ease of implementation. The discussion then turns outward to where PQC is actually being tested: Internet of Things deployments, blockchain ledgers, and AI-assisted defense pipelines, drawing on recent proposals in each area. We close by consolidating the recurring obstacles reported across this literature – oversized keys, added computational burden, and friction with legacy protocols – into a set of concrete directions for researchers aiming to make quantum-resistant security practical rather than merely theoretical.
Large-scale quantum computers, once realized, threaten the mathematical foundations on which today’s public-key infrastructure is built. Widely deployed schemes such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography depend on number-theoretic problems that quantum algorithms are expected to solve effi-ciently, motivating a decade-long effort to design cryptographic primitives that resist both classical and quantum adversaries. This survey brings together that effort under a single lens, tracing the reasoning behind post-quantum cryptography (PQC) from its theoretical origins to its practical deployment. We begin by clarifying why quantum computation undermines classical hardness assumptions, then walk through the four major PQC families – lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and multivariate constructions – weighing each against the others on security assurance, computational cost, and ease of implementation. The discussion then turns outward to where PQC is actually being tested: Internet of Things deployments, blockchain ledgers, and AI-assisted defense pipelines, drawing on recent proposals in each area. We close by consolidating the recurring obstacles reported across this literature – oversized keys, added computational burden, and friction with legacy protocols – into a set of concrete directions for researchers aiming to make quantum-resistant security practical rather than merely theoretical.
The rapid growth of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic systems. That is due in large part to the fact that they represent efficient solutions for some of the most challenging mathematical problems such as integer factoring or finding discrete logarithms. Schemes currently in wide use including RSA, Diffie–Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography are particularly susceptible to being attacked by quantum computers, using algorithms like Shor's Algorithm and Grover's Algorithm. The advent of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) provides a promising potential answer to providing longterm security from adversaries using quantum computing capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive state-of-the-art review of various PQC techniques currently being researched, including lattice-based methods, code-based methods, multivariate methods, hash-based methods, and isogeny-based methods. key challenges that will need to be addressed include computational overhead, large key sizes and implementation complexity. Furthermore the study reviews the current standardization efforts by the National Institute of Standards and Technology related to PQC and discusses some of the very specific practical considerations that need to be considered before widely deploying these techniques. The paper concludes by a complete list of existing research challenges and proposed future work that will assist in the development of efficient and scalable systems that will resist attacks from quantum computers.
As quantum computing advances, classical public-key cryptosystems face escalating risks, driving global standardization efforts by NIST, ETSI, and ISO. This paper provides a comprehensive review of recent developments in post-quantum cryptography (PQC), focusing on lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate approaches. We examine their security foundations, implementation challenges, and applicability across domains such as finance, blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT). A core contribution is the proposed Hybrid Cryptographic Framework (HCF), which combines classical and quantum-resistant primitives to enable a secure and interoperable migration path. The framework integrates hybrid key exchange, dual-signature schemes, and PQC-compatible Merkle trees, and is supported by a discrete multi-objective optimization model for selecting algorithms under real-world constraints. The paper also discusses deployment challenges, including hardware acceleration, side-channel resistance, and legacy compatibility. Real-world case studies illustrate how leading institutions are piloting PQC integration in practice. Finally, we propose a strategic roadmap for PQC adoption, incorporating adaptive triggers based on quantum capabilities and evolving threat models. By aligning cryptographic design with international standards and practical system requirements, this work offers guidance for building resilient, quantum-safe infrastructures.
The threats are existential to the traditional cryptosystems of public keys, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), due to the rapid progress in quantum computing. Such algorithms as the Shor and Grover algorithms prove that as soon as large scale quantum computers are achieved, these classical cryptographic protocols will not provide any privacy and integrity to online communication. This has created an emergency to find post-quantum cryptography (PQC), or quantum-safe cryptography, which will resist attacks by both classical and quantum attackers. The paper is a review of the latest research and development in post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and their implementation in current security systems. We organize quantum-safe methods into significant organizations such as lattice-based, hash-based, multivariate polynomial-based and code-based encrypted communications. Each type has been evaluated critically based on computational efficiency, key sizes, speed of encryption/decryption and security proofs. The survey also examines the current standardization activities happening in the world and especially the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC competition, which lists candidate algorithms that have advanced to standard adoption. Besides this, the paper addresses hybrid cryptographic designs that use both classical and post-quantum bases in ensuring a seamless migration in the transition phase. Internet security protocols like TLS, VPNs and blockchain consensus as applications of PQC are examined in detail. Lastly, we pinpoint open research issues, which include creating lightweight PQC to support resource-constrained IoT devices, balancing performance and strong security assurances, and interoperability between the new PQC algorithms and existing infrastructures. Through detailed survey we inform the future of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on the preparation of the post-quantum era of secure digital communications.
In the current time, the classical cryptographic systems are used worldwide.Cryptography makes the transmission operation secure and it ensure the basic motivation of security such that availability, integrity, confidentially and non-repudiation.The development of quantum computing algorithm such that Shor's algorithm rise the threats towards the classical cryptographic infrastructure particularly in public key infrastructure i.e.RSA and ECC.Also, Grover's algorithm provides the square root time enhancement of searching of keys in the symmetric key cryptography.In this scenario, the fully operation quantum computer will break the classical cryptographic systems, and it is the main reason behind the advancement of post quantum cryptography (PQC).Specially, in the IoT network, the energy constrain end devices have the main issue to implement the strong cryptographic methods to secure the network from quantum attacks.The current available cryptographic methods which are quantum resistance in context of IoT network is thoroughly discussed in the paper.Also, key families of PQC algorithms i.e. lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial based, hash-based, and isogeny-based and the NIST standardization of PQC techniques are investigated.This survey will be work as a bridge between deployment of PQC and existing methods of PQC in context of IoT environment.
accelerating development of quantum computing has profoundly altered long-standing assumptions about computational hardness that underpin classical public-key cryptography. Algorithms such as Shor’s polynomial-time approach to integer factorization and discrete logarithms have demonstrated, at least in theory, that cryptographic primitives based on number-theoretic problems are fundamentally vulnerable in a future where large-scale quantum computers become operational (Shor, 1997). This realization has catalyzed a global shift toward post-quantum cryptography, a domain dedicated to designing and analyzing cryptographic systems that remain secure against both classical and quantum adversaries. Within this broad transformation, the Internet of Things occupies a uniquely sensitive position. IoT ecosystems combine massive device heterogeneity, constrained computational resources, long device lifetimes, and high-stakes security requirements related to privacy, safety, and critical infrastructure. Consequently, the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography in IoT environments is not merely a matter of algorithmic substitution, but a systemic challenge involving protocol design, standardization, performance trade-offs, and long-term trust. This article presents an extensive, theory-driven research study that examines post-quantum cryptography for IoT through three interlinked lenses: foundational cryptographic paradigms, particularly code-based and lattice-based constructions; evolving standardization efforts, especially those coordinated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology; and applied security considerations across emerging network architectures such as fifth- and sixth-generation wireless systems, edge computing, and blockchain-enabled IoT. Drawing strictly on the provided scholarly references, the article situates code-based cryptography as one of the earliest and most conceptually resilient post-quantum approaches, emphasizing its relevance to long-lived IoT deployments where conservative security margins are valued (Sendrier, 2018). At the same time, it critically evaluates lattice-based schemes that currently dominate standardization trajectories due to their versatility and comparatively efficient implementations (W. S. P., 2022; NIST, 2024a). Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative, interpretive research design grounded in comparative literature analysis and theoretical synthesis. Rather than presenting experimental benchmarks or numerical evaluations, it systematically interprets reported findings across surveys, protocol proposals, and standards documents to identify recurring patterns, tensions, and unresolved questions. The results section articulates how post-quantum algorithms interact with IoT-specific constraints, revealing a persistent trade-off between cryptographic robustness, computational overhead, and deployment feasibility (Boneh, 2020; Karakaya & Ulu, 2024). The discussion then deepens this analysis by engaging with scholarly debates on algorithmic diversity, cryptographic agility, and the socio-technical implications of premature or fragmented adoption. Ultimately, the article argues that securing the IoT in the post-quantum era requires more than selecting standardized algorithms. It demands an integrated research agenda that reconciles theoretical security assurances with real-world operational contexts, anticipates future advances in both quantum computing and cryptanalysis, and aligns global standardization with local deployment realities. By offering an expansive and critical synthesis of post-quantum cryptography for IoT, this work contributes a comprehensive academic foundation for researchers, standards bodies, and practitioners navigating one of the most consequential transitions in contemporary information security.
The advent of quantum computing has precipitated an estimated attack resistant cryptography system necessitating quantum attacks. The classical asymmetric algorithms, i.e., RSA and ECC are susceptible to Shor algorithm and a transition should be made to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) anymore. The novelty of this work lies in providing a unified comparative framework that analyzes PQC families through security assumptions, concrete key/ciphertext sizes, and implementation complexity an aspect not addressed collectively in prior surveys. This survey gives a general picture of the status of the design process and general evaluation of PQC accounting its application within the paradigm of the diversified networks including the IoT and 5G/6G and in the cyber-physical environment. Furthermore, this review uniquely synthesizes practical hybrid‑deployment strategies, including protocol layering, coexistence models, and backward‑compatibility mechanisms, offering actionable guidance for real‑world migration. Additionally, the manuscript contributes a prioritized list of open problems across IoT, 5G/6G, blockchain, and cyber‑physical systems, highlighting domains facing the most urgent quantum‑resilience challenges. In this paper, the authors will evaluate the most popular PQC schemes, including schemes based on lattice, code, hash, and isogeny, depending on their performance, scalability, and interoperability (with reference to the recent research). It also examines the problems of integration as implemented with respect to the computational overhead, latency and adoption of hybrid with classical cryptography. This is expounded more to the standardization of PQC by NISTs and with a focus on such algorithms as CRYSTALS-Kyber and Dilithium. The findings suggest that, hybrid PQC protocols are able to control quantum resistance and actual performance in numerous infrastructures in computing systems.