The article proposes a new interpretation of parallel universes: they are not located "somewhere far away," but exist in the very same volume of space as our Universe. Different universes are different sets of active elements of reality that we "read" from a single "set" at different levels of description G. The key metaphor is the airport board: the board is one and the same, but by opening different cells we get different symbols. Formally: Universe U(G) = P(G)(Ω), where P(G) is the projection operator, Ω is the complete set of all degrees of freedom. The transition between universes is a change of the level of description G, not movement in space. This distinguishes the model from Everett's many-worlds interpretation, where branching is irreversible: in the proposed model the transition is reversible. A comparison is conducted with existing interpretations: Everett's MWI, Tegmark's Multiverse, MIW of Hall, Wiseman, and Deckert, brane worlds in string theory. It is shown that the model occupies a unique niche: not branching, not interaction, not remoteness, but an ontological choice. Consequences for superluminal communication are discussed: the signal does not fly through a brane but switches to another G. Verifiable consequences are proposed: anomalies in the cosmic microwave background, vacuum fluctuations, indirect markers. The model is consistent with the principles of the projection ontology of EFOS and resolves the problems of the standard many-worlds interpretation: it does not require infinite energy, does not require postulating irreversible branching. Key conclusions: parallel universes are here, in one volume; the transition between them is a change of G; the model has verifiable consequences.
The article proposes a new interpretation of parallel universes: they are not located "somewhere far away," but exist in the very same volume of space as our Universe. Different universes are different sets of active elements of reality that we "read" from a single "set" at different levels of description G. The key metaphor is the airport board: the board is one and the same, but by opening different cells we get different symbols. Formally: Universe U(G) = P(G)(Ω), where P(G) is the projection operator, Ω is the complete set of all degrees of freedom. The transition between universes is a change of the level of description G, not movement in space. This distinguishes the model from Everett's many-worlds interpretation, where branching is irreversible: in the proposed model the transition is reversible. A comparison is conducted with existing interpretations: Everett's MWI, Tegmark's Multiverse, MIW of Hall, Wiseman, and Deckert, brane worlds in string theory. It is shown that the model occupies a unique niche: not branching, not interaction, not remoteness, but an ontological choice. Consequences for superluminal communication are discussed: the signal does not fly through a brane but switches to another G. Verifiable consequences are proposed: anomalies in the cosmic microwave background, vacuum fluctuations, indirect markers. The model is consistent with the principles of the projection ontology of EFOS and resolves the problems of the standard many-worlds interpretation: it does not require infinite energy, does not require postulating irreversible branching. Key conclusions: parallel universes are here, in one volume; the transition between them is a change of G; the model has verifiable consequences.
The article proposes a new interpretation of parallel universes: they are not located "somewhere far away," but exist in the very same volume of space as our Universe. Different universes are different sets of active elements of reality that we "read" from a single "set" at different configurations of S. The key allegory is the "airport board": the board is one and the same, but by opening different cells we get different symbols. It is shown that the transition between universes is not movement in space and not a change of the scale of observation, but a change of the active set of elements A(S). This model is consistent with the principles of the projection ontology of EFOS (Entity Forming Objects and Subjects) and resolves the problems of the standard many-worlds interpretation: it does not require branching of worlds, does not require infinite energy, and the transition between universes is reversible. The ontological selector S is introduced as a parameter that determines which particular set of elements of reality from the complete set Ω is activated. It is emphasized that the complete set Ω exists independently of S. A change of S changes the active set; a change of the scale G does not. A comparison is conducted with existing interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation of Everett, the Multiverse theory of Tegmark, the theory of Many Interacting Worlds of Hall, Wiseman, and Deckert, and brane worlds. Consequences for superluminal communication are discussed: the signal is transmitted through a projection at another S. Possible areas of search are proposed: anomalies in the cosmic microwave background, vacuum fluctuations, indirect markers.
The article systematically presents and develops the concept "Everything Is Already Here" — an ontological model of parallel universes. Its essence: all elements of reality of all possible universes exist in a single ontological volume Ω. Different universes are different sets of active elements determined by the ontological selector S. S is not the choice of an observer and not a scale of observation, but a formal parameter that determines which elements from the complete set Ω are activated (manifested) in a given universe. S acts as natural selection under equilibrium: the universe activates only those elements that correspond to its stable parameters of space-time. The transition between universes is not movement in space but a change of S. It is shown that the concept explains quantum entanglement, nonlocality, and the absence of superluminal information transfer without postulating branching, interaction, or remoteness. Entangled particles are not connected by a superluminal signal; they are projections of one and the same element of Ω at a given S. This is consistent with the no-signaling theorem: the projection of a common element does not transmit information but only manifests a correlation. A comparison is conducted with existing approaches: Everett's many-worlds interpretation, Many Interacting Worlds of Hall, Wiseman, and Deckert, Lewis's modal realism, Saan's principle of plenitude, Tegmark's Multiverse, Susskind's string landscape. It is shown that the uniqueness of the model lies in the combination of the ideas of projection ontology, ontological choice S, and empirical testability. A program of empirical verification is proposed: CMB anomalies, H0 tension, variations of fundamental constants, anomalies in the distribution of galaxies, vacuum fluctuations (Casimir effect). Open questions are discussed: how does the change of S occur? Does a hierarchy of universes exist? How do elements of reality relate to physical fields and particles? Can traces of other values of S be detected in the laboratory? The model is open to further formalization and experimental verification.
The article formulates the ontological principle "everything is already here." Its essence: the complete set of all elements of which all possible universes may consist exists in a single volume. Individual universes are different sets of active (manifested) elements from this complete set. The remaining elements are latent (unmanifested). Transition between universes is a change of level of description G, not movement in space. The principle differs from a model. The principle asserts what exists. The model describes how it works. The principle does not depend on an observer: Ω exists independently of whether anyone reads it. The observer affects only the active set A(G), but not the existence of Ω. Ω is not a substance, not a field, not particles, but an ontological category — "that of which universes may consist." A distinction is introduced between G-ontological (natural selection under equilibrium) and G-epistemic (the observer's choice). Formally: U(G) = P(G)(Ω), where P(G) is the projection operator. The change of G is not a physical process but a change of the mode of reading. The principle is compared with close concepts: Parmenides, Platonism, MWI (Everett), MIW (Hall, Wiseman, Deckert). It is shown to occupy a unique niche and not repeat what is known. Consequences: parallel universes are different projections of one set; transition is a change of G; latency is real; the ontological invariant is preserved under a change of G. The principle allows an interpretation of quantum entanglement: particles are projections of one element of Ω, not connected by a superluminal signal. This is consistent with the no-signaling theorem. Open questions: does Ω exist? What does it consist of? How is the space of G structured? Why are some elements active and others not? Is the principle compatible with known physics? Can it be tested? One Ω or many? The article indicates the problem but does not solve it.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum entanglement experiments is at best incomplete, since the intermediate state induced by collapse of the wave function apparently depends upon the inertial rest frame in which the experiment is observed. While the Many Worlds Interpretation of Everett, MWI, avoids the issue of wave function collapse, it, too, is a casualty of the special theory of relativity. This requires all events in the universe, past, present and future, to be unique, as in the block universe picture, which rules out Everett style branching. The benefits of MWI may be retained, however, by postulating a multiverse of discrete, parallel, block universes which are identical to each other up to certain points in the MWI trunk before they diverge according to the MWI branching. The quantum probability of an event then emerges from the number of parallel universes in which the event happens divided by the total number of universes. This means that the total number of such universes is finite. Such a picture is more easily envisaged by thinking of it as a purely mathematical structure, as in the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis proposed by Tegmark. However, while Tegmark wished to avoid contamination from Goedelian self referential knots, not only does such contamination appear to be inevitable, it brings an unexpected benefit. The mathematical hierarchy required by the enigmatic footnote 48a in the paper by Goedel leads to an explanation for a unitary evolution of deterministic quantum rules across the multiverse while accounting for quantum uncertainty within an individual universe. Other aspects of this structure, called here the Plexus, are discussed, including awareness of existence and other questions raised by the hypothesis.
We argue that the many worlds of quantum mechanics and the many worlds of the multiverse are the same thing, and that the multiverse is necessary to give exact operational meaning to probabilistic predictions from quantum mechanics. Decoherence---the modern version of wave-function collapse---is subjective in that it depends on the choice of a set of unmonitored degrees of freedom, the environment. In fact decoherence is absent in the complete description of any region larger than the future light cone of a measurement event. However, if one restricts to the causal diamond---the largest region that can be causally probed---then the boundary of the diamond acts as a one-way membrane and thus provides a preferred choice of environment. We argue that the global multiverse is a representation of the many worlds (all possible decoherent causal diamond histories) in a single geometry. We propose that it must be possible in principle to verify quantum-mechanical predictions exactly. This requires not only the existence of exact observables but two additional postulates: a single observer within the Universe can access infinitely many identical experiments; and the outcome of each experiment must be completely definite. In causal diamonds with a finite surface area, holographic entropy bounds imply that no exact observables exist, and both postulates fail: experiments cannot be repeated infinitely many times; and decoherence is not completely irreversible, so outcomes are not definite. We argue that our postulates can be satisfied in hats (supersymmetric multiverse regions with vanishing cosmological constant). We propose a complementarity principle that relates the approximate observables associated with finite causal diamonds to exact observables in the hat.
The Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) famously avoids the issue of wave function collapse. Different MWI trees representing the same quantum events can have different topologies, depending upon the observer. However, they are all isomorphic to the group of block universes containing all of the outcomes of all of the events, and so, in that sense, the group of block universes is a more fundamental representation. Different branches of the MWI tree, representing different universes in MWI, ultimately share the same quantum state in a common ancestor branch. This branching topology is incompatible with that of the Minkowski block universe; the resolution is to replace the branches with discrete, parallel block universes, each of which extends from the trunk to the outermost twigs. The number of universes in a branch is proportional to its thickness which, in turn, depends upon the absolute square of the probability amplitude for the state in that branch. Every quantum event may be represented by a kernel of universes, which is the smallest group of universes that will reproduce the quantum probabilities of the outcomes of that event. By considering the ratios of the probabilities of the outcomes of any event, it can be shown that the number of universes in every kernel must finite, as must be the total number of universes in the multiverse. Further, every universe in the multiverse must be finite both in space and time. Another consequence is that quantum probabilities must be rational, which suggests that quantum mechanics is only an approximation to a discrete theory. A corollary is that not every conceivable universe exists in the multiverse, no doubt to the disappointment of those who enjoy alternate-history novels.