Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms are increasingly used in surveillance, sensing, and mission-critical coordination. Their wider deployment introduces security challenges when UAVs must authenticate control decisions without continuous Ground Control Station (GCS) support, especially against quantum-capable adversaries. Existing protocols mainly address UAV-GCS authentication or group key establishment, but they do not directly bind each accepted runtime command to the mission-approved leader. To address this gap, we propose a hash-based command authentication protocol for mission-bounded UAV swarms. It combines Merkle-tree accumulators with FORS-based one-time command tokens to bind leader authority to the enrolled mission state, enabling followers to verify commands locally without online GCS support. Security analysis and Raspberry Pi 5 measurements show 253.9 μs follower-side verification latency, lower than the evaluated post-quantum alternatives.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms are increasingly used in surveillance, sensing, and mission-critical coordination. Their wider deployment introduces security challenges when UAVs must authenticate control decisions without continuous Ground Control Station (GCS) support, especially against quantum-capable adversaries. Existing protocols mainly address UAV-GCS authentication or group key establishment, but they do not directly bind each accepted runtime command to the mission-approved leader. To address this gap, we propose a hash-based command authentication protocol for mission-bounded UAV swarms. It combines Merkle-tree accumulators with FORS-based one-time command tokens to bind leader authority to the enrolled mission state, enabling followers to verify commands locally without online GCS support. Security analysis and Raspberry Pi 5 measurements show 253.9 μs follower-side verification latency, lower than the evaluated post-quantum alternatives.
Resource-constrained unmanned aerial vehicle–ground control station (UAV–GCS) communications face substantial post-quantum authentication costs, expensive cryptographic operations triggered by invalid requests, and key-state desynchronization during rekeying. To address these problems, this paper proposes QUAD, a lightweight hybrid post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol. QUAD combines request pre-authentication, hybrid key establishment, and mutual key confirmation to reject invalid requests before costly cryptographic operations. It also allows a bounded transition period for receiving records under the old and new keys to mitigate key-state inconsistencies caused by link disruptions. Confidentiality and authentication are analyzed using ProVerif, while cryptographic and communication overhead, denial-of-service scenarios, and key-update behavior are evaluated on a Raspberry Pi platform. Under the specified security model, QUAD satisfies the tested authentication and confidentiality properties, reduces the computational burden of invalid requests, and improves bidirectional communication continuity under selected packet-loss conditions. These findings support its feasibility for post-quantum security in resource-constrained UAV–GCS links.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) increasingly operate in contested environments where command-and-control (C2) links face jamming, spoofing, and long-term cryptanalytic threats from future quantum adversaries. Open-source autopilot stacks such as ArduPilot rely on the MAVLink protocol, whose version~2 signing mechanism authenticates messages but leaves payloads unencrypted and does not provide post-quantum security. In this work we design and implement a post-quantum secure extension for MAVLink C2 traffic based on the HQC key encapsulation mechanism and a KEMTLS with pre-distributed keys (KEMTLS-PDK) handshake between Ground Control Stations (GCS) and flight controllers (FC). Our design derives per-link symmetric keys for lightweight payload encryption (AES--CTR and ChaCha20) while respecting the size, weight, and power (SWaP) constraints of small UAVs and the real-time requirements of 100~Hz control loops. We prototype the scheme in ArduPilot, apply implementation-level optimizations inspired by recent work on HQC for constrained hardware, and define a dedicated MAVLink dialect for the handshake. We then evaluate handshake latency, ciphertext throughput, and idle battery behaviour on a Parrot~Bebop~1 hardware testbed under indoor bench conditions. The results show that post-quantum authenticated key exchange can be integrated into MAVLink-based C2 links with typical session establishment around 0.6~s and no measurable additional idle battery penalty within the resolution of the onboard gauge.
With the widespread deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in both military and civilian domains, the demand for secure and encrypted communications in UAV networks integrated with ground stations has become increasingly prominent. Authentication and key agreement protocols are widely regarded as essential technical mechanisms for ensuring the security of data transmission in wireless communication environments. However, the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies poses potential security threats to conventional protocols based on elliptic curve cryptography. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a quantum-secure authentication and key agreement protocol tailored for UAV–ground station communication scenarios. By incorporating Crystal-Kyber, the proposed protocol ensures quantum resistance while striving to minimize system computational overhead. The results of the informal security analysis indicate that the proposed protocol can effectively withstand a variety of known attacks. In addition, comprehensive comparative evaluations with existing related protocols demonstrate that, while maintaining low computational overhead, the proposed scheme exhibits stronger robustness in terms of security and functional properties.
Smart cities are increasingly relying on information and communication technologies to cope with today's challenges, including increasing population, heterogeneous economic growth, and environmental legislation hardening. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) generates a growing interest in coping with such challenges, along with new business opportunities. As a result, it is expected to see the number of drone-based applications to rise at a very fast pace, entailing new cybersecurity risks to emerge. In this paper, we propose to tackle the problem of secure communication among untrusting parties with a certificateless-group authenticated key agreement (CL-GAKA) scheme. The intent is to enable confidentiality, message integrity, and authenticity in UAV-to-UAV communication. Provisioning untrusted UAV networks with trusted communication will provide ground for further research and applications, such as collaborative cybersecurity deterrence, network extension using trusted relay nodes, collaborative mission exercise in time-critical applications, or anonymous communication for user privacy. Moreover, in order to fill the gap of technology awareness, we provide an implementation and demonstrate that the generation of a session key between two users can be performed in approximately 600ms on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ system-on-chip (1.4GHz Cortex-A53). Finally, the protocol is formally evaluated with the Scyther tool.
With the rapid development of integrated vehicle-road-cloud systems, RoadSide Units (RSUs) have become crucial for communication in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs). However, RSU failures disrupt real-time vehicle-to-cloud connectivity, exacerbating traffic congestion and safety risks. Recently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as a promising solution for temporary mobile base stations due to their rapid deployment and flexibility. Nevertheless, the open and dynamic nature of UAV-vehicle communication networks presents critical challenges in achieving both secure communication and lightweight authentication. Furthermore, the unsupervised deployment environment of UAVs makes them particularly vulnerable to physical attacks. To address these challenges, in this paper, we propose a secure and lightweight UAV-assisted vehicle authentication scheme based on quantum key. The scheme leverages quantum keys, hash functions and XOR to ensure secrecy and traceability of malicious entities. Utilising the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and fuzzy extractor to resist physical attacks. A private blockchain architecture is implemented for secure data storage and management. We verify the scheme’s security using the real-or-random (ROR) oracle model and the Scyther tool. The experimental results show that, compared to other schemes, our scheme has a lower overhead, with an average packet loss rate reduction of 11.42% – 28.8% and an average communication delay reduction of 14.41%–63%.
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) network serves as the core infrastructure of the future low-altitude intelligent network, providing flexible aerial smart services for various industries through inter-UAV collaboration and ground-air connectivity. With the advancement of quantum computing, quantum algorithms pose a serious threat to UAV communication networks. Traditional authentication protocols based on classical number-theoretic problems are no longer secure against quantum attacks. To address the challenges of quantum threats and the inherent characteristics of UAVs, such as high mobility and resource constraints, this paper proposes a quantum resistant authentication and key agreement protocol for UAV networks. The comprehensive informal security analysis demonstrates the robustness of the protocol against various attacks, particularly attacks based on quantum computing. Furthermore, the authentication component of the protocol adopts a lightweight design, reducing computational overhead by up to 53.57%, thereby balancing security and efficiency.