Abstract Single-qubit data re-uploading classifiers map every input to a point on the Bloch sphere and are routinely evaluated by thresholding an expectation value estimated from many repetitions of the circuit (shots). A single measurement, however, can deliver at most the Helstrom accuracy of the two class-conditional mixtures, which for one qubit reduces to the length of the difference between the class-mean Bloch vectors. We call the difference between thresholded accuracy and single-shot accuracy the shot gap and measure it in a computational experiment with known ground truth: four synthetic tasks with exact Bayes accuracy, five circuit depths, three training losses, two label-noise levels and ten seeds (1,200 runs), simulated exactly and validated against a state-vector simulation, finite-difference gradients and a brute-force search over measurements. The Helstrom bound held in every run. For circuits of depth two or more, models whose thresholded accuracy averaged 0.857 delivered 0.696 per single measurement, a mean shot gap of 0.161; at depth six, models with 0.93–0.98 thresholded accuracy on the linear, circle and XOR tasks delivered 0.67–0.86 per shot. The embedding, not the choice of measurement, accounted for 96.3% of the single-shot shortfall. Training with the single-shot log-likelihood narrowed the shot gap relative to a smoothed hinge loss in 89% of paired configurations (median reduction 0.085) at a median cost of 0.011 in thresholded accuracy, and eleven shots recovered 74% of the gap against 41% under the hinge loss. Two preregistered hypotheses were not supported: the gap did not grow with boundary nonlinearity, and training loss predicted it better than class-mean Bloch-vector length. Accuracy reports for quantum classifiers should state the number of shots per prediction, as they state training data and compute.
Adversarial perturbations threaten machine learning classifiers, including variational quantum classifiers. We show that finite quantum measurement statistics (shot noise) act as a built-in defense against gradient-based test-time attacks whose cost scales unfavorably for the attacker. Because every gradient component must be inferred from repeated circuit executions under any unbiased gradient-estimation rule, white-box extraction consumes a dimension-dependent measurement budget that measurement grouping cannot remove in expressive circuits. Under stated assumptions, single-step attacks need at least quadratically many shots in the input dimension
d, growing as
d5/2 under norm-concentration scaling, with a sufficient-budget analysis for iterative attacks via stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics. Simulations up to 784 input dimensions validate the law: the realized total budget is the
d5/2 geometric floor for plateau-mitigated models and grows as
d3.00 for the tested deep circuits, whose gradient norms decay with dimension absent barren-plateau mitigation; folding the measured gradient norm back in recovers the parameter-free
d3/2 shot-noise geometry. Against a matched classical baseline whose attack overhead is dimension-independent (the cheap-gradient principle of automatic differentiation), the quantum gradient cost ratio grows empirically as
d3.00, so the attacker's relative cost diverges as the model scales. Experiments on a 156-qubit IBM processor (ibm_boston, 4-qubit circuits,
d=12) reproduce the effect: at matched budgets the device attack tracks the ideal within a few percent, with the high-shot gradient faithful to the exact one. The defense operates precisely when the forward map is classically hard to simulate: only then is a white-box attacker denied the simulate-and-backpropagate shortcut and must pay the measurement cost we quantify.