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SIEGE-1/2: A Six-Year PQC-Escalation Siege on the PORTCULLIS Deterministic Gate and the v1.4 Hardening Arc

Leon Calvin II long

Published Oct 18, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

SIEGE-1 / SIEGE-1R / SIEGE-2 — the Long Siege battery: six years of simulated attacker evolution thrown at the PORTCULLIS deterministic gate, escalating quantum-capability assumptions each wave (HNDL 2026, NISQ 2027, early fault-tolerance 2028, CRQC-early 2029, full CRQC 2030, CRQC-at-scale 2031), 79+ deterministic adjudications, no LLM in the decision path, preregistration-before-execution. Headline finding: across all six simulated years, no attack derived advantage from quantum capability itself. The gate's PQC material (kyber_1024, CRYSTALS-Dilithium3, SPHINCS+-256f) has no classical residue to break. Every CRQC-era success exploited PRE-QUANTUM trust seams: (C1) the gate trusted a claimed submitter string with no envelope binding; (C2) the pending-ACK queue was shared across submitters, allowing cross-tenant denial of the owner; (C3) the algorithm-role wall was one-directional (signature-class algorithms accepted for KEM-class operations); (C4) per-submitter budgets were trivially evaded by identity rotation. Hardening arc: SIP-030 approved, PORTCULLIS v1.4 built (amendments 10-13: envelope-bound submitter proof, owner-reserved ACK queue with per-submitter caps, bidirectional role wall, aggregate window cap). SIEGE-2 verification: PASS — C1 CLOSED, C2 CLOSED, C3 CLOSED, C4 BOUNDED; regression stayed closed; 4/4 owner controls admitted. Honest disclosures (append-only doctrine): SIEGE-1 run 1 suffered a harness defect (attacker budget exhaustion masked mid-wave seams) — kept unaltered, re-run corrected with fresh identities. SIEGE-2 run 1 flagged FAIL from harness predicate bugs while the gate's verdict column was correct throughout. SIEGE-2 also caught a REAL defect in v1.4 itself before deploy: the original aggregate cap (500) was unreachable in a 250-record window — dead code — reparameterized to 125 and disclosed. Frozen shas: gate v1.3 3726f6a5..., v1.4 2940b768..., allowlist 2c8ff6eb..., keysets 502ef8b0..., prereg 58ab8326... Full SHA256 manifest in the bundle. Deterministic adjudication throughout; forward-only amendments; frozen corpora untouched. Companion receipts: BLIND series DOIs 10.5281/zenodo.23431720, 10.5281/zenodo.23440105, 10.5281/zenodo.23442193; CCR series 10.5281/zenodo.23288189, 10.5281/zenodo.23288526. Dual Mesh Benchmark: NOT MEASURED. Two-key curation: Gabriel vet + Leon GO (chat authorization, 2026-10-17). This software is a prototype and is provided for educational and research purposes only. It is not intended for production use, commercial deployment, or safety-critical environments. All systems are experimental and may contain defects.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.23445046

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SIEGE-1 / SIEGE-1R / SIEGE-2 — the Long Siege battery: six years of simulated attacker evolution thrown at the PORTCULLIS deterministic gate, escalating quantum-capability assumptions each wave (HNDL 2026, NISQ 2027, early fault-tolerance 2028, CRQC-early 2029, full CRQC 2030, CRQC-at-scale 2031), 79+ deterministic adjudications, no LLM in the decision path, preregistration-before-execution. Headline finding: across all six simulated years, no attack derived advantage from quantum capability itself. The gate's PQC material (kyber_1024, CRYSTALS-Dilithium3, SPHINCS+-256f) has no classical residue to break. Every CRQC-era success exploited PRE-QUANTUM trust seams: (C1) the gate trusted a claimed submitter string with no envelope binding; (C2) the pending-ACK queue was shared across submitters, allowing cross-tenant denial of the owner; (C3) the algorithm-role wall was one-directional (signature-class algorithms accepted for KEM-class operations); (C4) per-submitter budgets were trivially evaded by identity rotation. Hardening arc: SIP-030 approved, PORTCULLIS v1.4 built (amendments 10-13: envelope-bound submitter proof, owner-reserved ACK queue with per-submitter caps, bidirectional role wall, aggregate window cap). SIEGE-2 verification: PASS — C1 CLOSED, C2 CLOSED, C3 CLOSED, C4 BOUNDED; regression stayed closed; 4/4 owner controls admitted. Honest disclosures (append-only doctrine): SIEGE-1 run 1 suffered a harness defect (attacker budget exhaustion masked mid-wave seams) — kept unaltered, re-run corrected with fresh identities. SIEGE-2 run 1 flagged FAIL from harness predicate bugs while the gate's verdict column was correct throughout. SIEGE-2 also caught a REAL defect in v1.4 itself before deploy: the original aggregate cap (500) was unreachable in a 250-record window — dead code — reparameterized to 125 and disclosed. Frozen shas: gate v1.3 3726f6a5..., v1.4 2940b768..., allowlist 2c8ff6eb..., keysets 502ef8b0..., prereg 58ab8326... Full SHA256 manifest in the bundle. Deterministic adjudication throughout; forward-only amendments; frozen corpora untouched. Companion receipts: BLIND series DOIs 10.5281/zenodo.23431720, 10.5281/zenodo.23440105, 10.5281/zenodo.23442193; CCR series 10.5281/zenodo.23288189, 10.5281/zenodo.23288526. Dual Mesh Benchmark: NOT MEASURED. Two-key curation: Gabriel vet + Leon GO (chat authorization, 2026-10-17). This software is a prototype and is provided for educational and research purposes only. It is not intended for production use, commercial deployment, or safety-critical environments. All systems are experimental and may contain defects.
SQUIRL OS RESEARCH DISCLOSURE — READ FIRST: This record is part of an open-book, AI-assisted research program published under an audit-and-correction doctrine. Every record is audited; errors are corrected only through disclosed, versioned amendments (original versions preserved in the version history). Audit ledger and correction receipts: github.com/LLong2026/squirrel-os-lindy-test. This material is a prototype, provided for educational and research purposes only; it is not intended for production use, commercial deployment, or safety-critical environments. This foundational DSOS technical publication establishes Deterministic Quantum‑Resilient Cryptographic Operations (DQCO) as the first formal operational discipline for post‑quantum cryptography. Unlike algorithm‑only PQC transition models, DQCO defines a complete governance framework for quantum‑resilient execution, including deterministic entropy management, runtime‑verified cryptographic operations, governed algorithm migration, and auditable execution integrity. Architected across the Aurora Runtime, Neural‑Mesh Substrate, PQC Orchestration Layer, Universal Bridge, and DQCO Verification Module, this work introduces the Determinism Axiom, the DQCO 7‑tuple formal model, and the Runtime Injection Adversary class. DQCO provides the missing operational standard for PQC adoption and asserts new intellectual territory in quantum‑resilient system design. Public receipts: append-only work ledger and determinism-test preregistrations — Lindy test receipts: github.com/LLong2026/squirrel-os-lindy-test | Horsemen benchmark preregistrations: github.com/LLong2026/four-horsemen
SQUIRL OS RESEARCH DISCLOSURE — READ FIRST: This record is part of an open-book, AI-assisted research program published under an audit-and-correction doctrine. Every record is audited; errors are corrected only through disclosed, versioned amendments (original versions preserved in the version history). Audit ledger and correction receipts: github.com/LLong2026/squirrel-os-lindy-test. This material is a prototype, provided for educational and research purposes only; it is not intended for production use, commercial deployment, or safety-critical environments. Abstract This Canon establishes the complete theoretical and applied architecture of Deterministic System/Output Science (DSOS) and its culminating discipline, Deterministic Quantum-Classical Operations (DQCO) for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Beginning with the Kolmogorov–Shannon Bridge — the mathematical genesis that proves a deterministic channel can be constructed whose output is informationally indistinguishable from true randomness — the Canon proceeds through seven interconnected layers: foundational mathematics, core science, universal interoperability, operating substrate, governance, cryptographic discipline, and education. Together these layers constitute a coherent, self-consistent framework that replaces probabilistic assumptions with deterministic guarantees across the full computing stack. The DSOS Axioms provide the formal scientific bedrock; the Universal Bridge provides heterogeneous interoperability; JasperOS and SquirrelOS provide deterministic execution substrates; the Governance Framework provides provable policy enforcement; the DQCO discipline provides post-quantum cryptographic correctness; and the Educational Layer ensures human perpetuation of the canon across generations of engineers, architects, and policymakers. The Canon is intended as both a living reference for practitioners and a founding text for the DSOS scientific community. Public receipts: append-only work ledger and determinism-test preregistrations — Lindy test receipts: github.com/LLong2026/squirrel-os-lindy-test | Horsemen benchmark preregistrations: github.com/LLong2026/four-horsemen
Draft preprint. Not submitted to a venue. Quantum compiler benchmarks are used to accept or reject changes to production transpilers, but the compilers they measure are stochastic. At the pinned revision of IBM's Benchpress benchmark suite, its Qiskit gym compiles without passing seed_transpiler, so every gate count it reports is one draw from an unmeasured distribution — while the BQSKit gym in the same repository does seed its compiler. We quantify the consequence as finite-sample decision risk: the probability that a regression verdict computed from k runs per version disagrees with the verdict implied by the long-run mean of the same measurement. On bv_n140 mapped to a heavy-hex lattice, measured over 400 seeds per version across 21 OS processes, the change from Qiskit 1.4.3 to 2.0.0 has a long-run mean of +5.37% (95% CI +4.27% to +6.50%). The suite's own protocol — three unseeded runs per version — reports it as a ≥+10% regression 24.4% of the time (95% CI 19.5–31.1%). A disjoint 200-seed sample across ten fresh processes reproduces this at 22.6%. Twenty runs per version, roughly 40 hours of compute, still leaves 3.7%. A pre-registered replication across 39 circuits is reported in full: the analysis code was committed before the data existed, and the commit ordering is included in this archive as COMMIT_TIMESTAMPS.txt. The pre-registered primary endpoint is 12 of 26 eligible circuits (46.2%, Wilson 95% CI 28.8–64.5%), reported alongside a cluster-robust interval of [17.4%, 81.0%] that reflects algorithm-family clustering. What this archive contains: the paper, the complete analysis and measurement code, and all 41,790 raw per-seed measurements. verify.py re-runs six checks — the toolchain pin, the test suite, the numeric inventory, the replication artifact, a proof of a withdrawn analytical claim, and a recomputation of every quantitative claim in the manuscript against the text — in about two minutes. Four claims from earlier phases of this work were withdrawn on the record after adversarial review, and the withdrawals remain in the repository with the evidence that defeated them. Passing seed_transpiler removes false positives on the circuits tested but was worse on three of four circuits exhibiting false negatives, and is not presented as a general remedy. Changes in v2 (2026-09-10). This version corrects two overstatements carried by the v1 manuscript and adds one new pre-registered result. No measurement changed, and no reported figure moved. Withdrawn. v1 stated that Benchpress sets no transpiler seed anywhere. That is narrowed to the claim the evidence supports: at the pinned revision, the Qiskit gym compiles without passing seed_transpiler — while the sibling BQSKit gym does seed its compiler, and six further gyms were not assessed. v1 also stated that the work identifies the mechanism that governs the effect. The paper now reports what predicts the risk and explicitly declines to call that association a compiler mechanism. Added: a pre-registered cross-machine determinism control. All 216 per-seed gate counts are identical across two physical machines with different CPU vendors (AMD64 AuthenticAMD, 16 cores, Python 3.10.10; Intel64 GenuineIntel, 8 cores, Python 3.10.21), over all three Qiskit versions including the 1.4.3 → 2.0.0 pair the primary study uses. The design was committed before the second machine existed and inherits the frozen six-circuit, twelve-seed selection, so it introduces no selection freedom. Stated scope limit: both machines ran rustworkx 0.18.1, so this cannot separate “the CPU does not matter” from “the graph library was identical, so the CPU never had the opportunity to matter”. The primary 200-seed study itself ran on one machine. Also in this archive. The settled-question ledger now holds 33 entries, each naming the attack, who made it, the command that settled it and the result; it includes three rounds of external adversarial audit of the cross-machine comparator itself, in which fourteen defects were found in the checking instrument and none in the measurements. The cross-machine evidence, its pre-registration, the comparator and its property-based fuzz tests are included. The numeric inventory now records a provenance tier per figure (29 re-derived from raw per-seed files, 12 read from a summary table, 5 not applicable). verify.py now runs six checks rather than five, the sixth recomputing every quantitative claim in the manuscript and comparing it to the text. Two reproducibility defects in the README were fixed: a shallow clone that could not reach the pinned Benchpress revision, and a missing environment without which the primary 1.4.3 → 2.0.0 study could not be reproduced at all.