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Anais de XXXV Simpósio Brasileiro de Telecomunicações e Processamento de Sinais

CHSH Constrained Variational Attacks on the E91 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Tharso Dominisini Fernandes, Demerson Nunes Gonçalves, Filippo Giovanni Ghiglieno, Fernando M. Araújo-Moreira

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We investigate Quantum Circuit Learning (QCL) as a variational framework for exploring eavesdropping attacks on the entanglement-based E91 quantum key distribution protocol.Eve's attack is modeled by a hardware-efficient parameterized quantum circuit optimized with a loss function combining the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) parameter, the Alice-Bob quantum bit error rate (QBER), and Eve's conditional bitinference probability.We consider two attack models: a twosided attack, in which Eve has coherent access to both distributed qubits before their delivery to Alice and Bob, and a one-sided attack restricted to an Alice-Eve interaction.In the noiseless two-sided scenario, the optimized circuit reaches PEve ≈ 0.79, S ≈ 2.57, and QBER ≈ 4.6%, while the corresponding CHSHbased lower bound on the asymptotic secret-key rate remains positive.Under depolarizing noise with probability p = 0.1, the two-sided attack remains inside the exploratory region |S| > 2 and QBER < 8%, but the resulting key-rate lower bound becomes non-positive.In contrast, the one-sided attack reaches unit conditional inference probability only by causing a substantial QBER and eliminating Bell violation.These results show that variational circuits can explore information, disturbance regimes beyond fixed attack models, while the quantitative CHSH-based key-rate bound, rather than a binary Bell-violation or QBER threshold, is required to assess whether positive asymptotic secret-key extraction is certified.

DOI
10.14209/sbrt.2026.1571295613

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We investigate Quantum Circuit Learning (QCL) as a variational framework for exploring eavesdropping attacks on the entanglement-based E91 quantum key distribution protocol.Eve's attack is modeled by a hardware-efficient parameterized quantum circuit optimized with a loss function combining the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) parameter, the Alice-Bob quantum bit error rate (QBER), and Eve's conditional bitinference probability.We consider two attack models: a twosided attack, in which Eve has coherent access to both distributed qubits before their delivery to Alice and Bob, and a one-sided attack restricted to an Alice-Eve interaction.In the noiseless two-sided scenario, the optimized circuit reaches PEve ≈ 0.79, S ≈ 2.57, and QBER ≈ 4.6%, while the corresponding CHSHbased lower bound on the asymptotic secret-key rate remains positive.Under depolarizing noise with probability p = 0.1, the two-sided attack remains inside the exploratory region |S| > 2 and QBER < 8%, but the resulting key-rate lower bound becomes non-positive.In contrast, the one-sided attack reaches unit conditional inference probability only by causing a substantial QBER and eliminating Bell violation.These results show that variational circuits can explore information, disturbance regimes beyond fixed attack models, while the quantitative CHSH-based key-rate bound, rather than a binary Bell-violation or QBER threshold, is required to assess whether positive asymptotic secret-key extraction is certified.
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Abstract Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides secure communication through the principles of quantum mechanics. The E91 protocol using entangled photon pairs and Bell’s inequality has been extensively researched for its security advantage. Practical realization is, however hindered by environmental noise, channel losses and detector inefficiencies, constraining secure key rates and communication distances. This paper presents AZE91, an optimized version of E91 that includes novel noise reduction methods, such as Dynamical Decoupling (DD), Decoherence-Free Subspaces (DFS) and the Quantum Zeno Effect. Moreover, adaptive basis optimization adaptively adjusts measurement settings in real-world scenario to optimize the violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality a key element in determining quantum correlations. The protocol starts with the creation of a most entangled Bell state and uses a Werner state noise model to mimic actual time imperfections. Using DD and the Quantum Zeno Effect, AZE91 greatly minimizes the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and maximizes the CHSH parameter. Monte Carlo simulations show that although conventional E91 achieves a CHSH parameter close to 2.5 and a QBER of around 3.5%, AZE91 enhances these values to a CHSH parameter of around 2.7 and a QBER of around 2%. This enhancement results in a higher raw key rate and more security. The results indicate the capability of AZE91 to outperform conventional entanglement-based QKD systems and form a robust platform for experimental verification and further exploration.
BB84 quantum key distribution derives its security from a physical guarantee that any eavesdropper disturbs the channel in a statistically detectable way. Prior work evaluates this by assuming Eve attacks at a fixed, analytically optimized rate. We examine what happens when Eve is modeled instead as a learning agent. Classical reinforcement learning is used, specifically tabular Q-Learning, SARSA, and Double Q-Learning, to adaptive BB84 eavesdropping. This formulates the attacker's decision as a Markov Decision Process where the agent observes Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) feedback and decides, qubit by qubit, whether to intercept or pass. Experiments span three channel noise levels (μch∈{1%,3%,5%}μ_{ch}\in\{1\%,3\%,5\%\}μch​∈{1%,3%,5%}) and are validated across five independent random seeds (45 training runs per condition, 10,000 episodes each). Against the best non-adaptive analytical baseline, Q-Learning reduces detection from 99.4%99.4\%99.4% to 0.28%±0.27%0.28\%\pm0.27\%0.28%±0.27% at μch=1%μ_{ch}=1\%μch​=1% while extracting approximately 10.5 correct bits per episode. This is a 355-fold reduction that is statistically significant (p=0.020p=0.020p=0.020, Mann-Whitney UUU test). We also report the spontaneous emergence of an end-game burst, where agents independently learn to surge their attack rate at the final block. This exploit vanishes under randomized checkpoint intervals while stealth performance remains statistically indistinguishable. These results motivate the inclusion of adaptive adversary baselines in quantum cryptographic security evaluations.
Quantum circuit learning (QCL) has been proposed to optimize eavesdropping attacks on BB84.We investigate the behavior of learned attacks under depolarizing, bit-flip, phaseflip, amplitude-damping, phase-damping, and combined noise.After validating the variational model against the noiseless phasecovariant cloning machine (PCCM) frontier, we compare the optimized QCL attacks with analytical PCCM reference points evaluated under the same noise conditions.Results show that deviations from PCCM behavior depend primarily on noise structure: basis-dependent channels induce asymmetric strategies, whereas depolarizing noise largely preserves symmetry.Consequently, aggregate figures of merit may hide basis-resolved asymmetries within the restricted attack model considered here.
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