Gauge-Related States Are Physically Distinct: A Reductio ad Absurdum
Shan Gao
Abstract
Gauge theories are conventionally interpreted by identifying gauge-related configurations as one and the same physical state. We argue that this identification is untenable. The key distinction is between dynamics and physical identity: a dynamics determines how configurations evolve, whereas physical identity, an ontological relation between configurations, is independent of that dynamics. We apply this principle to the local QED transformation $(A_\mu,\psi)\rightarrow(A_\mu-\partial_\mu\Lambda,e^{ie\Lambda/\hbar}\psi).$ Although this transformation is a symmetry of the massless electromagnetic dynamics, a dynamics on the same configuration variables containing a gauge-field mass term distinguishes the two configurations. If they were one and the same physical state, their identity could not depend on this change of dynamics; hence the gauge-related configurations cannot be identified as one physical state. The Higgs mechanism does not change the conclusion: enlarging the configuration space restores gauge covariance without establishing gauge redundancy. The result extends to non-Abelian gauge theories and, with diffeomorphisms replacing gauge transformations, to general relativity. Gauge covariance is thus a symmetry of the equations, not a principle of physical identity. Gauge-related configurations are physically distinct, and the electromagnetic potential $A_\mu$ should consequently be regarded as a real physical field rather than a mathematical redundancy.