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3PC honest-majority PRAM computation with perfect security and low overhead

Zexiang Chen

Published Apr 27, 2023• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this thesis, we present new techniques for three-party secure computation in the parallel random access machine (PRAM) model.Our protocol is perfectly secure and concretely efficient.Considering a PRAM machine storing n w-bit words and having a large number (p = O(n)) of processors, and assuming at most one passively corrupt party, our construction exhibits the following properties:

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In this thesis, we present new techniques for three-party secure computation in the parallel random access machine (PRAM) model.Our protocol is perfectly secure and concretely efficient.Considering a PRAM machine storing n w-bit words and having a large number (p = O(n)) of processors, and assuming at most one passively corrupt party, our construction exhibits the following properties:
Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao's (semi-honest) 2PC protocol.
Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao’s (semi-honest) 2PC protocol. We demonstrate the practicality of our protocol with an implementation based on the JustGarble framework of Bellare et al. (S&P 2013). The implementation incorporates various optimizations including the most recent techniques for efficient circuit garbling. We perform experiments on several benchmarking circuits, in different setups. Our experiments confirm that, despite providing a more demanding security guarantee, our protocol has performance comparable to existing information-theoretic 3PC. 1
As far as we know, the literature on secure computation from cut-and-choose has focused on achieving computational security against malicious adversaries. It is unclear whether the idea of cut-and-choose can be adapted to secure computation with information-theoretic security. In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose in information theoretic setting for secure three-party computation (3PC). Previous work on 3PC has mainly focus on the semi-honest case, and is motivated by the observation that real-word deployments of multi-party computation (MPC) seem to involve few parties. We propose a new protocol for information-theoretically secure 3PC tolerating one malicious party with cheating probability 2−s2^{-s}2−s using sss runs of circuit computation in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our protocol is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art 3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its communication round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC protocols in information-theoretic setting.
Multiparty computation (MPC) over rings such as Z232\mathbb {Z}_{2^{32}}Z232​ or Z264\mathbb {Z}_{2^{64}}Z264​ has received a great deal of attention recently due to its ease of implementation and attractive performance. Several actively secure protocols over these rings have been implemented, for both the dishonest majority setting and the setting of three parties with one corruption. However, in the honest majority setting, no concretely efficient protocol for arithmetic computation over rings has yet been proposed that allows for an arbitrary number of parties.
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, several distrustful parties wish to carry out a distributed computing task on their local private data while satisfying several security properties such as correctness, privacy, independence of inputs and fairness. The aim of secure multiparty computation (MPC) is to enable the parties to carry out the computation in a secure manner, eliminating any attempt of an adversarial entity to harm the execution. The concept of secure computation is very general and fundamental in cryptography, and models any distributed computing task, including simple computations as coin-tossing and broadcast, as well as more complex tasks such as electronic auctions and anonymous transactions. In this thesis, we study two foundational aspects of secure computation: perfect security and fairness. In the first part of this thesis, we study perfect security in secure computation. A protocol that is perfectly secure cannot be broken even when the adversary has unlimited computational power and its security holds unconditionally. One of the most fundamental results of secure computation was presented by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson (BGW) in 1988. They demonstrated that any n-party functionality can be computed with perfect security, in the private channels model. When the adversary is semi-honest this holds as long as t < n/2 parties are corrupted, and when the adversary is malicious this holds as long as t < n/3 parties are corrupted. Unfortunately, a full proof of these results was never published. In this thesis, we remedy this situation and provide a full proof of security of the BGW protocol. This also includes a full description of the protocol for the malicious setting. In addition to the above, we observe that by some simple and natural modifications, the BGW protocol can be significantly simplified and one of its expensive (and perhaps most complicated) subprotocols can be saved. We present a new multiplication protocol that is based on the original construction, but is simpler and achieves higher efficiency. In the second part of this thesis, we study fairness in secure two party computation. Informally, the fairness property guarantees that if one party receives its output, then the other party does too. The well-known impossibility result of Cleve (STOC 1986) implies that, in general, it is impossible to securely compute a function with complete fairness without an honest majority. Until recently, the accepted belief has been that nothing non-trivial can be computed with complete fairness in the two party setting. The surprising work of Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell (STOC 2008) shows that this belief is false, and that there exist some non-trivial (deterministic, finite-domain) Boolean functions that can be computed fairly. This raises the fundamental question of characterizing complete fairness in secure two-party computation. We focus on this question and give both positive and negative results. We first characterize