K SC Governments are adopting artificial intelligence at the same moment that the cryptographic assumptions under their long-lived secrets are being placed on a clock. This paper treats four developments as a single problem of digital trust rather than as separate technical topics. First, AI systems are moving from content generation to agentic action, and are already exposed to impersonation, poisoning and unauthorised use. Second, persistent memory across sessions creates a new class of institutional record, whose integrity cannot be reduced to a signature. Third, cryptographic security depends on unpredictable keys, not on non-determinism, and better randomness does not answer a quantum attack on public-key mathematics. Fourth, harvest-now-decrypt-later means that the threat to data which must remain confidential for decades exists before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer does. Drawing on published resource estimates, the NIST post-quantum standards, and the positions of major security agencies on quantum key distribution, the paper argues that preparation should begin with an inventory of vulnerable cryptography, hybrid migration of high-value key exchange, and an explicit regime for the ownership and correction of AI memory. The implications for diplomatic communications and for states with constrained compute and language resources are developed throughout. Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/134650176/download_file?s=portfolio
K SC Governments are adopting artificial intelligence at the same moment that the cryptographic assumptions under their long-lived secrets are being placed on a clock. This paper treats four developments as a single problem of digital trust rather than as separate technical topics. First, AI systems are moving from content generation to agentic action, and are already exposed to impersonation, poisoning and unauthorised use. Second, persistent memory across sessions creates a new class of institutional record, whose integrity cannot be reduced to a signature. Third, cryptographic security depends on unpredictable keys, not on non-determinism, and better randomness does not answer a quantum attack on public-key mathematics. Fourth, harvest-now-decrypt-later means that the threat to data which must remain confidential for decades exists before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer does. Drawing on published resource estimates, the NIST post-quantum standards, and the positions of major security agencies on quantum key distribution, the paper argues that preparation should begin with an inventory of vulnerable cryptography, hybrid migration of high-value key exchange, and an explicit regime for the ownership and correction of AI memory. The implications for diplomatic communications and for states with constrained compute and language resources are developed throughout. Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/134650176/download_file?s=portfolio
Governments are adopting artificial intelligence at the same moment that the cryptographic assumptions under their long-lived secrets are being placed on a clock. This paper treats four developments as a single problem of digital trust rather than as separate technical topics. First, AI systems are moving from content generation to agentic action, and are already exposed to impersonation, poisoning and unauthorised use. Second, persistent memory across sessions creates a new class of institutional record, whose integrity cannot be reduced to a signature. Third, cryptographic security depends on unpredictable keys, not on non-determinism, and better randomness does not answer a quantum attack on public-key mathematics. Fourth, harvest-now-decrypt-later means that the threat to data which must remain confidential for decades exists before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer does. Drawing on published resource estimates, the NIST post-quantum standards, and the positions of major security agencies on quantum key distribution, the paper argues that preparation should begin with an inventory of vulnerable cryptography, hybrid migration of high-value key exchange, and an explicit regime for the ownership and correction of AI memory. The implications for diplomatic communications and for states with constrained compute and language resources are developed throughout. KSCCN discussion paper prepared for the SQLL session on AI and quantum computing, Baridhara DOHS, 3 October 2026. Dr. Syed Muntasir Mamun, ORCID 0000-0001-6845-2853. The views expressed are those of the author.
Agentic AI systems depend on classical public-key cryptography for agent identity, tool invocation, inter-agent communication, model integrity, and persistent state, exposing them to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) along two axes: confidentiality (harvest-now-decrypt-later) and integrity (harvest-now-forge-later). Existing post-quantum migration guidance addresses static, operator-controlled enterprise estates, while emerging agent-identity work omits post-quantum cryptography entirely; neither treats non-human-identity-dense, runtime-negotiated agentic systems as a distinct migration class. This paper develops a conceptual framework that does. It organizes agentic cryptography into seven migration surfaces and separates each identity into a credential layer (symmetric, operator-held, low-risk) and a trust-anchor layer (the asymmetric roots that underwrite the fleet). These layers scale inversely: a small set of trust anchors carries a forge-later blast radius equal to the population beneath it, so migration effort and forge-later risk rank the work in opposite orders. A migration matrix and a parametric effort-and-risk model formalize this, yielding the core sequencing rule: migrate anchors first. Because agentic adoption is ongoing, it also reframes migration from a finite inventory into a continuously regenerating problem, distinguishing remediation of the installed base from prevention of new classical-cryptographic debt in future deployments. It closes with oversight and procurement implications for federal post-quantum readiness.
The growing concern around AI-driven cyber threats has often overshadowed a deeper structural weakness within enterprise security systems, namely the fragile state of cryptographic foundations that were never built for long-term resilience. While artificial intelligence amplifies the speed and scale of attacks, quantum computing introduces a more disruptive possibility, the obsolescence of widely used public-key encryption. The release of post-quantum algorithms by the National Institute of Standards and Technology marks an important milestone; however, the broader challenge extends beyond algorithm selection to issues of data sovereignty, interoperability, and delayed preparedness. Sensitive assets such as financial systems, healthcare records, national security data, and intellectual property remain exposed under a harvest now, decrypt later strategy already adopted by adversaries. This situation calls for a shift from reactive cybersecurity measures toward crypto-agility, where enterprises actively assess cryptographic inventories, align with emerging standards, embed quantum-resistant mechanisms, and integrate intelligent threat detection with durable encryption strategies. Leading cloud and technology providers including IBM, AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform have begun operationalizing quantum-safe initiatives through structured discovery, migration roadmaps, hybrid cryptographic models, and enterprise-wide inventory assessments. The transition toward quantum-safe security is not a temporary fix but a long-term architectural transformation aimed at ensuring governance, compliance, and institutional survival in an evolving threat landscape.
The growing concern around AI-driven cyber threats has often overshadowed a deeper structural weakness within enterprise security systems, namely the fragile state of cryptographic foundations that were never built for long-term resilience. While artificial intelligence amplifies the speed and scale of attacks, quantum computing introduces a more disruptive possibility, the obsolescence of widely used public-key encryption. The release of post-quantum algorithms by the National Institute of Standards and Technology marks an important milestone; however, the broader challenge extends beyond algorithm selection to issues of data sovereignty, interoperability, and delayed preparedness. Sensitive assets such as financial systems, healthcare records, national security data, and intellectual property remain exposed under a harvest now, decrypt later strategy already adopted by adversaries. This situation calls for a shift from reactive cybersecurity measures toward crypto-agility, where enterprises actively assess cryptographic inventories, align with emerging standards, embed quantum-resistant mechanisms, and integrate intelligent threat detection with durable encryption strategies. Leading cloud and technology providers including IBM, AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform have begun operationalizing quantum-safe initiatives through structured discovery, migration roadmaps, hybrid cryptographic models, and enterprise-wide inventory assessments. The transition toward quantum-safe security is not a temporary fix but a long-term architectural transformation aimed at ensuring governance, compliance, and institutional survival in an evolving threat landscape.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
This eighth volume in the KSCCN Series addresses the profound implications of quantum computing for sovereign AI systems. As quantum computers advance toward cryptographically relevant scale, they threaten to undermine the cryptographic foundations upon which current AI infrastructure, secure communications, and agentic systems depend. Simultaneously, quantum technologies offer new capabilities for machine learning, optimisation, and simulation that could enhance sovereign AI if harnessed appropriately. This volume provides a comprehensive analysis of the quantum transition for sovereign AI, examining post-quantum cryptography migration strategies, quantum-enhanced AI opportunities and risks, and the information-geometric extensions of quantum information theory to privacy and epistemic sovereignty. It analyses how quantum threats and opportunities intersect with the agentic systems examined in Volume VI and the implementation strategies developed in Volume VII. Special attention is given to Global South contexts, where the quantum transition presents both risks of renewed technological dependency and opportunities for strategic leapfrogging. The volume develops recommendations for quantum-resilient sovereign AI architectures that protect epistemic assets while enabling beneficial quantum-enhanced capabilities. Also available on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/133307508/download_file?s=portfolio