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International Symposium ELMAR (ELMAR)

From Bell’s Theorem to Quantum Key Distribution: Mapping the Fundamental Assumptions

Mate Jagnjić, Josip Vuković, Dario Bojanjac

Published Sep 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/elmar71231.2026.11712198

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Abstract A new eavesdropping strategy is proposed for the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol. This scheme represents a new kind of intercept/resend strategy based on Bell’s theorem. Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides the foremost reliable form of secure key exchange, using only the input-output statistics of the devices to realize information-theoretic security. In this paper, we present an improved QKD protocol that can simultaneously distribute the quantum secret key. We are already using the QKD protocol with simulated results matched completely with the theoretical concepts.
This paper presents the 3+1 challenge to quantum key distribution: one fundamental theoretical contradiction and three untested operational attack vectors that constitute the first substantive challenge to quantum cryptography from an information-theoretic perspective. The 3: Quantum Shadow Mapping a passive EMF field resonance side-channel targeting the message, not the key, with full mathematical formalization Neural manifold-based geometric information navigation — extending empirically validated GCIS preimage recovery methodology to quantum information states Classical channel dependency exploiting the demonstrated geometric vulnerability of ECC authentication infrastructur The +1: The BB84 security guarantee contradicts the No-Hiding Theorem, the No-Deleting Theorem, and unitarity proven results of quantum mechanics itself. QKD security reduces to an access limitation, not a physical impossibility. We claim that BB84 is no longer valid as absolutely secure. Any defense must argue against quantum mechanics itself.
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) provides a model of quantum key distribution with minimal assumptions and highly abstract theoretical building blocks. Although DIQKD frees us from detailed discussions of specific device models and associated error parameters, it replaces them with fundamental assumptions about the validity of quantum experiments. In this work, we propose a way to lift a protocol based on DIQKD-style assumptions to a device-dependent QKD protocol by performing local self-tests in the laboratories of the two key-generating parties. In particular, we consider routed Bell-test setups as a means of self-testing the local parties in earnest and develop a rigorous mathematical framework showing that the underlying optimization problems can indeed be transferred to the device-dependent QKD setting. As an application, we illustrate many of the relevant techniques through the case study of a routed BB84 protocol.