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IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT)

SPADE: A Protocol for Secure Post-Quantum AI-Model Deployment to Edge-Devices

Soumyadev Saha, Ranajoy Hajra, Shashidhara R, Beda Prakash Meher, Anish Singhania, Pavan Kumar Panakalapati

Published Jul 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The deployment of over-the-air model updates in edge AI systems is hindered by suboptimal distribution protocols and a dependence on classical cryptographic methods, which are susceptible to potential threats from quantum cryptanalysis in the future. To address this vulnerability, we propose the Secure Post-quantum AI-model Deployment to Edge devices (SPADE) protocol. SPADE protects the complete model update lifecycle by combining NIST-standardized ML-KEM for post-quantum key exchange with EdDSA for deterministic digital signatures, ensuring end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. We formalize the security of SPADE against both classical and quantum adversaries through rigorous threat modeling and standard game-based security proofs. Furthermore, we implement and benchmark SPADE against three classical and decentralized baseline protocols (including ECDH-ChaCha20 and IPFS-AES) on both server and mobile hardware platforms. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that while the post-quantum cryptographic primitives introduce an anticipated computational overhead, the latency scales linearly and remains highly competitive with vulnerable classical methods. SPADE thereby delivers a practical, forward-secrecy-preserving framework for securing modern edge AI deployments.

DOI
10.1109/conecct68978.2026.11700766

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The deployment of over-the-air model updates in edge AI systems is hindered by suboptimal distribution protocols and a dependence on classical cryptographic methods, which are susceptible to potential threats from quantum cryptanalysis in the future. To address this vulnerability, we propose the Secure Post-quantum AI-model Deployment to Edge devices (SPADE) protocol. SPADE protects the complete model update lifecycle by combining NIST-standardized ML-KEM for post-quantum key exchange with EdDSA for deterministic digital signatures, ensuring end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. We formalize the security of SPADE against both classical and quantum adversaries through rigorous threat modeling and standard game-based security proofs. Furthermore, we implement and benchmark SPADE against three classical and decentralized baseline protocols (including ECDH-ChaCha20 and IPFS-AES) on both server and mobile hardware platforms. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that while the post-quantum cryptographic primitives introduce an anticipated computational overhead, the latency scales linearly and remains highly competitive with vulnerable classical methods. SPADE thereby delivers a practical, forward-secrecy-preserving framework for securing modern edge AI deployments.
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As artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly underpin critical applications in healthcare, finance, defense, and infrastructure, ensuring their security has become paramount. However, the rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic schemes that currently safeguard these systems. Quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s threaten to undermine the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data and models that AI systems depend on. In this context, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a crucial area of research aimed at developing cryptographic algorithms that are secure against both classical and quantum adversaries. This paper investigates the intersection of quantum computing threats and AI system vulnerabilities, highlighting how current security mechanisms may fail in a post-quantum era. We explore various categories of PQC—including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial cryptography—and evaluate their applicability to securing AI systems, particularly in scenarios such as model distribution, federated learning, data encryption, and communication in AI-enabled edge and IoT environments. Through analysis of emerging use cases and proposed architectures, the paper outlines how PQC can be integrated into the AI lifecycle to mitigate quantum-era threats. It also identifies key challenges such as computational overhead, integration complexity, and standardization gaps. The study concludes by outlining future research opportunities, including the development of efficient PQC protocols tailored to AI workloads, the creation of quantum-resilient AI pipelines, and the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration to secure AI’s future.
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) deployments increasingly rely on cloud–edge collaboration while operating with long-lived field devices, heterogeneous hardware, deterministic control requirements, and bandwidth-constrained links. These properties make “PQC everywhere” upgrades costly and operationally risky, yet the edge–device access boundary remains a critical trust bottleneck and an attractive target for impersonation, replay, and key-compromise threats. This paper proposes a selective-deployment approach for post-quantum authentication in industrial systems: rather than enforcing uniform migration, we identify security-critical boundaries and map protocol changes to lifecycle safe points to enable incremental, deployable protection. Building on this framework, we design SDAKA, a lifecycle-oriented post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol spanning onboarding/registration, runtime access, maintenance (key evolution), and decommissioning/ revocation. SDAKA combines the standardized post-quantum signature primitive ML-DSA with an ML-KEM-inspired Module-LWE key-establishment component to establish session keys and authenticate lifecycle operations, while supporting operational needs such as pseudonymous access with accountable traceability. We validate the protocol via machine-checked symbolic analysis (ProVerif) and reduction-style security arguments in the Real-or-Random (RoR) model. A heterogeneous edge–device testbed evaluation further demonstrates that SDAKA’s computational latency and communication overhead remain practical for industrial links, and that different security configurations provide flexible trade-offs between protection strength and deployment cost.
Blockchain AI architectures stand at the nexus of distributed consensus and machine-driven intelligence, offering transformative applications across finance, supply chain, healthcare, and beyond. However, the emergence of scalable quantum computers threatens foundational cryptographic primitives—most notably, elliptic-curve and RSA-based schemes—that secure transaction integrity, key exchange, and smart-contract execution. This manuscript presents a comprehensive evaluation of quantum threat mitigation strategies tailored for blockchain AI systems. We examine three distinct approaches: (1) adoption of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms (lattice-based signatures and hash-based KEMs) that resist Shor’s algorithm; (2) integration of hybrid quantum-classical key distribution leveraging quantum key distribution (QKD) combined with classical post-quantum algorithms; and (3) deployment of trusted execution environments (TEEs) to isolate critical key operations from both classical and quantum side-channel attacks. Our mixed-methods methodology includes simulation on a 50-node blockchain AI testbed, processing 240,000 transactions over 24 hours, and statistical analysis of throughput, latency, and key-exchange performance. The results demonstrate that lattice-based schemes maintain 128-bit quantum security with a moderate performance overhead (~27 % throughput reduction, ~20 % increased latency), while hybrid QKD delivers information-theoretic security but incurs significant latency penalties (115 % higher than baseline). TEEs effectively mitigate side-channels with negligible additional overhead. We conclude by offering practical guidelines for phased deployment—beginning with immediate migration to lattice-based cryptography, followed by pilot QKD integration for high-security use cases—and outline future research directions.
This book explores the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing, focusing on the urgent need to secure machine learning systems in the face of emerging quantum threats. As quantum computers advance, they expose vulnerabilities in classical cryptographic methods, potentially undermining data integrity, privacy, and trust in AI-driven applications. To address these challenges, this study introduces the concept of post-quantum AI—a framework for integrating quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, Anomaly detection mechanisms, and Resilient machine learning architectures. This book makes three core contributions: it motivates a quantum-era threat model for machine learning (ii) it maps a migration path to standardised post-quantum cryptography Crypto-agile architectures (iii) it presents a defence-in-depth blueprint across the data → training → inference lifecycle that integrates privacy-preserving learning Governance. This work explicitly highlights key contributions, including proposed frameworks, algorithms, and case studies. Future research directions are also outlined to guide continued exploration in this emergent field. The final candidate algorithms from the NIST PQC standardisation process (NIST, 2022–2023) further strengthen this discussion. Key themes include the foundations of quantum mechanics relevant to computation, the fundamental differences between classical and quantum computing, and the transformative potential of quantum algorithms for optimisation, pattern recognition, and predictive analytics. The book highlights case studies spanning drug discovery, finance, mobile networks, and supply chain optimisation, illustrating how quantum-enhanced AI can revolutionise industry while simultaneously raising complex security and ethical concerns. A central focus is the development and deployment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC)), such as lattice-based and hash-based algorithms, to safeguard AI models against adversarial and quantum-accelerated attacks. The discussion extends to adversarial machine learning, explainable AI (XAI), and hybrid classical–quantum systems as strategies for strengthening resilience. The ethical, legal, and regulatory dimensions of post-quantum AI are also examined, emphasising fairness, transparency, accountability, and international cooperation. By combining technical innovations with responsible governance, the book advocates for building trustworthy AI systems that remain robust in the quantum era. Future work includes post-quantum cryptography (PQC) performance benchmarking in ML pipelines Patterns for crypto-agile key management, Assurance methods for privacy-preserving Federated learning as standards, and Implementations that are mature.
With the rapid advancement of quantum computing, classical cryptographic protocols face an increasing risk of being broken. The Post-Quantum OpenPGP (PQ OpenPGP) protocol is an extension of the OpenPGP standard that incorporates hybrid cryptography by combining a classical key exchange and a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism. This design aims to provide long-term security even in the presence of adversaries equipped with quantum computational capabilities and ensures backward compatibility while transitioning safely to the quantum era. This article presents a formal specification and verification of the PQ OpenPGP protocol using the algebraic specification language CafeOBJ. Our specification captures key aspects of the protocol, including hybrid key encapsulation using post-quantum Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and classical Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH)-KEM, dual digital signatures using post-quantum Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and classical Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). To model adversarial behavior, we extend the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, widely used in the analysis of security protocols, by incorporating quantum-enabled capabilities. Under our threat model, the intruder not only has full control over the network, as in the traditional Dolev-Yao setting, but is also capable of breaking classical public-key cryptographic primitives and compromising sensitive information, reflecting the realistic power of large-scale quantum computers. We successfully verify that the PQ OpenPGP protocol satisfies three essential security properties: secrecy of the session key, forward secrecy, and authenticity. The proofs are supported by ten auxiliary lemmas. Given the formal specification, security properties, and conjecture lemmas, the Invariant Proof Score Generator (IPSG) tool automatically generates proof scores to facilitate verification. This work contributes to the growing research on formal verification in post-quantum cryptographic protocols.