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Lecture notes in computer science

X3DH with Deniable Authentication Without Trusted Third Parties

Stanisław Jarecki, Phillip Nazarian, Apurva Rai

Published Sep 26, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-36264-3_27

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The Signal protocol and its X3DH key exchange core are regularly used by billions of people in applications like WhatsApp but are unfortunately not quantum-secure. Thus, designing an efficient and post-quantum secure X3DH alternative is paramount. Notably, X3DH supports asynchronicity, as parties can immediately derive keys after uploading them to a central server, and deniability, allowing parties to plausibly deny having completed key exchange. To satisfy these constraints, existing post-quantum X3DH proposals use ring signatures (or equivalently a form of designated-verifier signatures) to provide authentication without compromising deniability as regular signatures would. Existing ring signature schemes, however, have some drawbacks. Notably, they are not generally proven secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and so the quantum security of parameters that are proposed is unclear and likely weaker than claimed. In addition, they are generally slower than standard primitives like KEMs. In this work, we propose an efficient, deniable and post-quantum X3DH-like protocol that we call K-Waay, that does not rely on ring signatures. At its core, K-Waay uses a split-KEM, a primitive introduced by Brendel et al. [SAC 2020], to provide Diffie-Hellman-like implicit authentication and secrecy guarantees. Along the way, we revisit the formalism of Brendel et al. and identify that additional security properties are required to prove a split-KEM-based protocol secure. We instantiate split-KEM by building a protocol based on the Frodo key exchange protocol relying on the plain LWE assumption: our proofs might be of independent interest as we show it satisfies our novel unforgeability and deniability security notions. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by thoroughly benchmarking both K-Waay and existing X3DH protocols. Our results show even when using plain LWE and a conservative choice of parameters that K-Waay is significantly faster than previous work.
A deniable authentication protocol enables a receiver to identify the true source of given message, but not to prove the identity of the sender to a third party.This property is very useful for providing secure negotiation over the Internet.Recently, Shi et al. proposed a quantum deniable authentication protocol based on the property of unitary transformation and quantum one-way function.A trusted center (TC) is introduced in their protocol, and a much amount of quantum resources, such as entanglement, quantum memory and quantum one-way function, are required.In this paper, a deniable authentication protocol without a trust center is proposed based on the quantum key distribution (QKD).In the presented protocol, the QKD is used firstly to share a secret key between the sender and the receiver.Then, the shared key is used to identify the true source of sender's message by the receiver.Finally, the simulation based proof shows that the receiver cannot prove the identity of the sender to any third party.