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Collapse or No Collapse? What Is the Best Ontology of Quantum Mechanics in the Primitive Ontology Framework?

Shan Gao

Published Apr 20, 2018• 0 citations

DOI: 10.1017/9781316995457.011

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Paradoxes and Primitive Ontology in Collapse Theories of Quantum Mechanics

Shan Gao

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 20, 2018•14 citations

Collapse or no collapse? What is the best ontology of quantum mechanics in the primitive ontology framework?

Michaël Esfeld

Recalling the state of the art in the interpretation of quantum physics, this paper emphasizes that one cannot simply add a collapse parameter to the Schrödinger equation in order to solve the measurement problem. If one does so, one is also committed to a primitive ontology of a configuration of matter in physical space in order to have something in the ontology that constitutes the determinate measurement outcomes. The paper then argues that in the light of this consequence, the collapse postulate loses its attractiveness in comparison to an ontology of persisting particles moving on continuous trajectories according to a deterministic law.

arXiv:1611.09218•Nov 28, 2016•8 citations

The Ontology of Quantum Mechanics (I)

Shan Gao

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

The Ontology of Quantum Mechanics (II)

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

Paradoxes and Primitive Ontology in Collapse Theories of Quantum Mechanics

Roderich Tumulka

Collapse theories are versions of quantum mechanics according to which the collapse of the wave function is a real physical process. They propose precise mathematical laws to govern this process and to replace the vague conventional prescription that a collapse occurs whenever an "observer" makes a "measurement." The "primitive ontology" of a theory (more or less what Bell called the "local beables") are the variables in the theory that represent matter in space-time. There is no consensus about whether collapse theories need to introduce a primitive ontology as part of their definition. I make some remarks on this question and point out that certain paradoxes about collapse theories are absent if a primitive ontology is introduced.

arXiv:1102.5767•Feb 28, 2011•35 citations

General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics as Bookkeeping Projection Regimes

Amos Maley

This paper presents an interpretive boundary result concerning the relationship between general relativity and quantum mechanics under a closed admissibility framework. It argues that both theories are best understood not as competing ontologies or incomplete fragments of a deeper unification, but as projection regimes—distinct bookkeeping skins licensed over a shared admissible interior. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a unifying theory, new dynamics, or a reconciliation mechanism. Instead, it demonstrates that apparent incompatibilities between GR and QM arise from scope-relative representational commitments, not from ontic conflict. When admissibility, standing conservation, and reference stability are treated as fixed constraints, the demand for further unification collapses: each theory is shown to be internally coherent and mutually non-conflicting within its licensed expressive envelope. No new primitives are introduced. No procedural or operational framework is specified. The result functions as a boundary clarification, blocking a class of illicit inferences that treat representational artifacts as ontological commitments. In doing so, it reframes long-standing unification problems as category errors induced by projection overreach rather than as open foundational gaps. This work is intended as a structural constraint on interpretation, not as a program for further development. It closes, rather than advances, a line of inquiry by showing why certain questions are inadmissible once the boundary conditions of representation are made explicit.

•Feb 7, 2026•0 citations

Recalling the state of the art in the interpretation of quantum physics, this paper emphasizes that one cannot simply add a collapse parameter to the Schrödinger equation in order to solve the measurement problem. If one does so, one is also committed to a primitive ontology of a configuration of matter in physical space in order to have something in the ontology that constitutes the determinate measurement outcomes. The paper then argues that in the light of this consequence, the collapse postulate loses its attractiveness in comparison to an ontology of persisting particles moving on continuous trajectories according to a deterministic law.

Collapse theories are versions of quantum mechanics according to which the collapse of the wave function is a real physical process. They propose precise mathematical laws to govern this process and to replace the vague conventional prescription that a collapse occurs whenever an "observer" makes a "measurement." The "primitive ontology" of a theory (more or less what Bell called the "local beables") are the variables in the theory that represent matter in space-time. There is no consensus about whether collapse theories need to introduce a primitive ontology as part of their definition. I make some remarks on this question and point out that certain paradoxes about collapse theories are absent if a primitive ontology is introduced.

This paper presents an interpretive boundary result concerning the relationship between general relativity and quantum mechanics under a closed admissibility framework. It argues that both theories are best understood not as competing ontologies or incomplete fragments of a deeper unification, but as projection regimes—distinct bookkeeping skins licensed over a shared admissible interior. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a unifying theory, new dynamics, or a reconciliation mechanism. Instead, it demonstrates that apparent incompatibilities between GR and QM arise from scope-relative representational commitments, not from ontic conflict. When admissibility, standing conservation, and reference stability are treated as fixed constraints, the demand for further unification collapses: each theory is shown to be internally coherent and mutually non-conflicting within its licensed expressive envelope. No new primitives are introduced. No procedural or operational framework is specified. The result functions as a boundary clarification, blocking a class of illicit inferences that treat representational artifacts as ontological commitments. In doing so, it reframes long-standing unification problems as category errors induced by projection overreach rather than as open foundational gaps. This work is intended as a structural constraint on interpretation, not as a program for further development. It closes, rather than advances, a line of inquiry by showing why certain questions are inadmissible once the boundary conditions of representation are made explicit.