Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Beyond the Handshake: PSKs, Session Resumption, and KeyUpdate in Post-Quantum TLS Migration

Pinky Sarkar

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.7362158

Related papers

Assessing and Managing Post-Quantum Migration Readiness Across TLS and PKI Infrastructure

Pinky Sarkar

•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations

Zero-Downtime Post-quantum TLS 1.3 Migration: A Bridge-Server-Based Approach

Minjoo Sim, Subin Jo, Hyuntae Song +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2026•1 citation

Observability for Post-Quantum TLS Readiness: A Multi-Surface Evidence Framework

José Luis Delgado

Post-quantum migration in Transport Layer Security (TLS) requires evidence-aware measurements that distinguish session negotiation, endpoint capability, certificate-chain evidence, and the provenance of missing observations. This distinction is essential under TLS 1.3 encryption, resumption, mutual TLS, trace truncation, fragmentation, coalescing, active certificate retrieval, and temporal drift. We present a multi-surface framework for post-quantum TLS observability. The framework separates passive session evidence, active probing, certificate-chain evidence, and registry knowledge, and maps them onto measurement planes for session behavior, key establishment, endpoint capability, authentication, lifecycle, observability, and policy. We instantiate it as a reproducible artifact with schema-enforced observations and results, versioned registries, auditable inference rules, stress contracts, and baseline adapters. We evaluate the framework on 29 controlled scenarios spanning TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, classical and hybrid key establishment, mutual TLS, resumption, HelloRetryRequest, truncation, fragmentation and coalescing, temporal drift, IPv6, and chain-depth variation. Passive evidence closes session-level planes, active probing establishes capability lower bounds, and multi-surface evidence closes the full measurement object while preserving uncertainty and contradiction when required. Against an inherited TLS quantum-vulnerability analyzer, the baseline detects 2 of 29 runs and 0 of 23 TLS 1.3 runs. In a stratified public campaign over 1000 targets and 2000 fresh probes, the framework completes 1971 handshakes, collects 1368 chain artifacts, confirms hybrid capability for 310 targets, and identifies 310 cases where endpoint capability exceeds what any single classical session view reveals.

cs.CRCross-listedarXiv:2605.02978•May 5, 2026

A Hybrid Quantum-Resistant Resumption framework for zero-RTT TLS 1.3

Tahera Begum Abdul, Kondapalli Venkata Ramana

Introduction Zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT) resumption is a central performance feature of TLS 1.3, cutting reconnection latency by letting clients attach early application data to pre-shared keys derived from previously issued session tickets. Latency-sensitive deployments—web services, API gateways, IoT fleets-rely heavily on this mechanism. However, today's session tickets derive their symmetric keys from a purely classical X25519 exchange, leaving them exposed to Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks: an adversary who records the ticket exchange today gains the ability to decrypt all associated 0-RTT early data retroactively once a cryptographically capable quantum machine exists. This paper introduces HQRT (Hybrid Quantum-Resistant Resumption for TLS 1.3), which folds a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 encapsulation directly into the NewSessionTicket lifecycle, rendering tickets quantum-safe without adding any extra round trip. Methods At the core of HQRT is a Hybrid Resumption Master Secret, constructed jointly from classical and post-quantum shared secrets and integrated into the existing TLS 1.3 key schedule as a drop-in addition. The paper supports this construction with a formal, game-based security model proving HNDL resistance, and extends the replay-protection analysis to quantum adversaries. A working proof-of-concept was implemented on OpenSSL 3.x via the OQS provider, with benchmarking conducted across server, desktop, and IoT hardware. Results The latency penalty introduced by HQRT is just 4–9%, with a throughput loss of 6.5% relative to classical 0-RTT-a stark contrast to the 81–89% overhead imposed by full post-quantum handshakes. Across multi-session workloads, the amortised overhead falls by 34–97%, and latency-distribution tails diverge from the classical baseline by under a millisecond. Discussion These results demonstrate that HQRT offers a deployable, incremental route to quantum-safe TLS resumption, delivering HNDL resistance and quantum-safe replay protection at a fraction of the cost of full post-quantum handshakes, while leaving existing certificate infrastructure untouched.

Frontiers in Computer Science•Jul 23, 2026•0 citations

Challenges and Strategies for Transitioning TLS to Post-Quantum Cryptography

Moritz Beckel

•Sep 8, 2026•0 citations

Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration in Zero-Trust Networks: Implications for Identity, mTLS, PKI, and Service Authentication

Pinky Sarkar

•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations
Post-quantum migration in Transport Layer Security (TLS) requires evidence-aware measurements that distinguish session negotiation, endpoint capability, certificate-chain evidence, and the provenance of missing observations. This distinction is essential under TLS 1.3 encryption, resumption, mutual TLS, trace truncation, fragmentation, coalescing, active certificate retrieval, and temporal drift. We present a multi-surface framework for post-quantum TLS observability. The framework separates passive session evidence, active probing, certificate-chain evidence, and registry knowledge, and maps them onto measurement planes for session behavior, key establishment, endpoint capability, authentication, lifecycle, observability, and policy. We instantiate it as a reproducible artifact with schema-enforced observations and results, versioned registries, auditable inference rules, stress contracts, and baseline adapters. We evaluate the framework on 29 controlled scenarios spanning TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, classical and hybrid key establishment, mutual TLS, resumption, HelloRetryRequest, truncation, fragmentation and coalescing, temporal drift, IPv6, and chain-depth variation. Passive evidence closes session-level planes, active probing establishes capability lower bounds, and multi-surface evidence closes the full measurement object while preserving uncertainty and contradiction when required. Against an inherited TLS quantum-vulnerability analyzer, the baseline detects 2 of 29 runs and 0 of 23 TLS 1.3 runs. In a stratified public campaign over 1000 targets and 2000 fresh probes, the framework completes 1971 handshakes, collects 1368 chain artifacts, confirms hybrid capability for 310 targets, and identifies 310 cases where endpoint capability exceeds what any single classical session view reveals.
Introduction Zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT) resumption is a central performance feature of TLS 1.3, cutting reconnection latency by letting clients attach early application data to pre-shared keys derived from previously issued session tickets. Latency-sensitive deployments—web services, API gateways, IoT fleets-rely heavily on this mechanism. However, today's session tickets derive their symmetric keys from a purely classical X25519 exchange, leaving them exposed to Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks: an adversary who records the ticket exchange today gains the ability to decrypt all associated 0-RTT early data retroactively once a cryptographically capable quantum machine exists. This paper introduces HQRT (Hybrid Quantum-Resistant Resumption for TLS 1.3), which folds a hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 encapsulation directly into the NewSessionTicket lifecycle, rendering tickets quantum-safe without adding any extra round trip. Methods At the core of HQRT is a Hybrid Resumption Master Secret, constructed jointly from classical and post-quantum shared secrets and integrated into the existing TLS 1.3 key schedule as a drop-in addition. The paper supports this construction with a formal, game-based security model proving HNDL resistance, and extends the replay-protection analysis to quantum adversaries. A working proof-of-concept was implemented on OpenSSL 3.x via the OQS provider, with benchmarking conducted across server, desktop, and IoT hardware. Results The latency penalty introduced by HQRT is just 4–9%, with a throughput loss of 6.5% relative to classical 0-RTT-a stark contrast to the 81–89% overhead imposed by full post-quantum handshakes. Across multi-session workloads, the amortised overhead falls by 34–97%, and latency-distribution tails diverge from the classical baseline by under a millisecond. Discussion These results demonstrate that HQRT offers a deployable, incremental route to quantum-safe TLS resumption, delivering HNDL resistance and quantum-safe replay protection at a fraction of the cost of full post-quantum handshakes, while leaving existing certificate infrastructure untouched.