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Automated Post-Quantum Readiness Assessment for Internet-Facing TLS and PKI Infrastructure

Hridoy Roy

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.7324778

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Current cellular authentication mechanisms rely primarily on SIM-based Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), which have scaled successfully worldwide but face challenges as the Internet of Things (IoT) grows to billions of devices. SIM provisioning and lifecycle management become increasingly costly, while reliance on long-term symmetric keys limits revocation flexibility and cross-operator support. To address these issues, we propose a SIM-less, certificate-based authentication framework that integrates Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Specifically, the framework employs Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium for digital signatures, providing quantum-resistant protection for future networks. A key challenge is the computational overhead of PQC on constrained IoT devices; we address this by offloading cryptographic operations to trusted edge servers, whose integrity is validated using attestation mechanisms such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) or secure enclaves. We implement and evaluate the framework in a simulated FutureG environment, comparing IoT-only execution against edge-assisted configurations. Results show that edge offloading reduces TLS handshake latency by up to 96% while maintaining minimal resource usage on devices. These findings demonstrate that PQC-enabled PKI, combined with edge-assisted execution, offers a scalable and practical complement to SIM/AKA for secure and quantum-resilient authentication in FutureG IoT deployments.

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Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming an important component of long-term trust in Internet-facing infrastructure. Publicly observable PQC support provides evidence of externally visible deployment, but does not necessarily reflect the overall progress of an organisation's post-quantum migration. This distinction matters when observable deployment is used as an indicator of organisational readiness or progress towards migration deadlines. We present a measurement study of observable PQC deployment across 4,665 UK organisations spanning ten sectors. We measure post-quantum key-exchange support across HTTPS and SMTP STARTTLS endpoints, attribute reachable endpoints to their underlying infrastructure providers where possible, and statistically examine protocol-, sector-, and provider-level deployment patterns. Among reachable endpoints, 44.0\% of HTTPS services supported at least one evaluated PQC key-exchange group, compared with 6.4\% of SMTP services. Among organisations reachable over both protocols, HTTPS support was significantly more common than SMTP support (matched odds ratio 16.89). Although deployment varied across sectors, infrastructure provider identity was substantially more predictive than organisational sector, and observable deployment was highly concentrated among a small number of providers. Only 144 organisations supported PQC across both web and email infrastructure, highlighting an uneven and fragmented migration landscape. No post-quantum certificate signatures were observed across the measured endpoints. These findings show that observable PQC deployment is currently shaped predominantly by infrastructure-provider deployment decisions and should not be interpreted as a complete measure of organisational migration readiness.

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Post-Quantum Cryptography :A Framework for Implementing and Consulting on Post-Quantum Cryptography Systems in Enterprise PKI

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Quantum computing is developing quickly, and that's a big problem for traditional encryption techniques such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Shor's algorithm, a quantum algorithm, specifically calls into question the long-term security that Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) currently rely on. So, this thesis investigates how new post-quantum cryptography methods can be integrated into the public key infrastructure that businesses already use. This thesis examines the problems, both theoretical and practical, that arise when switching to cryptography resistant to quantum attacks. This thesis specifically examines how the NIST-selected algorithms, Kyber and Dilithium, are used in hybrid X.509 certificates that combine classical and post-quantum signatures.A test PKI environment was set up using OpenSSL-OQS and OpenXPKI to facilitate the testing process. Important PKI processes were examined in this setting, including TLS handshakes, certificate issuance, validation, and revocation. The results show that integrating PQC increases key and certificate sizes and also causes a moderate performance overhead. However, hybrid approaches offer a practical way to switch over. Lattice-based algorithms are particularly advantageous because they provide a strong balance of security, speed, and compatibility with existing systems. Using this information, a method was developed to help organizations gradually transition to a more secure system for managing their digital keys. This thesis connects advanced cryptography research with how businesses actually use it. It offers useful ideas and advice for companies getting ready for an age after quantum computing.

•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations
Current cellular authentication mechanisms rely primarily on SIM-based Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), which have scaled successfully worldwide but face challenges as the Internet of Things (IoT) grows to billions of devices. SIM provisioning and lifecycle management become increasingly costly, while reliance on long-term symmetric keys limits revocation flexibility and cross-operator support. To address these issues, we propose a SIM-less, certificate-based authentication framework that integrates Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Specifically, the framework employs Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium for digital signatures, providing quantum-resistant protection for future networks. A key challenge is the computational overhead of PQC on constrained IoT devices; we address this by offloading cryptographic operations to trusted edge servers, whose integrity is validated using attestation mechanisms such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) or secure enclaves. We implement and evaluate the framework in a simulated FutureG environment, comparing IoT-only execution against edge-assisted configurations. Results show that edge offloading reduces TLS handshake latency by up to 96% while maintaining minimal resource usage on devices. These findings demonstrate that PQC-enabled PKI, combined with edge-assisted execution, offers a scalable and practical complement to SIM/AKA for secure and quantum-resilient authentication in FutureG IoT deployments.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming an important component of long-term trust in Internet-facing infrastructure. Publicly observable PQC support provides evidence of externally visible deployment, but does not necessarily reflect the overall progress of an organisation's post-quantum migration. This distinction matters when observable deployment is used as an indicator of organisational readiness or progress towards migration deadlines. We present a measurement study of observable PQC deployment across 4,665 UK organisations spanning ten sectors. We measure post-quantum key-exchange support across HTTPS and SMTP STARTTLS endpoints, attribute reachable endpoints to their underlying infrastructure providers where possible, and statistically examine protocol-, sector-, and provider-level deployment patterns. Among reachable endpoints, 44.0\% of HTTPS services supported at least one evaluated PQC key-exchange group, compared with 6.4\% of SMTP services. Among organisations reachable over both protocols, HTTPS support was significantly more common than SMTP support (matched odds ratio 16.89). Although deployment varied across sectors, infrastructure provider identity was substantially more predictive than organisational sector, and observable deployment was highly concentrated among a small number of providers. Only 144 organisations supported PQC across both web and email infrastructure, highlighting an uneven and fragmented migration landscape. No post-quantum certificate signatures were observed across the measured endpoints. These findings show that observable PQC deployment is currently shaped predominantly by infrastructure-provider deployment decisions and should not be interpreted as a complete measure of organisational migration readiness.
Quantum computing is developing quickly, and that's a big problem for traditional encryption techniques such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. Shor's algorithm, a quantum algorithm, specifically calls into question the long-term security that Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) currently rely on. So, this thesis investigates how new post-quantum cryptography methods can be integrated into the public key infrastructure that businesses already use. This thesis examines the problems, both theoretical and practical, that arise when switching to cryptography resistant to quantum attacks. This thesis specifically examines how the NIST-selected algorithms, Kyber and Dilithium, are used in hybrid X.509 certificates that combine classical and post-quantum signatures.A test PKI environment was set up using OpenSSL-OQS and OpenXPKI to facilitate the testing process. Important PKI processes were examined in this setting, including TLS handshakes, certificate issuance, validation, and revocation. The results show that integrating PQC increases key and certificate sizes and also causes a moderate performance overhead. However, hybrid approaches offer a practical way to switch over. Lattice-based algorithms are particularly advantageous because they provide a strong balance of security, speed, and compatibility with existing systems. Using this information, a method was developed to help organizations gradually transition to a more secure system for managing their digital keys. This thesis connects advanced cryptography research with how businesses actually use it. It offers useful ideas and advice for companies getting ready for an age after quantum computing.