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IEEE Access

Post-Quantum Extension of the Conditional CRO Trilemma: Impossibility Bounds on Confidentiality, Reliability, and Opposability Under Quantum Institutional Extraction Limits

Thierry Emmanuel Minka Mi Nguidjoï, Flavien Serge Mani Onana, Thomas Djotio Ndié

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Cryptographic evidence systems face fundamental trade-offs between confidentiality (Conf), reliability (Rel), and opposability (Opp), with Conf $\cdot $ Rel $\cdot $ Opp products ranging from 0.27 to 0.57 in deployed systems. The Conditional CRO Trilemma recently established that institutional capacity $\Delta $ fundamentally constrains achievable trade-offs through the bound $\text {Conf}\cdot \text {Rel}\cdot \text {Opp} \leq \Delta /\lambda + \mathcal {O}(\lambda ^{-2})$ . However, the imminent deployment of post-quantum cryptographic systems raises critical questions: do quantum adversaries and quantum channel effects modify these bounds? This paper presents the Post-Quantum Conditional CRO Trilemma, establishing that both institutional capacity and quantum interpretability loss fundamentally constrain achievable trade-offs. Under explicit assumptions about quantum-aware institutional limits, we prove \begin{equation*} \text {Conf}^{q} \cdot \text {Rel}^{q} \cdot \text {Opp}^{q} \leq \frac {\Delta _{q} + \eta _{q} \cdot H(C)}{\lambda } + \mathcal {O}(\lambda ^{-2}) + \text {negl}(\lambda)\end{equation*} where $\Delta _{q}$ quantifies the quantum-aware institutional extraction capacity, $\eta _{q}$ is the quantum interpretability loss coefficient, $H(C)$ is the contextual entropy, and $\lambda $ is the security parameter. Our main contributions are as follows: 1) a quantum extension of the institutional capacity model with parameters $\Delta _{q}$ and $\eta _{q}$ ; 2) complete information-theoretic proofs using Quantum Pinsker’s inequality, the Gentle Measurement Lemma, and quantum Fano bounds; 3) an internal coherence analysis showing that NIST PQC finalists (Dilithium, Kyber, and SPHINCS+) imply $\Delta _{q} \in [{28, 67}]$ bits under quantum adversaries, consistent with quantum-aware bounded rationality; and 4) a framework for matching post-quantum protocols to quantum-aware institutional capacity. We demonstrate the internal coherence of our framework against the same deployed systems analyzed in the Conditional CRO work, Helios voting, zk-SNARKs compliance, and ECDSA signatures, showing how quantum effects modify their implied institutional capacities. This trilemma shifts post-quantum protocol design from purely computational security to quantum-constraint-aware engineering, with applications to GDPR-compliant quantum-safe systems and eIDAS quantum readiness.

DOI
10.1109/access.2026.3722742

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The looming threat of large-scale quantum computers necessitates a paradigm shift in cryptographic design, giving rise to the field of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). While the computational hardness assumptions underpinning PQC schemes are well-studied, their fundamental security limits from an information-theoretic perspective remain an area requiring deeper exploration. This paper introduces and systematically investigates the concept of "entropic resilience," defined as the inherent ability of a cryptographic system to maintain its security guarantees even under an adversary possessing unbounded computational power, provided only limited information about the secret components is revealed. We present a comprehensive framework for analyzing the information-theoretic security of prominent PQC families, including lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes. Our methodology leverages various entropy measures, such as min-entropy and conditional entropy, to quantify the information leakage and the irreducible uncertainty preserved in cryptographic secrets. We derive theoretical bounds on the information-theoretic security for representative PQC constructions and discuss the implications of these bounds for parameter selection, key generation, and resistance against information-theoretic attacks and side channels. The findings highlight critical trade-offs between entropy requirements, efficiency, and the achievable level of provable security in a post-quantum world. Ultimately, this work provides a foundational understanding of the ultimate security boundaries for PQC, guiding the design of more robust and provably secure schemes against both classical and quantum adversaries.
The imminent threat of cryptographically relevant quantum computers to blockchain infrastructure presents a fundamental engineering challenge we term the PQC Blockchain Migration Trilemma: existing migration approaches cannot simultaneously achieve quantum security, performance parity, and backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure. This paper formally characterizes this trilemma, proves its existence through incompatibility analysis of current PQC standards including CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+, and proposes the Adaptive Quantum Migration Protocol, or AQMP a novel framework employing temporal decoupling, ZK-aggregated PQC proofs, dual-commit layers, and decentralized quantum threat oracles to resolve all three dimensions concurrently. Simulation results demonstrate AQMP achieves a 93% security score, 87% performance score, and 91% compatibility score the first proposal to break the trilemma. We analyze deployment pathways for Bitcoin, Ethereum, and permissioned blockchains with estimated migration timelines of 24 to 48 months with zero downtime.
The advent of quantum computing presents a paradigm shift in modern cybersecurity, threatening the foundations of classical cryptographic systems such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Quantum algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s can efficiently break these schemes, rendering existing encryption mechanisms vulnerable and obsolete. This growing risk necessitates the development of quantum-resilient or post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions that can safeguard data and computation in the era of quantum networks. Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC), a cornerstone of privacy-preserving computation, enables multiple entities to jointly compute a function over their private inputs without revealing them. However, its traditional security assumptions are also undermined by quantum threats. This research aims to explore and evaluate quantum-safe cryptographic protocols for integrating PQC into SMPC frameworks, thereby ensuring both confidentiality and correctness even in the presence of quantum-capable adversaries. The study focuses on lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based cryptographic primitives, analyzing their resilience, efficiency, and scalability when applied to distributed systems. A comparative framework is proposed to assess the performance and security trade-offs of different post-quantum SMPC implementations under realistic network conditions. The findings are expected to contribute to the design of a new class of cryptographic protocols capable of resisting quantum attacks, supporting the secure functioning of next-generation networks, and guiding policymakers and technologists toward practical post-quantum standardization. Ultimately, this research strengthens the bridge between theoretical cryptography and real-world cybersecurity readiness in the post-quantum era.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of currently deployed public-key cryptosystems. In response, the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged, proposing new algorithms based on mathematical problems believed to be hard for both classical and quantum computers. While the security of these systems is typically analyzed using computational complexity theory, this paper explores an alternative and complementary approach rooted in information theory. We investigate the security of PQC schemes by establishing entropic bounds on the information available to a quantum adversary. By leveraging concepts such as conditional min-entropy and Rényi divergence, we formulate a framework to quantify the uncertainty of secret keys and plaintexts from an adversary's perspective. This paper derives explicit entropic security bounds for several major families of post-quantum cryptosystems, including lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes. We demonstrate that the security of these systems can be directly related to the entropy of the underlying hard problems' solutions. The results provide a new lens through which to assess and compare the security of PQC candidates, offering insights that are independent of specific computational models and algorithmic assumptions. This information-theoretic perspective not only strengthens the security foundations of PQC but also offers practical guidance for parameter selection to ensure long-term resilience against future cryptanalytic advances.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of currently deployed public-key cryptosystems. In response, the field of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged, proposing new algorithms based on mathematical problems believed to be hard for both classical and quantum computers. While the security of these systems is typically analyzed using computational complexity theory, this paper explores an alternative and complementary approach rooted in information theory. We investigate the security of PQC schemes by establishing entropic bounds on the information available to a quantum adversary. By leveraging concepts such as conditional min-entropy and Rényi divergence, we formulate a framework to quantify the uncertainty of secret keys and plaintexts from an adversary's perspective. This paper derives explicit entropic security bounds for several major families of post-quantum cryptosystems, including lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes. We demonstrate that the security of these systems can be directly related to the entropy of the underlying hard problems' solutions. The results provide a new lens through which to assess and compare the security of PQC candidates, offering insights that are independent of specific computational models and algorithmic assumptions. This information-theoretic perspective not only strengthens the security foundations of PQC but also offers practical guidance for parameter selection to ensure long-term resilience against future cryptanalytic advances.
We apply the Information-Theoretic Unification (ITU) framework (Terada 2026, concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20109209; current version v2.0.0 at 10.5281/zenodo.20133709) to cryptography. The ITU axiom δS = δ⟨K⟩ simultaneously governs noise correction (quantum error correction, QECC) and adversary protection (cryptography); these are dual applications of the same information-protection principle. This is Tier 1 paper #3, completing the ITU engineering triangle of Quantum Computing (Tier 1 #1, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20139391), Machine Consciousness / ASI (Tier 1 #2, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20150501), and Cryptography. Phase 51: Establishes the ITU foundation. Shannon's perfect-secrecy theorem (one-time pad), BB84 information-theoretic security, and post-quantum computational security all follow from the ITU axiom applied to adversary-resilient code design. We numerically verify Shannon's bound (I(M;C) ~ 0 when H(K) ≥ H(M)) and reproduce the 11% BB84 security threshold. Phase 52: BB84 detailed analysis with photon loss and decoy-state protocol. Standard BB84 supports ~200 km fibre links at practical rates. We propose a naive ITU enhancement (embed the [[5,1,3]] code from Tier 1 #1 in transmitted photons) and report a HONEST NEGATIVE FINDING: the naive 5-to-1 embedding underperforms standard BB84 because overhead dominates the loss-recovery gain. This refines the ITU prescription — protective code embedding must respect channel-specific overhead trade-offs. Phase 53: Lattice-based post-quantum cryptography (CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, NIST 2024 standards). A toy LWE KEM is implemented and verified; exponential brute-force scaling is observed. Kyber-1024 provides ~256/240-bit (classical/quantum) security, future-proof through the 2050s. We propose an ITU 3-TIER cryptographic framework: Tier 1 classical (AES-256), Tier 2 quantum-safe (PQC + QKD), Tier 3 ASI-safe (Φ_ITU-embedded protocols). Serial application yields combined 584-768-bit security against adversaries up to ASI. Phase 54: Synthesis into a 2024-2040 cryptography migration roadmap with: PQC adoption timeline (mainstream by 2029) QKD network deployment (~500 cities by 2040) Cost estimates by organisation type (individual to military, spanning $0 to ~$500B) Quantum-computer capability vs crypto-threshold projection 10 falsifiable predictions (Kyber-1024 secure to 2050; ASI cryptanalysis ∝ Φ_ITU; etc.) Policy recommendations at national, corporate, and individual levels Central thesis: under ITU, cryptography is the DUAL of quantum error correction, both governed by δS = δ⟨K⟩; a 3-tier defence-in-depth is the optimal response to the ASI-era threat landscape (ITU central prediction: ASI by 2030). Includes 4 theory documents, 4 Python numerical experiments, 4 figures, 4 JSON summaries, paper metadata. Total runtime ~2 minutes on a modern laptop.