Anonymous Public-Key Quantum Money and Quantum Voting
Alper Çakan, Vipul Goyal, Takashi Yamakawa
Quantum information allows us to build quantum money schemes, where a bank can issue banknotes in the form of authenticatable quantum states that cannot be cloned or counterfeited. Similar to paper banknotes, in existing quantum money schemes, a banknote consists of an unclonable quantum state and a classical serial number, signed by bank. Thus, they lack one of the most fundamental properties cryptographers look for in a currency scheme: privacy. In this work, we first further develop the formal definitions of privacy for quantum money schemes. Then, we construct the first public-key quantum money schemes that satisfy these security notions. Namely, - Assuming existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and hardness of Learning with Errors (LWE), we construct a public-key quantum money scheme with anonymity against users and traceability by authorities. Since it is a policy choice whether authorities should be able to track banknotes or not, we also construct an untraceable money scheme from the same cryptographic assumptions, where no one (not even the authorities) can track banknotes. Further, we show that the no-cloning principle, a result of quantum mechanics, allows us to construct schemes, with security guarantees that are classically impossible, for a seemingly unrelated application: voting! - Assuming iO and LWE, we construct a universally verifiable quantum voting scheme with classical votes. Finally, as a technical tool, we introduce the notion of publicly rerandomizable encryption with strong correctness, where no adversary is able to produce a malicious ciphertext and a malicious randomness such that the ciphertext before and after rerandomization decrypts to different values! We believe this might be of independent interest. - Assuming LWE, we construct a (post-quantum) classical publicly rerandomizable encryption scheme with strong correctness.
arXiv:2411.04482•Nov 7, 2024•0 citations