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International Conference Laser Optics (ICLO)

Vulnerability of 1310-nm quantum key distribution systems to 1550-nm cw light-injection attacks

E.V. Borisova, Anastasiya Ponosova, D. O. Trefilov, M. A. Petrov, Vadim Makarov

Published Jun 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We examine the possibility of attacks using a high-power cw laser operating at 1550 nm on fiber-optic isolators used in QKD systems operating at 1310 nm.
DOI
10.1109/iclo69056.2026.11624638

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