Modern cloud-based data marketplaces require secure mechanisms that enable sensitive data sharing and retrieval among mutually distrustful parties under strict confidentiality, accountability, and regulatory constraints, while relying on semi-trusted cloud infrastructures. Existing cryptographic solutions address only limited aspects of these requirements and fail to jointly support bilateral access control, efficient keyword-based retrieval, and privacy protection against information leakage in unsuccessful access attempts, particularly in the presence of post-quantum adversaries. To bridge these gaps, we propose a quantum-resistant matchmaking encryption scheme with keyword search (QKS-ME), which supports flexible keyword-based ciphertext filtering and enables on-demand decryption under bilateral access control, thereby reducing communication overhead while ensuring data authenticity. Unsuccessful searches or decryption attempts reveal no information about the plaintext, keywords, or underlying access structures to either the cloud server or unauthorized receivers. We formally prove that QKS-ME achieves indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks and existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks based on standard lattice assumptions. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that QKS-ME is computationally efficient and suitable for practical data marketplace environments.
Modern cloud-based data marketplaces require secure mechanisms that enable sensitive data sharing and retrieval among mutually distrustful parties under strict confidentiality, accountability, and regulatory constraints, while relying on semi-trusted cloud infrastructures. Existing cryptographic solutions address only limited aspects of these requirements and fail to jointly support bilateral access control, efficient keyword-based retrieval, and privacy protection against information leakage in unsuccessful access attempts, particularly in the presence of post-quantum adversaries. To bridge these gaps, we propose a quantum-resistant matchmaking encryption scheme with keyword search (QKS-ME), which supports flexible keyword-based ciphertext filtering and enables on-demand decryption under bilateral access control, thereby reducing communication overhead while ensuring data authenticity. Unsuccessful searches or decryption attempts reveal no information about the plaintext, keywords, or underlying access structures to either the cloud server or unauthorized receivers. We formally prove that QKS-ME achieves indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks and existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks based on standard lattice assumptions. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that QKS-ME is computationally efficient and suitable for practical data marketplace environments.
Searchable encryption enables efficient retrieval of encrypted data stored in cloud environments while preserving data confidentiality. Within this context, Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) allows data users to perform keyword-based searches using their public-private key pairs. However, traditional PEKS schemes remain vulnerable to Inside Keyword Guessing Attacks (IKGA), which led to the introduction of the Public-Key Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search (PAEKS) paradigm to enhance resilience against insider threats. Despite this advancement, most existing PAEKS schemes rely on number-theoretic assumptions, such as the discrete logarithm problem, thereby becoming insecure in the presence of against quantum adversaries. Consequently, recent research has focused on developing quantum-resistant, lattice-based PAEKS schemes. Although schemes based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem provide strong post-quantum security, they often incur high computational and communication costs, limiting their practicality in large-scale cloud environments. To overcome these limitations, this work presents an efficient and verifiable PAEKS scheme based on the Middle-Product LWE (MP-LWE) problem, which preserves the underlying security guarantees while significantly improving performance. Formal security analysis demonstrates resistance against Chosen Keyword Attack (CKA) and IKGA in the random oracle (RO) model. Experimental results confirm that the proposed scheme achieves substantially lower computational and communication overheads compared to existing schemes, while maintaining robust post-quantum security.
To protect the privacy of cloud data, encryption before uploading provides a solution. However, searching for target data in ciphertext takes effort. Therefore, searchable encryption has become an important research topic. On the other hand, since the advancement of quantum computers will lead to the crisis of cracking traditional encryption algorithms, it is necessary to design encryption schemes that can resist quantum attacks. Therefore, we propose a multi-keyword searchable identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme from lattices. In addition to resisting quantum attacks, the proposed scheme uses several cryptographic techniques to improve encryption efficiency. First, identity-based encryption is used to reduce the computation and transmission costs caused by certificates. Second, the proposed scheme uses proxy re-encryption to achieve the purpose of outsourced computing, allowing the proxy server to reduce the computation and transmission costs of the users. Third, the proposed multi-keyword searchable encryption can provide AND and OR operators to increase the flexibility of searchability. Moreover, the access structure of the proposed scheme is not based on a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS), avoiding the errors caused by an LSSS-based structure in decryption or search results. Finally, we also give formal security proof of the proposed scheme under the decisional learning with errors assumption.
With the rapid development of cloud computing, an increasing number of companies are adopting cloud storage technology to reduce overhead. However, to ensure the privacy of sensitive data, the uploaded data need to be encrypted before being outsourced to the cloud. The concept of public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was introduced by Boneh et al. to provide flexible usage of the encrypted data. Unfortunately, most of the PEKS schemes are not secure against inside keyword guessing attacks (IKGA), so the keyword information of the trapdoor may be leaked to the adversary. To solve this issue, Huang and Li presented public key authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS) in which the trapdoor generated by the receiver is only valid for authenticated ciphertexts. With their seminal work, many PAEKS schemes have been introduced for the enhanced security of PAEKS. Some of them further consider the upcoming quantum attacks. However, our cryptanalysis indicated that in fact, these schemes could not withstand IKGA. To fight against the attacks from quantum adversaries and support the privacy-preserving search functionality, we first introduce a novel generic PAEKS construction in this work. Then, we further present the first quantum-resistant PAEKS instantiation based on lattices. The security proofs show that our instantiation not only satisfies the basic requirements but also achieves enhanced security models, namely the multi-ciphertext indistinguishability and multi-trapdoor privacy. Furthermore, the comparative results indicate that with only some additional expenditure, the proposed instantiation provides more secure properties, making it suitable for more diverse application environments.
Recently, how to retrieve the encrypted data efficiently from a cloud storage system becomes a hot topic. Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) can allow one to search the encrypted data with a keyword efficiently. Due to the booming of post-quantum cryptography, we propose public key encryption with keyword search from lattice assumption, which can resist quantum computer attacks. We delegate a particular cloud server to search the results, thus only the designated cloud server can finish the test process. Our scheme has been proved ciphertext indistinguishability in the standard model, which can reflect its security in the real world. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first construction based on lattice in the standard model, which is a step stone in the post-quantum cryptographic communication.
With the growing need for secure cloud storage and the threat of quantum attacks, we propose a post-quantum secure lattice-based multi-authority attribute-based multi-keyword searchable encryption scheme with dynamic membership. Based on the decisional learning with errors assumption, the proposed scheme resists quantum adversaries while supporting flexible multi-keyword search, decentralized authority to avoid key escrow, and dynamic attribute updates without affecting other users. It enables users to independently generate search tokens, allowing offline authorities and reducing communication overhead. Despite higher encryption costs, experimental results demonstrate that search and decryption remain efficient compared to existing post-quantum lattice-based solutions. The proposed scheme achieves strong data confidentiality and keyword privacy in the post-quantum setting.
Scholars are currently exploring Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption (IB-ME), which allows senders and receivers to specify identities for decryption, protecting sensitive data in ciphertexts. Our work advances Revocable Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption (RIB-ME) by adding revocation of decryption rights from unauthorized users. However, most RIB-ME systems rely on the Diffie-Hellman assumption, making them vulnerable to quantum computing threats. Current security models also fail to fully capture adversaries' evolving capabilities, risking unexpected exploits. To address this, we propose a flexible RIB-ME framework, inspired by Wang et al., using a two-tier revocable hierarchical identity-based encryption (RHIBE) approach integrated with post-quantum cryptography. This creates the first quantum-resistant RIB-ME system. We also introduce a detailed security model defining adversaries' strengths and attack patterns over time, enhancing the system's robustness and reliability across various practical scenarios.