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International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks (CICN)

Impact of Channel Noise and Intercept—Resend Eavesdropping Attack on BB84 Quantum Key Distribution

Nitesh Kumar Rijwani, Brijesh Kumar Chaurasia

Published Jun 12, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/cicn70047.2026.11594151

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The security analysis of the Ekert 1991 (E91), Bennett 1992 (B92), six-state protocol, Scarani–Acín–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 (SARG04) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, and their variants have been studied in the presence of collective-rotation noise channels. However, besides the Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) being the first proposed, extensively studied, and essential protocol, its security proof under collective-rotation noise is still missing. Thus, we aim to close this gap in the literature. Consequently, we investigate how collective-rotation noise channels affect the security of the BB84 protocol. Mainly, we study scenarios where the eavesdropper, Eve, conducts an intercept-resend attack on the transmitted photons sent via a quantum communication channel shared by Alice and Bob. Notably, we distinguish the impact of collective-rotation noise and that of the eavesdropper. To achieve this, we provide rigorous, yet straightforward numerical calculations. First, we derive a model for the collective-rotation noise for the BB84 protocol and parametrize the mutual information shared between Alice and Eve. This is followed by deriving the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for two intercept-resend attack scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate that, for small rotation angles, one can extract a secure secret key under a collective-rotation noise channel when there is no eavesdropping. We observe that noise induced by rotation of 0.35 radians of the prepared quantum state results in a QBER of 11%, which corresponds to the lower bound on the tolerable error rate for the BB84 QKD protocol against general attacks. Moreover, a rotational angle of 0.53 radians yields a 25% QBER, which corresponds to the error rate bound due to the intercept-resend attack. Finally, we conclude that the BB84 protocol is robust against intercept-resend attacks on collective-rotation noise channels when the rotation angle is varied arbitrarily within particular bounds.
The goal of the protocol QKD BB84 is to allow a transmitter and a receiver which uses a quantum channel to exchange their keys and to detect the presence of eavesdropping attacks. In the present research, we investigate the effect of several eavesdroppers with both intercept-resend and cloning attacks. We will propose the different possible cases of the positioning of the eavesdroppers and their strategies of attacks; also we will calculate the mutual information for each case. The explicit expressions of the mutual information and quantum error clearly show that the security of the exchanged information depends on the numbers of the eavesdroppers and their attacks parameters on the quantum channel.
The BB84 protocol is fundamental to quantum-secure communications, yet its extension to multi-receiver networks remains underexplored. This study addresses this gap by implementing a dual-receiver BB84 framework in Qiskit to evaluate security against intercept–resend and photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Our methodology incorporates weak coherent pulses and realistic channel imperfections. Key findings show that intercept–resend attacks induce a detectable (~25%) increase in QBER, while PNS attacks allow a 100% gain in eavesdropper information with less than 2.5% QBER—revealing a critical vulnerability, which highlights the importance of a true single-photon source. The findings emphasize the suitability of BB84 for multiparty QKD scenarios, either as a decoy-state mechanism for enhanced eavesdropping detection or as a direct secure communication protocol.