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IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps)

On Information Theoretical Limits of Oblivious Transfer

Hadi Aghaee, Bahareh Akhbari, Christian Deppe

Published Dec 8, 2025• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Information-theoretical limits of oblivious transfer are studied. First, we explore the feasibility and constraints of implementing oblivious transfer protocols over some communication channels, with a focus on noisy point-to-point and multiple-access channels with non-colluding parties. The paper also examines secure multiparty communication, and highlighting the challenges of achieving oblivious transfer under information-theoretic security models. As an example, the limits of oblivious transfer over a two-user multiple access channel are studied.

DOI
10.1109/gcwkshps68340.2025.11591160

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Information-theoretical limits of oblivious transfer are studied. First, we explore the feasibility and constraints of implementing oblivious transfer protocols over some communication channels, with a focus on noisy point-to-point and multiple-access channels with non-colluding parties. The paper also examines secure multiparty communication, and highlighting the challenges of achieving oblivious transfer under information-theoretic security models. As an example, the limits of oblivious transfer over a two-user multiple access channel are studied.
In this paper, we study the information-theoretic limits of oblivious transfer via noisy channels. We also investigate oblivious transfer over a noisy multiple-access channel with two non-colluding senders and a single receiver. The channel is modeled through correlations among the parties, who may be honest-but-curious or, in the case of the receiver, potentially malicious. We first revisit the information-theoretic limits of two-party oblivious transfer and then extend these results to the multiple-access setting. For honest-but-curious participants, we introduce a multiparty protocol that reduces a general multiple access channel to a suitable correlation model. In scenarios with a malicious receiver, we characterize an achievable oblivious transfer rate region.
Historically, cryptography was created and used to deliver messages between people in such a way that only the intended receiver would be able to read them. The two persons communicating trusted each other, but not the rest of the world - for instance, not the message bearer. But what happens if we assume instead that even the receiver of a message may not be trusted by the sender, while both still have an interest in communicating? This problem is addressed by secure multi-party computation, that studies communication and shared computation between mutually distrusting parties. In a world where most of the communication happens over the Internet, and where an ever-increasing amount of computation is outsourced, for example to the cloud, multi-party computation is a subject of crucial importance. However, unconditionally secure multi-party protocols have never found practical application: the lack of realistic noisy channel models, that are required to achieve security against computationally unbounded adversaries, prevents implementation over real-world, standard communication protocols.\n\nIn this thesis, we study the properties and characteristics of noisy channels, and we introduce new models based on real-world error sources that have never been studied in this context, such as delays. On the contrary, previous works mostly focused on theoretical noisy channels that have little in common with the reality of network communication. We show that the models we propose are suitable for multi-party computation by building on each of them a protocol for oblivious transfer, a fundamental cryptographic primitive that implies any secure computation. Thanks to the realism of our noisy channels, we are able to provide the first working implementation of unconditionally secure oblivious transfer over both wired and wireless networks and different Internet protocols, which we test thoroughly in an extensive set of experiments. Our constructions are not only more realistic, but also more flexible, as they allow larger ranges of error probabilities. This will eventually open the way for the widespread use of unconditionally secure multi-party computation.
This work investigates the fundamental limits of implementing network oblivious transfer via noisy multiple access channels and broadcast channels between honest-but-curious parties when the parties have access to general tripartite non-signaling correlations. By modeling the shared resource as an arbitrary tripartite non-signaling box, we obtain a unified perspective on both the channel behavior and the resulting correlations. Our main result demonstrates that perfect oblivious transfer is impossible. In the asymptotic regime, we further show that even negligible leakage cannot be achieved, as repeated use of the resource amplifies the receiver(s)'s ability to distinguish messages that were not intended for him/them. In contrast, the receiver(s)'s own privacy is not subject to a universal impossibility limitation.
We consider a new application of oblivious transfer. In our proposed scheme, different from the original oblivious transfer, there will be three parties namely, the information holder, trust third party and information receivers. Our proposed scheme is multi-receiver, so we have designed a protocol which not only achieves the basic requirement of oblivious transfer but also disguises the information received by other receivers from the current receiver. In some points of view, we extend the 1-on-1 oblivious transfer to be 1-on-n where n is larger than or equal to 1. With this brand new idea, we have faith that there will be some other related applications which can be implemented by this idea. For example, we can achieve a secure communication in the CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) system and a novel type of electronic commerce transaction through our proposed scheme.
One of the most important primitives in two-party distrustful cryptography is oblivious transfer, a complete primitive for two-party computation. Recently introduced, the oblivious transfer capacity of a noisy channel measures an efficiency of information theoretical reductions from 1-out-of-k, l-string oblivious transfer to noisy channels. It is defined as the maximal achievable ratio l/n, where l is the length of the strings which are to be transferred and n is the number of times the noisy channel is invoked. This quantity is unknown in a general case. For discrete memoryless channels, it is known to be nonnegligible for honest-but-curious players, but the non-zero rates have not ever been proved achievable in the case of malicious players. Here, we show that in the particular case of the erasure channel, more precise answers can be obtained. We compute the OT capacity of the erasure channel for the case of honest-but-curious players and, for the fully malicious players, we give its lower bound.