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Reality as Constrained Actualization: A Philosophical Convergence between Classical and Quantum Physics

David (Daoud) Matta

Published Jul 5, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Classical and quantum physics are standardly contrasted through continuity versus discreteness, determinism versus probability, and definite properties versus measurement-dependent outcomes. This paper argues that beneath these real differences lies a deeper philosophical convergence: both theories rely on mathematical spaces of possibility that must not be confused with reality itself. Classical mechanics describes continuous ranges of possible trajectories, yet actualizes only one constrained path under given causes and conditions. Quantum mechanics describes structured possibilities through states, operators, eigenstates, and eigenvalues, yet these are not realities existing in advance but formal expressions of what may become definite under a physical context of measurement. The paper makes three contributions. First, it develops the concept of constrained actualization as a single modal grammar spanning both theories: reality is neither the free unfolding of all possibilities nor the mere execution of mathematics, but the actualization of what constraints permit. Second, it constructs an eigenvalue bridge from macroscopic to quantum systems: strings, membranes, and engineered structures exhibit constrained eigenmodes, and the decisive difference is that classical eigenmodes reveal the constrained forms of motion, while quantum eigenstates reveal the constrained forms of definite physical answer. Third, it situates the model against Heisenbergian potentia realism, propensity interpretations, dispositionalist metaphysics, and structural realism, showing it to be ontologically more minimal, relational rather than property-based, situational rather than essentialist, and event-preserving, while its compatibility with decoherence and its support from the Kochen–Specker theorem are made explicit. Quantum mechanics, on this account, radicalizes an insight classical mechanics conceals: constraint operates within the very structure of possible outcomes.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.21202162

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International Journal of Philosophy•Jan 1, 2021•0 citations
Classical and quantum physics are standardly contrasted through continuity versus discreteness, determinism versus probability, and definite properties versus measurement-dependent outcomes. This paper argues that beneath these real differences lies a deeper philosophical convergence: both theories rely on mathematical spaces of possibility that must not be confused with reality itself. Classical mechanics describes continuous ranges of possible trajectories, yet actualizes only one constrained path under given causes and conditions. Quantum mechanics describes structured possibilities through states, operators, eigenstates, and eigenvalues, yet these are not realities existing in advance but formal expressions of what may become definite under a physical context of measurement. The paper makes three contributions. First, it develops the concept of constrained actualization as a single modal grammar spanning both theories: reality is neither the free unfolding of all possibilities nor the mere execution of mathematics, but the actualization of what constraints permit. Second, it constructs an eigenvalue bridge from macroscopic to quantum systems: strings, membranes, and engineered structures exhibit constrained eigenmodes, and the decisive difference is that classical eigenmodes reveal the constrained forms of motion, while quantum eigenstates reveal the constrained forms of definite physical answer. Third, it situates the model against Heisenbergian potentia realism, propensity interpretations, dispositionalist metaphysics, and structural realism, showing it to be ontologically more minimal, relational rather than property-based, situational rather than essentialist, and event-preserving, while its compatibility with decoherence and its support from the Kochen–Specker theorem are made explicit. Quantum mechanics, on this account, radicalizes an insight classical mechanics conceals: constraint operates within the very structure of possible outcomes.
The quantum-to-classical transition — the disappearance of quantum superposition, interference, and entanglement at macroscopic scales — is standardly explained through decoherence: environmental entanglement suppresses interference terms, making macroscopic superpositions effectively unobservable. Decoherence is mathematically rigorous and empirically well-confirmed, but it faces a persistent philosophical limitation: it explains the appearance of classicality without fully accounting for its ontology. The measurement problem survives decoherence because decoherence does not explain why quantum systems produce definite outcomes, why the pointer basis is selected, or what it means for a macroscopic object to have a determinate state rather than merely appearing to have one. This paper argues that Constraint Theory (CT) — the thesis, established by transcendental argument, that constraint is the ontological primitive constitutive of determinate existence as such — provides the ontological grounding that decoherence theory presupposes but does not supply. On the CT account, quantum superposition is open constraint configuration: the genuine ontological openness of a possibility space that has not been closed by the system’s constraint profile or its environmental interactions. Macroscopic determinacy is closed constraint configuration: the progressive closure of macroscopic possibility spaces by the cumulative propagation of environmental constraint into the system’s profile at a rate that overwhelms quantum coherence. Decoherence is the process by which environmental constraint propagation closes possibility spaces; CT explains why this closure has the ontological consequences it does rather than merely the epistemic consequences that the standard account describes. The pointer basis selection problem receives a principled CT resolution: the pointer basis is the constraint-stable basis, the set of states whose constraint pro files are robust under the specific pattern of environmental constraint propagation. The measurement problem is reframed as the question of which branch of an open constraint configuration is closed by a measurement interaction, a question that CT narrows to its irreducible residual without dissolving prematurely. The mesoscopic regime — where quantum behaviour persists at scales larger than individual particles — is explained as the regime of partial constraint closure: systems whose environmental coupling is sufficient to close some but not all dimensions of their possibility space. The paper engages the principal interpretations of quantum mechanics and the philosophical literature on decoherence, situating the CT account as an ontological foundation compatible with multiple interpretive positions.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
Quantum mechanics is empirically extraordinarily successful yet continues to admit a wide range of competing interpretations. While the formalism constrains probabilistic relations between preparation procedures, measurements, and outcomes, it does not uniquely determine the ontology that realises those relations. Interpretations such as Everettian quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse theories, relational quantum mechanics, and QBist approaches preserve the predictive structure of the theory while diverging sharply in their metaphysical commitments. At the same time, developments within quantum theory itself weaken the classical ontology of independently existing objects with intrinsic properties. Entanglement, violations of Bell inequalities, and decoherence theory collectively support the view that physical description is fundamentally relational. Structural realism therefore provides a natural interpretive framework, treating the mathematical structure of physical theory as ontologically primary. However, structural realism alone leaves open the question of instantiation: how relational organisation becomes concrete as a determinate world.This paper develops Experiential Structural Ontology (ESO) as a non-interventionist interpretation of quantum mechanics that addresses this problem. ESO retains the relational ontology suggested by quantum theory while proposing that relational constraint organisation is enacted as manifestation within a fundamental experiential field. On this interpretation, the wavefunction represents relational constraint architecture governing transitions within this field, measurement corresponds to the stabilisation of particular regimes within that structure, and decoherence explains the emergence of classical stability without invoking collapse dynamics or ontological branching.
I begin by examining the question of the quantum limits of knowledge by briefly presenting the constraints of the theory that derive from its mathematical structure (in particular the no-go theorems formulated by von Neumann and Kochen and Specker). I then argue that these theorems reflect on a formal level those practical and experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems. In particular, I discuss some aspects of this relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. Both interpretations are based on the widely shared fact fact that quantum mechanics does not describe previously definite quantities. In the final part I show that, as a consequence of a relationist and perspectival approach to quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the universe regarded as an isolated system cannot be known in principle, so that the universe must be described “from within” by dividing it into two arbitrary parts. This is in fact the only way in which the two systems can exchange information by being physically correlated.
I begin by examining the question of the quantum limits of knowledge by briefly presenting the constraints of the theory that derive from its mathematical structure (in particular the no-go theorems formulated by von Neumann and Kochen and Specker). I then argue that these theorems reflect on a formal level those practical and experimental settings that are needed to come to know the properties of physical systems. In particular, I discuss some aspects of this relationist and contextualist conception of reality by comparing, in their apparent diversity, Bohr’s holistic and Rovelli’s relationist interpretation of the formalism, that deep down share a unifying metaphysics of dispositions and propensities. Both interpretations are based on the widely shared fact that quantum mechanics does not describe previously definite quantities. In the final part I show that, as a consequence of a relationist and perspectival approach to quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the universe regarded as an isolated system cannot be known in principle, so that the universe must be described “from within” by dividing it into two "parts". This is in fact the only way in which any two systems can exchange information by being physically correlated.
I suggest a contextual realist interpretation of Carlo Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics. The principal point is a correct understanding of the concept of reality and taking into account the categorical distinction between the ideal and the real. Within my interpretation, consciousness of the observer does not play any metaphysical role. The proposed approach can also be understood as a return to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, corrected within the framework of contextual realism. The contextual realism allows one to get rid of the metaphysical problems encountered by various interpretations of quantum mechanics, including the relational one. A wave function neither literally reflects an “exterior reality”, nor is it merely a predictive mathematical tool. In particular, an entangled wave function can be viewed as the formal cause of quantum correlations whose reality is contextual. The reduction of a wave function is not a real physical process. And there are no autonomous quantum events which would be different from the facts of their representation. The quantum measurement problem results from a confusion between the categories of the ideal and the real. It is dissolved logically. The quantum theory plays the role of a Wittgensteinian rule (norm), “measuring” physical reality within a language game of its application.