Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate heterogeneous hardware and software components across multi-layered architectures, enabling real-time interaction between computational elements and physical environments. The rapid evolution of quantum computing introduces a paradigm shift in the threat landscape for CPS security, as quantum algorithms — particularly Shor's algorithm — threaten to compromise widely deployed public-key cryptographic schemes such as RSA and ECC. This paper provides a structured analysis of quantum-induced threats to CPS and evaluates candidate mitigation frameworks, including Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). We present a taxonomy of attack scenarios organised by CPS layer, a comparative analysis of quantum-resilient defence models, and a conceptual risk-projection model illustrating how cryptographic breach probabilities may evolve as quantum hardware matures between 2025 and 2050. NOTE: All tabular data in this paper are based on conceptual simulations derived from theoretical models and existing literature; they are intended as illustrative benchmarks rather than empirically validated results. Our findings indicate that migration toward hybrid PQC architectures, combined with hardware-level security measures and regulatory modernisation, is the most pragmatic near-term strategy for CPS operators facing the quantum transition.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate heterogeneous hardware and software components across multi-layered architectures, enabling real-time interaction between computational elements and physical environments. The rapid evolution of quantum computing introduces a paradigm shift in the threat landscape for CPS security, as quantum algorithms — particularly Shor's algorithm — threaten to compromise widely deployed public-key cryptographic schemes such as RSA and ECC. This paper provides a structured analysis of quantum-induced threats to CPS and evaluates candidate mitigation frameworks, including Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). We present a taxonomy of attack scenarios organised by CPS layer, a comparative analysis of quantum-resilient defence models, and a conceptual risk-projection model illustrating how cryptographic breach probabilities may evolve as quantum hardware matures between 2025 and 2050. NOTE: All tabular data in this paper are based on conceptual simulations derived from theoretical models and existing literature; they are intended as illustrative benchmarks rather than empirically validated results. Our findings indicate that migration toward hybrid PQC architectures, combined with hardware-level security measures and regulatory modernisation, is the most pragmatic near-term strategy for CPS operators facing the quantum transition.
Quantum computing is the future of computing with promised radical increase in processing capability; however, it is a threat the existing cybersecurity paradigm. Classical encryption techniques especially the ones based on public-key cryptography are insecure against quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm where typical cryptographic schemes the use of which was exemplified by the RSA and ECC will be threatened. While torrents of research have been accomplished in building and developing quantum computers, the importance of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) becomes more felt. This paper attempts to look at the threats that quantum technologies pose to current cryptographic methods and the countermeasures that are being worked on to counter them. We do so to evaluate the current status on quantum computing and its ramifications to data security, as well as the work that academic and government institutions and business enterprises have done on coming with Quantum-Resistant Cryptography. In addition, the paper gives an overview of the most promising post-quantum cryptographic techniques including lattice cryptography, hash-based signatures, and code-based cryptosystems and cryptographic protocols that are under consideration as the next generation cryptographic protocols. It also tackles the problems related to the migration to the post-quantum cryptographic systems the problem of standardisation the problem of compatibility, and the problem of growth of new algorithms. Moreover, prescriptive advice on the concept of quantum readiness and timely implementation of cyber defence plans to safeguard sensitive data and crucial infrastructure against quantum risks is provided. Finally, the paper offers suggestions for the organisations for starting to transition to the post-quantum landscape in terms of using hybrid cryptographic systems and promoting cooperation in the fight against the threats of quantum technology world-wide.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing presents both unprecedented opportunities and significant threats to modern cybersecurity. As quantum processors progress toward practical large-scale deployment, widely used cryptographic systems, particularly RSA, ECC, and other public-key mechanisms, face the risk of becoming obsolete. This review examines how quantum technologies can be strategically leveraged to enhance cybersecurity while simultaneously addressing the vulnerabilities introduced by quantum-enabled attacks. A systematic analysis of 35-40 peer-reviewed studies was conducted to evaluate developments in post-quantum cryptography, quantum-resistant security protocols, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), and hybrid classical–quantum defense architectures. The findings reveal a rapidly evolving research landscape focused on resilient lattice-based cryptography, scalable quantum-safe communication frameworks, and early-stage quantum machine learning applications for intrusion detection. The review highlights both the promise and current limitations of quantum-driven security solutions, including hardware constraints, integration challenges, and the need for global standardization. The study underscores the urgency for governments, industries, and researchers to adopt quantum-ready cybersecurity strategies and accelerate the transition to quantum-resilient infrastructures.
Abstract Background The emergence of quantum computing poses unprecedented threats to current cryptographic systems, potentially rendering RSA, ECC, and other widely-deployed algorithms vulnerable to exponential-time attacks. Objective This study provides a comprehensive analysis of quantum threats to cryptography through systematic review of 67 recent publications (2018–2025), identifying vulnerabilities, evaluating countermeasures, and proposing novel hybrid security frameworks with validated economic models. Methods We conducted a systematic literature review using PRISMA-ScR guidelines, analyzed 847 cryptographic implementations across different sectors, developed a quantum threat assessment matrix, and validated our hybrid framework through field deployments in automotive and healthcare sectors. Cross-disciplinary methodologies from quantum physics, AI, and cybersecurity were integrated using context-aware security (CAS) principles. Results Our analysis reveals three critical threat vectors: immediate harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks affecting 67% of surveyed organizations, medium-term RSA/ECC vulnerabilities projected for 2030–2035, and long-term post-quantum transition challenges. We achieved an 800-fold improvement in quantum error correction implementation and demonstrated that our AI-enhanced hybrid cryptographic framework reduces vulnerability exposure by 94% while maintaining 99.4% system uptime. Economic analysis shows 214% greater cost efficiency for SMEs compared to standalone PQC implementations. Conclusions Quantum threats require immediate action despite uncertain timelines. Our proposed AI-enhanced hybrid cryptographic framework, combining post-quantum algorithms with quantum key distribution and FPGA acceleration, provides 99.7% security assurance against projected quantum capabilities through 2040 at 37% below industry average costs.
The convergence of quantum computing and space-based communications presents both significant cybersecurity risks and transformative security opportunities for modern space infrastructure. This chapter examines the impact of quantum technologies on space cybersecurity, focusing on the threats posed to classical cryptographic systems by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's, alongside emerging solutions including quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and quantum-enhanced sensing. A comparative analysis is presented between classical and quantum threats across different orbital environments. The chapter develops a taxonomy of quantum-security mechanisms tailored for space deployment, considering operational constraints such as radiation exposure, communication latency, and size, weight, and power limitations. It further evaluates implementation barriers and proposes a phased adoption roadmap centered on hybrid architectures and crypto-agile systems. A multi-layered defense framework integrating quantum-resistant protocols and adaptive threat detection is proposed to enhance resilience and future-proof space systems against evolving quantum-era cyber threats and operational challenges.
Quantum attacks on cryptographic systems remain hypothetical but are grounded in strong theoretical foundations. The emergence of quantum computing presents a significant challenge to national security, particularly in protecting critical infrastructures such as energy grids, financial systems, and healthcare networks. Quantum algorithms like Shor’s may soon be capable of breaking widely used cryptographic standards (RSA, ECC, AES), rendering current encryption obsolete and exposing essential services to disruption and data breaches. These vulnerabilities could threaten economic stability and public safety on a national scale. This paper analyzes the risks posed by quantum computing to classical cryptographic frameworks and evaluates quantum-resistant alternatives such as lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based cryptography. It assesses their theoretical soundness and suitability for securing national critical infrastructure. The analysis also explores the dangers of delayed implementation, where postponed adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) could expose systems to future quantum-enabled cyberattacks. Additionally, the paper discusses the challenges of integrating PQC into existing systems, including regulatory compliance, interoperability, and operational readiness. Without coordinated strategies and accelerated transition plans, nations risk severe consequences, including financial disruption, healthcare service breakdowns, and energy supply chain failures. Finally, the study highlights the need for international cooperation, policy alignment, and robust testing to ensure the effective deployment of quantum-resistant solutions. Prompt action is essential to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of vital national systems in the face of the advancing quantum threat landscape.
This preprint presents a systematic review of how quantum computing impacts the security of classical cryptography and what mitigation strategies are available. The review synthesises key survey papers, standards reports and transition guidelines on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum-safe security published between 2015 and 2025. First, the paper summarises the impact of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms on widely deployed public-key schemes, symmetric ciphers and hash functions, highlighting in particular the existential break of RSA, Diffie–Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography, and the reduced security margins for symmetric and hash-based constructions. It then examines major quantum-resilient responses, including lattice-, code-, multivariate- and hash-based PQC, quantum key distribution (QKD), hybrid classical–PQC schemes and crypto-agile architectures. Building on Mosca’s x, y, z risk-timing model, the review discusses cross-cutting themes such as harvest-now-decrypt-later threats and sector-specific implications for government and defence, finance and blockchain, healthcare, cloud providers and critical infrastructure. It identifies several research gaps, including the lack of quantitative migration-cost data, limited coverage of small and resource-constrained organisations, and few system-scale evaluations comparing PQC-only, hybrid and QKD-based designs. The paper concludes by arguing that planning and investment in quantum-resilient cryptography need to start now, before migration time and data shelf-life push critical systems into the risky regime.