With the fast advancement in quantum computing, conventional cryptography is facing great challenges, with quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm and Grover’s algorithm threatening to break most widely used cryptosystems and hashing algorithms. Cryptosystems that use public-key cryptography, such as RSA, have proven vulnerable to quantum attacks. This presents a high threat to digital communication, as it can compromise modern communication systems’ confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. On the other hand, modern cryptosystems treat digital signatures and encryption as two separate operations, adopting the sign-then-encrypt method for securing communication, which results in significant computational cost and overhead. This paper proposes a Quantum Signcryption tool to solve these problems, offering a system enhanced by quantum technology and secured against quantum threats. This system combines the functions of encryption and digital signatures into a single process to function as an efficient and secure tool for future quantum communication, with an average end-to-end execution time of 20.615s, consuming 11092 KBs of memory.
With the fast advancement in quantum computing, conventional cryptography is facing great challenges, with quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm and Grover’s algorithm threatening to break most widely used cryptosystems and hashing algorithms. Cryptosystems that use public-key cryptography, such as RSA, have proven vulnerable to quantum attacks. This presents a high threat to digital communication, as it can compromise modern communication systems’ confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. On the other hand, modern cryptosystems treat digital signatures and encryption as two separate operations, adopting the sign-then-encrypt method for securing communication, which results in significant computational cost and overhead. This paper proposes a Quantum Signcryption tool to solve these problems, offering a system enhanced by quantum technology and secured against quantum threats. This system combines the functions of encryption and digital signatures into a single process to function as an efficient and secure tool for future quantum communication, with an average end-to-end execution time of 20.615s, consuming 11092 KBs of memory.
The fact that modern cryptographic systems are susceptible to a significant attack from quantum computing which solves complex mathematical problem exponentially faster than the classical scheme of computers makes the present situation a dangerous one. Legacy encryption methods including RSA, ECC, and AES that are the heart of secure communication are especially susceptible to quantum attacks such as Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. To mitigate this potential threat, this research puts forth state of the art quantum-resistant technologies inclusive of lattice based cryptography and hash based signature solutions. The Lattice-Hash Hybrid method that is proposed, improves security by exploiting the computational intractability of lattice problems and the collision resistance of the hash functions, making it very hard to crack the system using quantum decryption algorithms. In the study, a comparative analysis of the proposed method with traditional lattice-based, hash-based and code-based cryptographic methods is performed. Experimental results suggest that the proposed algorithm features better encryption speed, decreased decryption latency, and increased security level as compared with the current state of the art. The results emphasize the need for the implementation of cutting edge electronic cryptography strategies to protect integrity and confidentiality of data in the days to come within the context of quantum computing. Further research will concentrate on optimizing the proposed techniques further and bringing them to real-world deployment.
With the rise of quantum computing, traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), face potential vulnerabilities. Quantum computers could efficiently solve problems that are currently computationally infeasible for classical computers, thus threatening the security of cryptographic systems. As a result, there is a pressing need to develop quantum- resistant cryptographic algorithms to ensure secure communication in a future where quantum computing is prevalent. ECDSA, widely used for securing digital communications, relies on elliptic curve cryptography to provide robust security through digital signatures. However, the advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to ECDSA's security, as quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm could break the elliptic curve-based encryption by efficiently solving discrete logarithm problems. To address this issue, we propose a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm based on lattice-based cryptography. Our approach utilizes the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, known for its resistance to quantum attacks. We implement the proposed algorithm and compare its performance with ECDSA in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. The algorithm's security is analyzed against quantum attacks using theoretical and empirical methods. The experimental results demonstrate that the quantum-resistant algorithm provides a comparable level of security to ECDSA while offering significant advantages in the context of quantum resistance. Specifically, our quantum-resistant algorithm achieved key generation times of 120 ms, signing times of 150 ms, and verification times of 100 ms. In comparison, ECDSA showed key generation times of 80 ms, signing times of 90 ms, and verification times of 70 ms. Despite these performance trade-offs, the quantum resistance of the proposed algorithm ensures future-proof security for digital communications.
The boom of quantum computing has brought both benefits and threats to cyber-physical systems. The primary purpose of the paper is to highlight the possible threats by quantum computers, and to provide a comparative study of the on-going quantum-resistant post-quantum cryptography suitable for current network infrastructure. Asymmetric key cryptography, mainly the widely adopted RSA and ECC algorithms, has been compromised by quantum algorithms such as the Shor’s algorithm. Moreover, symmetric algorithms such as AES are weakened by brute force attacks using Grover’s algorithm. Thus, researchers are developing public key algorithms based on hard mathematical models that provide resistance against quantum attacks and can be deployed in classical hardware. We categorize the well-known post-quantum schemes based on (1) their security goals: confidentiality and integrity, and (2) their mathematical problems: code-based, lattice-based, super-singular elliptic curve isogeny based, multivariate and hash-based algorithm. Hash-based post- quantum cryptography is further categorized into two: stateless and stateful signature scheme. Furthermore, the chapter compares the algorithms based on the key sizes, ciphertext sizes, signature sizes, computation, and time cost. The paper also presents the challenges faced by the post-quantum algorithms, and it outlines directions for further research to improve the algorithms. Moreover, various cyber-physical fields, including industrial control systems, mainly nuclear power plants, water management plants, and even space stations and their infrastructure, rely on classical cryptography. Thus, the paper presents a generic hybrid cryptosystem based on classical and post-quantum cryptography to enhance resistance against classical and quantum attacks.
Quantum computing represents one of the most disruptive technological advancements of the 21st century, with profound implications for modern cryptographic systems. Traditional digital signature algorithms—such as RSA, DSA, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)—derive their security from mathematical problems like integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers. However, the advent of quantum algorithms, particularly Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, poses a direct threat to these cryptographic assumptions by drastically reducing the time required to solve such problems. This development renders existing Digital Signature infrastructures potentially obsolete once large-scale quantum computers become operational. To counter this threat, researchers have proposed a range of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based signature schemes, which are designed to resist quantum attacks. This paper critically examines the extent of quantum vulnerability in current Digital Signature systems and evaluates the comparative performance, efficiency, and security trade-offs of post-quantum alternatives. The study aims to provide a structured understanding of the ongoing transition toward quantum-resistant digital authentication and to propose a roadmap for secure implementation in future cryptographic environments.
Cryptography, the practice of concealing messages for private exchange, has evolved significantly to address the challenges posed by new communication methods. In today`s digital world, cryptography has become the cornerstone of cybersecurity, using advanced mathematics like number theory and computational complexity to protect digital information through algorithms. The upcoming arrival of quantum computers poses a serious threat to traditional cryptographic methods, especially those based on asymmetric key cryptography. Quantum Safe Cryptography (QSC) represents the next step in information security, designed to develop cryptographic systems that can withstand attacks from both quantum and classical computers. As quantum computing moves from theory to reality, it`s becoming clear that current cryptographic methods based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor`s algorithm. This study highlights the security risks that quantum computing poses to existing encryption methods and proposes a comprehensive approach to quantum-safe cryptography. The transition to quantum-resistant algorithms involves replacing vulnerable cryptographic systems with alternatives that can resist quantum computational attacks. Current analysis shows that while asymmetric key cryptography faces immediate vulnerability, symmetric key algorithms and hash functions remain relatively secure in the near term with appropriate adjustments. Quantum cryptography, which directly uses quantum mechanical principles, offers highly secure encryption mechanisms, notably Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). This research aims to enhance the security of digital infrastructure against quantum threats by evaluating hybrid cryptographic implementations that combine classical and quantum-resistant approaches for optimal security.
The advent of quantum computing presents a paradigm shift in the field of cryptanalysis, challenging the security of classical encryption schemes that underpin modern digital communications. This study explores the capabilities of quantum algorithms, particularly Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm, in undermining widely used cryptographic systems. Shor's algorithm poses a direct threat to publickey cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC by enabling efficient integer factorization and discrete logarithm computation, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers. Meanwhile, Grover's algorithm provides a quadratic speedup for bruteforce attacks on symmetric-key cryptosystems like AES, significantly reducing their effective security. Through theoretical analysis and simulation-based evaluation, this paper highlights the vulnerabilities of classical encryption in the face of quantum advances and underscores the urgent need for post-quantum cryptographic solutions. The findings emphasize the critical importance of transitioning to quantum-resistant algorithms to ensure long-term data confidentiality in a future dominated by quantum technologies.